MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

ROBERT B. JONES, JR., Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the court on the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings [DE-16, -19] pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Claimant Kelly M. Ramsey ("Claimant") filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of the denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") payments. Claimant filed a response to Defendant's motion, [DE-22], and the pending motions are ripe for adjudication. Having carefully reviewed the administrative record and the motions and memoranda submitted by the parties, it is recommended that Claimant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings be denied, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings be allowed, and the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Claimant protectively filed an application for SSI on February 2, 2013, alleging disability beginning September 1, 2012. (R. 259-64). The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (R. 18-105, 142-50, 154-63). A hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") was held on September 14, 2015, at which Claimant, represented by counsel, and a vocational expert ("VE") appeared and testified. (R. 39-54). On October 7, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision denying Claimant's request for benefits. (R. 12-37). Claimant then requested 'a review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council, (R. 8-11), and after incorporating additional evidence into the record, the Appeals Council denied Claimant's request for review, (R. 1-5).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The scope of judicial review of a final agency decision regarding disability benefits under the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's factual findings and whether the decision was reached through the application of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). "The findings of the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion." Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). While substantial evidence is not a "large or considerable amount of evidence," Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988), it is "more than a mere scintilla . . . and somewhat less than a preponderance." Laws, 368 F.2d at 642. "In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the court should not] undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]." Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996), superseded by regulation on other grounds, 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)). Rather, in conducting the "substantial evidence" inquiry, the court's review is limited to whether the ALJ analyzed the relevant evidence and sufficiently explained his or her findings and rationale in crediting the evidence. Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 439-40 (4th Cir. 1997).

III. DISABILITY EVALUATION PROCESS

The disability determination is based on a five-step sequential evaluation process as set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 under which the ALJ is to evaluate a claim:

Albright v. Comm'r of the SSA, 174 F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). "If an applicant's claim fails at any step of the process, the ALJ need not advance to the subsequent steps." Pass v. Chater., 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The burden of proof and production during the first four steps of the inquiry rests on the claimant. Id. At the fifth step, the burden shifts to the ALJ to show that other work exists in the national economy which the claimant can perform. Id.

When assessing the severity of mental impairments, the ALJ must do so in accordance with the "special technique" described in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(b)-(c). This regulatory scheme identifies four broad functional areas in which the ALJ rates the degree of functional limitation resulting from a claimant's mental impairment(s): activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence or pace; and episodes of decompensation. Id. § 416.920a(c)(3). The ALJ is required to incorporate into his written decision pertinent findings and conclusions based on the "special technique." Id. § 416.920a(e)(3).

In this case, Claimant alleges the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate her impairments under Listing 12.05C for intellectual disability. Pl.'s Mem. [DE-17] at 1.

IV. ALJ'S FINDINGS

Applying the above-described sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Claimant "not disabled" as defined in the Act. At step one, the ALJ found Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful employment since the application date. (R. 17). Next, the ALJ determined Claimant had the following severe impairments: asthma, affective disorder, anxiety disorder, borderline intelligence disorder, and substance abuse disorder. Id. At step three, the ALJ concluded Claimant's impairments were not severe enough, either individually or in combination, to meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 17-19). Applying the technique prescribed by the regulations, the ALJ found that Claimant's mental impairments had resulted in mild restriction in her activities of daily living, and moderate difficulties in social functioning and maintenance of concentration, persistence, or pace, with no episodes of decompensation of extended duration. (R. 18). Prior to proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed Claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), finding that Claimant had the ability to perform light work1 with the following restrictions: "[S]he must avoid concentrated exposure to irritants such as fumes, odors, dust, and gases; and she is limited to simple[,] routine[,] repetitive tasks with only occasional interaction with the public." (R. 19-27). In making this assessment, the ALJ found Claimant's statements about the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely credible. (R. 20). At step four, the ALJ concluded Claimant had no past relevant work. (R. 27). At step five, upon considering Claimant's age, education, work experience and RFC, the ALJ determined there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Claimant can perform. (R. 27-28).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Listing 12.05C

Claimant contends that the ALJ erred in determining Claimant did not meet Listing 12.05C. Pl.'s Mem. [DE-17] at 7-32. Claimant bears the burden of demonstrating that her impairments meet or equal a listed impairment. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146, n.5 (1987); Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981). At the time of the ALJ's decision,2 a claimant met the requirements of Listing 12.05 by first satisfying the introductory description for intellectual disability. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 12.00A. Specifically, the claimant must have demonstrated: (1) significant subaverage general intellectual functioning; (2) deficits in adaptive functioning; and (3) onset before the age of twenty-two. Id. § 12.05. Upon satisfaction of the diagnostic description, the claimant must have also met the required severity level of this disorder, which was accomplished by satisfying any one of four categories labeled (A)-(D). Id. In this case, Claimant contends she satisfies the intellectual disability listing under paragraph C, which required: (1) a valid verbal, performance or full-scale IQ of 60 through 70; and (2) another impairment, physical or mental, imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function. Id § 12.05C. With respect to paragraph C, the ALJ stated the following:

(R. 18-19). Plaintiff contends she met each of the requirements, and in turn, the ALJ's contrary findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Pl.'s Mem. [DE-17] at 9-32.

The Commissioner effectively concedes that Claimant meets the final prong of the paragraph C criteria, stating, "[T]he ALJ necessarily found that she established the third prong of Listing 12.05C when he found that she had other severe impairments." Def.'s Mem. [DE-20] at 14. Accordingly, while the first and second prongs are in dispute, the court finds the ALJ's determination with respect to the second prong to be dispositive. The record contains three separate sets of IQ scores. First, on August 13, 2009, Claimant obtained a verbal IQ score of 66, a performance IQ of 63, and a full-scale IQ of 62 on the WAIS-III test administered by Joan Marshall, MS. (R. 601). Second, on September 9, 2009, Claimant obtained a verbal IQ score of 71, a performance IQ of 76, and a full-scale IQ of 71 on the WAIS-III test administered by Len Lecci, Ph.D. (R. 637). Lastly, on May 1, 2013, Claimant obtained a full-scale IQ of 55 on the WAIS-IV test administered by Ashley T. Weeks, MA. (R. 795). However, in Ms. Weeks' report, she stated that Claimant "did not appear to be putting forth adequate effort during this evaluation," "she skipped, a lot of items," "did not fully participate," and "became easily frustrated when items became difficult for her." (R. 796). Further, she stated that the full-scale IQ score of 71 from 2009 "is probably a more accurate representation of [Claimant's] functioning." Id. The ALJ discussed each of these three IQ scores, (R. 21, 22, 24), and then stated the following:

(R. 27). The ALJ expressly gave significant weight to the IQ score of 71, expressly discounted the two lower scores, and provided reasons for favoring the IQ score of 71 over the two lower scores. Id. Specifically, the ALJ concluded that Claimant's school records, her ability to obtain a driver's license, her ability to recount reasons for why she should be disabled, and her continued substance abuse contradicted the lower IQ scores. Id. Claimant contends that the ALJ erred by failing to explain, "except in the most general way," how this evidence conflicted with the lower IQ scores. Pl.'s Mem. [DE-17] at 29. The Commissioner contends that the ALJ provided specific reasons to discount the lower scores, and thus properly exercised his discretion. Def.'s Mem. [DE-20] at 13.

In addition to listing the reasons outlined above, the ALJ also expanded upon those reasons elsewhere in his decision. Claimant argues that her school records demonstrate that she is disabled, citing a cumulative GPA of 0.833 when she left school in the ninth grade, her scores in the 9th percentile for reading and 12th percentile for math when she was in the eighth grade, and the fact that she was "in special classes in math, reading, and speech therapy." Pl.'s Mem. [DE-17] at 10-11. Further, Claimant cites Ms. Marshall's report, which stated Claimant was "in special education all of her academic life," "does not know how to read beyond a few simple words," "does not know how to write her own name," "was unable to read many of the comprehension questions," and "does not know fractions, decimals, or multiplication tables." Id. at 11. However, the ALJ cited Claimant's school records, stating that Claimant repeated the first grade because "she was absent 39 times," and she was required to attend summer school after eighth grade because "she was absent 36 times." (R. 26). Otherwise, "[t]he claimant's school records do not indicate that the claimant was in special education classes, with the exception of being in remedial reading classes in the ninth grade." Id. Accordingly, it is clear to the court that the ALJ addressed Claimant's school records, and therefore Claimant's argument is confined to an invitation for the court to conduct an improper reweighing of the evidence. See Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (citing Craig, 76 F.3d at 589) (finding that it is not within the province of the court to reweigh the evidence, even if the court might reach a different result, where the ALJ has considered and analyzed all the relevant evidence and her decision is supported by substantial evidence, as is the case here).

With respect to Claimant's ability to obtain a driver's license, the ALJ relied upon the opinion of Ashley Weeks, M.A., who stated her assessment of Claimant's full-scale IQ score of 55 was not consistent with Claimant's history of obtaining a driver's license. (R. 24 (citing R. 796)). Claimant cites Elmore v. Colvin, to support the proposition that the ability to obtain a driver's license does not refute evidence of deficits in adaptive functioning in school records and in the record as a whole. Pl.'s Mem. [DE-17] at 10 (citing No. 1:14-4144-RMG, 2015 WL 5178458, at *17 (D.S.C. Sept. 4, 2015)). However, in that case, the ALJ herself did not cite the claimant's ability to obtain a driver's license as evidence, but rather the Commissioner cited it in her brief to further support the ALJ's conclusions. This case is easily distinguishable where, here, the consultative examiner who assessed the full-scale IQ score of 55 provided, in her own report, that the full-scale IQ score of 71 from 2009 "is probably a more accurate representation of her functioning," and that Claimant's ability to obtain a driver's license "is not consistent with having a full-scale IQ score of 55." (R. 796).

During his recitation of Claimant's medical history, the ALJ cited multiple occasions where Claimant's substance abuse was diagnosed or noted in the record. From June 27, 2007, through July 11, 2007, Claimant underwent inpatient alcohol abuse rehabilitation. (R. 20). Treatment notes from November 8, 2007, indicate Claimant "had attended, relapsed, attended, relapsed, gone to [rehabilitation], and tried to use someone else's urine to fool the staff during drug screening." Id. On August 12, 2008, Claimant's hospital admission drug screen tested positive for THC. Id. On May 22, 2009, Claimant presented to East Coast Solutions for a psychosocial assessment and was diagnosed with cannabis and alcohol dependence. (R. 21). On February 9, 2011, Claimant presented to Circle of Courage Support Services for a comprehensive clinical assessment, where she was diagnosed with poly-substance dependence in early partial remission. (R. 23). In a letter dated June 28, 2011, Jade Knutson, MA, NCC, LCAS, of New Visions stated that Claimant was enrolled in treatment from March 29, 2006, through November 8, 2007, and again from May 22, 2009, through October 22, 2010, with final diagnoses including alcohol and cannabis dependence. Id. Claimant tested positive for THC and benzodiazepines during a July 1, 2011 emergency room drug screen, and again tested positive for THC during a February 20, 2012 emergency room drug screen. Id. During a primary care visit at Black River Health Services on August 1, 2012, Claimant reported a history of alcohol abuse, but stated that she had not consumed alcohol in six months. Id. A December 1, 2013 emergency room drug screen was positive for THC, opiates, oxycodone, and methadone. (R. 25). Claimant was subsequently referred to Jeremy Mullis, LCAS, a substance abuse counselor, who noted that the NC controlled substance database did not indicate any prescribed medications in the past six months to explain Claimant's positive drug screen, and that Claimant reported "frequent THC use" to Mr. Mullis. (R. 26). Mr. Mullis diagnosed Claimant with opiate use disorder, severe on methadone maintenance and THC use disorder, severe. Id.

Most notably, Dr. Lecci, whose September 9, 2009 assessment of Claimant's full-scale IQ of 71 the ALJ adopted, diagnosed Claimant with alcohol abuse, sustained full remission; marijuana abuse, in early partial remission, and opined that "the claimapt's prognosis was largely predicated on her ability to stay drug and alcohol free." (R. 22). The ALJ discussed Dr. Lecci's assessment of Claimant, stating that, "the claimant did not appear to fully appreciate how her substance abuse might adversely impact parenting," "it was unclear if this was due to cognitive limitations, a naive view of substance abuse, or if it was a more intentional under-reporting/minimization," and that claimant "denied that drug or alcohol use had ever undermined her parenting and even minimized her use while in the role of parent." (R. 22), cf. Williams v. Colvin, No. 5:12-CV-676-D, 2013 WL 6058204 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 15, 2013) (finding that the ALJ's conclusion that substance abuse contributed to the claimant's cognitive decline when no doctor, consulting psychologist, or other medical professional expressed such an opinion was reversible error). Lastly, with respect to Claimant's history of substance abuse, the ALJ stated, "[t]he lack of medical evidence from December 2013 through the date of this decision, a period of time when it appears the claimant's substance abuse accelerated, along with her reported opiate abuse in the absence of a condition necessitating chronic pain management, does not bolster the claimant's disability claim." (R. 26).

Claimant also argues that the ALJ erred by not expressly discussing "practice effects," which refer to gains in scores on cognitive tests that occur when a person is retested on the same or similar instrument within a short period of time. Pl.'s Mem. [DE-17] at 25. Claimant argues that, because Dr. Lecci's test was performed within a month of Joan Marshall's test, the IQ score of 71 is inflated, and therefore the ALJ should not have adopted it. Id. The ALJ did not discuss practice effects in his decision. However, while Dr. Lecci acknowledged that the short turnaround "could result in some learning/practice effects and higher scores," he concluded that "based on the resultant scores, an inflated performance is unlikely as the scores were universally low." (R. 637). Accordingly, any error here is harmless because there is no indication in the record that practice effects resulted in an inflated score in this case.

"[A]n ALJ has the discretion to assess the validity of an IQ test result." Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 474 (4th Cir. 2012). More particularly, an ALJ may "reject [IQ] scores if they are inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record such as conflicting professional opinions or other record evidence indicating that the claimant is historically higher achieving or has more advanced functional capacities than would be expected from someone with a below-average [IQ]." Moore v. Colvin, 2016 WL 3211470, at *7 (E.D.N.C. May 4, 2016) (quoting Maybank v. Astrue, No. C/A 4:08-0643-MBS, 2009 WL 2855461, at *11 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2009)); see also Powell v. Barnhart, No. 6:04-CV-63, 2005 WL 1926613, at *4 (W.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2005) (holding that if an IQ score is "inconsistent with the remainder of evidence in the record on the claimant's daily activities and behavior, it need not be conclusive proof of mental retardation"). Claimant's argument is not that the ALJ failed to provide evidence to support his decision to discount the lower two scores, but rather that there is other evidence to rebuke his decision to discount the lower two scores. The ALJ considered Claimant's testimony, medical records, and three sets of IQ scores, and adopted the full-scale IQ score of 71 for reasons he articulated and explained. The evidence the ALJ cited is sufficient to support his determination that Claimant's valid IQ score is 71, and it is not the province of the court to reweigh the evidence where the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Hancock, 667 F.3d at 474 (finding that the ALJ has the discretion to assess the validity of an IQ test result). Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in determining that the full-scale IQ score of 71 was the valid score for purposes of analyzing Listing 12.05C.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, it is RECOMMENDED that Claimant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE-16] be DENIED, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE-19] be ALLOWED, and the final decision of the Commissioner be affirmed.

IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on each of the parties or, if represented, their counsel. Each party shall have until April 11, 2018 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D.N.C. Any response to objections shall be filed within 14 days of the filing of the objections.

If a party does not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, the party will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, the party's failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar the party from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).