JOI ELIZABETH PEAKE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Chanin Frances Pickens ("Plaintiff") brought this action pursuant to Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), as amended (42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3)), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claims for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under, respectively, Titles II and XVI of the Act. The parties have filed cross-motions for judgment, and the administrative record has been certified to the Court for review.
Plaintiff protectively filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income Benefits on September 23, 2013, alleging a disability onset date of January 15, 2013 in both applications. (Tr. at 30, 245-58.)
Federal law "authorizes judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of social security benefits."
"Substantial evidence means `such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'"
"In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court should not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ]."
In undertaking this limited review, the Court notes that "[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving a disability."
"The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate disability claims."
A finding adverse to the claimant at any of several points in this five-step sequence forecloses a disability designation and ends the inquiry. For example, "[t]he first step determines whether the claimant is engaged in `substantial gainful activity.' If the claimant is working, benefits are denied. The second step determines if the claimant is `severely' disabled. If not, benefits are denied."
On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at the first two steps, and if the claimant's impairment meets or equals a "listed impairment" at step three, "the claimant is disabled."
In the present case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in "substantial gainful activity" since January 15, 2013, her alleged onset date. The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff met her burden at step one of the sequential evaluation process. (Tr. at 32.) At step two, the ALJ further determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:
(Tr. at 33.) The ALJ found at step three that none of these impairments, individually or in combination, met or equaled a disability listing. (Tr. at 35-38.) Therefore, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's RFC and determined that she could perform light work with myriad further limitations. Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
(Tr. at 38.) Based on this determination, the ALJ found under step four of the analysis that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a hotel cleaner. (Tr. at 43.) The ALJ also made an alternative finding at step five that, given Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of the vocational expert as to these factors, she could perform other jobs available in the national economy. (Tr. at 44-45.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (Tr. at 45.)
Plaintiff now raises three challenges to the ALJ's decision. (Pl.'s Br. [Doc. #14] at 5.) Substantively, she contends that the ALJ failed "to provide a logical bridge between the evidence and her conclusions regarding [Plaintiff's] RFC." Plaintiff also raises two procedural challenges, arguing that (1) Defendant improperly asserted the affirmative defense of res judicata, and that (2) "the ALJ's appointment did not comply with the Appointments Clause." (
Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ failed to conduct a proper function-by-function analysis of Plaintiff's impairments. In particular, she argues that the ALJ's decision lacks a "logical bridge" linking the evidence with the ultimate RFC findings regarding Plaintiff's PTSD, anxiety, and hearing loss. As SSR 96-8p instructs, "[t]he RFC assessment must first identify the individual's functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis," including the functions listed in the regulations. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1. "Only after such a function-by-function analysis may an ALJ express RFC in terms of the exertional levels of work."
In the present case, the Court finds that the ALJ erred in evaluating the effects of Plaintiff's hearing loss. As the ALJ notes in her decision, the results of Plaintiff's hearing test in 2014 showed "severe to profound bilateral mixed hearing loss," with severe hearing loss in her left ear and profound hearing loss in her right. (Tr. at 34, 442, 445.) Her treating providers noted that "ossiculoplasty would not improve her hearing much considering her degree of sensorineural loss." (Tr. at 446.) Plaintiff also reported intermittent balance problems, including frequent stumbling and dizziness, bilateral tinnitus, and frequent ear infections. (Tr. at 34.) The ALJ included hearing loss among Plaintiff's severe impairments at step two and categorized the related impairments of tinnitus and ear infections as non-severe. (Tr. at 33-34.) At step three of the sequential analysis, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's hearing loss did not meet or equal the relevant listed impairment, namely Listing 2.10 (Tr. at 36), and when later assessing Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ included the following hearing-related limitation: "[Plaintiff] requires a work environment in which there is low background noise to the extent communications is required with others" (Tr. at 38).
Notably, in making her RFC assessment, the ALJ found that "the medical evidence is generally supportive of [Plaintiff's] testimony" with regard to her bilateral hearing loss. (Tr. at 41.) The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with profound mixed hearing loss, and even with her hearing aid, Plaintiff was found to have only 25% hearing in her left ear — the better of the two. (Tr. at 41.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff's psychiatrist, Dr. Molly Froelich, noted that Plaintiff "appeared to understand speech and interact with me in an appropriate way" (Tr. at 41, 578), but Dr. Froelich also found that Plaintiff had anxiety related to her hearing difficulties (Tr. at 40, 578) "because she cannot really hear what is going on around her. She cannot tell if someone might be coming to her home or someone is behind her or other things, and she feels very scared when she is alone at night" (Tr. at 578). At the hearing, Plaintiff also testified that she has difficulty discriminating between sounds in a noisy environment and that her hearing aid does not help with this. (Tr. at 65-66.) She further stated that, in prior jobs, she had difficulty focusing on tasks when someone was speaking to her, because she needed to look directly at the speaker in order to understand. (Tr. at 66-67.) Plaintiff reported that her most recent employers addressed this problem by taking her to a quiet environment to give her instructions so that she would understand them. (Tr. at 74.)
The ALJ attempted to address Plaintiff's hearing impairment by limiting her to "a work environment in which there is low background noise to the extent communications is required with others." (Tr. at 38.) Plaintiff, however, argues that she "would need to have a direct line of [sight] to anyone speaking to her in the workplace, might need repeated statements[,] and would require a quiet work environment." (Pl.'s Br. at 17.) Plaintiff specifically testified that "I have to look straight at somebody to be able to talk to them" in order to read their lips, and explained that she needed to be able to stop other work and focus on listening if someone was trying to speak to her. (Tr. at 65, 66.) The ALJ noted this testimony and found that the medical evidence regarding her bilateral hearing loss was "generally supportive of [Plaintiff's] testimony." (Tr. at 39, 41.)
Moreover, the Court further finds that all of the jobs identified at steps four and five of the sequential analysis appear to include conflicting limitations which were not addressed by the vocational expert or the ALJ. As correctly noted by Plaintiff, both of Plaintiff's past relevant jobs as generally performed, as well as all three jobs identified at step five, involve at least a "Level 3 — Moderate" noise level, which appears to be greater than the "low background noise" set out in the RFC, and is also greater than the "quiet work environment" and additional limitations reflected by the hearing testimony.
As the Fourth Circuit explained in
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability be REVERSED, and that the matter be REMANDED to the Commissioner under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner should be directed to remand the matter to the ALJ for proceedings consistent with this Recommendation. To this extent, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. #15] should be DENIED, and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #13] should be GRANTED. However, to the extent that Plaintiff's motion seeks an immediate award of benefits, it should be DENIED.
With respect to these contentions, Defendant notes that the ALJ "did not limit Plaintiff to jobs with no ambient noise" (Def.'s Br. [Doc. #16] at 8), and it is certainly true that there was no limitation to a "very quiet" noise level. However, the RFC limitation to "low background noise" appears analogous to a "quiet" rather than "moderate" noise level on this scale, and as noted above, a limitation to a "quiet" noise level is consistent with the hearing testimony, which the ALJ accepted as supported by the medical evidence. To the extent there is ambiguity or inconsistency in these determinations, that is for the ALJ to clarify and resolve, not this Court.