JAMES E. GATES, Magistrate Judge.
In this action, plaintiff Charlie Locklear ("plaintiff" or, in context, "claimant") challenges the final decision of defendant Commissioner of Social Security Andrew Saul ("Commissioner") denying his application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") on the grounds that he is not disabled. The case is before the court on the parties' motions for judgment on the pleadings. D.E. 15, 17. Both filed memoranda in support of their respective motions. D.E. 16, 18. The motions were referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for a memorandum and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). See 13 Aug. 2019 Text Ord. For the reasons set forth below, it will be recommended that the Commissioner's motion be granted, plaintiff's motion be denied, and the Commissioner's final decision be affirmed.
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on 11 February 2016 alleging a disability onset date of 1 July 2014. Transcript of Proceedings ("Tr.") 17. The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and a request for a hearing was timely filed. Tr. 17. On 15 August 2018, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), at which plaintiff, represented by counsel, and a vocational expert testified. Tr. 17; 34-57. The ALJ issued a decision denying plaintiff's claims on 12 October 2018. Tr. 17-29.
Plaintiff timely requested review by the Appeals Council. Tr. 173-76. On 27 November 2018, the Appeals Council denied the request. Tr. 1. At that time, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481.
The Social Security Act ("Act") defines an individual as disabled for purposes of SSI "if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (a)(3)(A); Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995). "An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). The Act defines a physical or mental impairment as "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(D).
The disability regulations under the Act ("Regulations") provide a five-step analysis that the ALJ must follow when determining whether a claimant is disabled:
Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634-35 (4th Cir. 2015) (some bracketing original).
Plaintiff was 39 years old on the application date, 40 years old on the date of the hearing, and 42 years old on the date of issuance of the ALJ's decision. See Tr. 27 ¶ 6. The ALJ found that he has at least a high school education (Tr. 27 ¶ 7) and no past relevant work (Tr. 27 ¶ 5).
Applying the five-step analysis of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4), the ALJ found at step one that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application date of 11 February 2016. Tr. 19 ¶ 1. At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff has the following medically determinable impairments that are severe: rheumatoid arthritis, cervicalgia, and hypertension. Tr. 19 ¶ 2. At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals any of the Listings. Tr. 20 ¶ 3.
The ALJ next determined that plaintiff has the RFC to perform a limited range of work at the light exertional level:
Tr. 21 ¶ 4.
At step four, the ALJ found, as indicated, that plaintiff has no past relevant work. Tr. 27 ¶ 5. At step five, citing the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ found that there are jobs in the national economy existing in significant numbers that plaintiff can perform, including jobs in the occupations of cafeteria attendant (DOT # 311.677-010),
Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner is limited to considering whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the appropriate legal standards were applied. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Unless the court finds that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or that the wrong legal standard was applied, the Commissioner's decision must be upheld. See Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986); Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Perales, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). It is more than a scintilla of evidence, but somewhat less than a preponderance. Id.
The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner as long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). In addition, the court may not make findings of fact, revisit inconsistent evidence, or make determinations of credibility. See Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979). A Commissioner's decision based on substantial evidence must be affirmed, even if the reviewing court would have reached a different conclusion. Blalock, 483 F.2d at 775.
Before a court can determine whether a decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must ascertain whether the Commissioner has considered all relevant evidence and sufficiently explained the weight given to probative evidence. See Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 439-40 (4th Cir. 1997). "Judicial review of an administrative decision is impossible without an adequate explanation of that decision by the administrator." DeLoatche v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1983); see also Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's decision should be reversed and benefits awarded him or, alternatively, that this case should be remanded for a new hearing on the grounds that the ALJ erred in failing to account for the effects of plaintiff's rheumatoid arthritis flare-ups in her RFC determination. The court finds no error.
The ALJ expressly explained that she took plaintiff's rheumatoid arthritis flare-ups into account in determining plaintiff's RFC. She stated:
Tr. 27 ¶ 4.
The ALJ also explained why she did not find the flare-up more limiting than she did. She stated:
Tr. 24 ¶ 4.
In the same vein, the ALJ stated: "The medical evidence indicates that the claimant is more significantly limited during his flare-ups, but that these are rare, and he still retains some functionality when they occur." Tr. 26 ¶ 4.
Thus, in finding plaintiff's rheumatoid flare-ups not to be more limiting than she did, the ALJ cited the rarity of the flare-ups, plaintiff's retention of functionality during flare-ups, his reported ability to live a normal life during flare-ups, and the longitudinal improvement of plaintiff's symptoms generally. These are all proper reasons.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ found that he has flare-ups only when he lacks medication. But the ALJ made no such finding. The only statements by the ALJ that expressly associate the frequency of flare-ups with medication appear to be descriptions of observations by Dr. Watson to the effect that the flare-ups are more frequent if plaintiff is off his medication. See, e.g., Tr. 374 (Ex. 7F/7); 487 (Ex. 10F/5). For example, as previously quoted, the ALJ stated: "Dr. Watson observed that the claimant periodically has flares where his symptoms get worse, particularly when he is unable to obtain his medications." Tr. 24 ¶ 4. Similarly, in giving "little to no weight" to Dr. Watson's 3 July 2017 opinion that plaintiff is disabled (see Tr. 503), the ALJ stated: "Dr. Watson's statement is not supportable by her own observations, both prior to the date of the opinion and after, that the claimant's flare-ups of symptoms and the associated limitations decrease when he takes his medications as prescribed."
Plaintiff also contends that the consultative examination of plaintiff by Peter Morris, M.D. on 28 September 2016 (Tr. 361-67) establishes that plaintiff does not retain the ability to perform light work as the ALJ determined. It is true that Dr. Morris found plaintiff to be more limited than the ALJ found, including with respect to handling, reaching, and fingering (see Tr. 366-67), and that the vocational expert testified that a person with limitations tracking those Dr. Morris found plaintiff to have would not qualify for competitive employment (see Tr. 55-56). But the ALJ properly gave Dr. Morris's opinions "little weight." Tr. 26 ¶ 4. The ALJ stated:
Tr. 26 ¶ 4.
The reasons given by the ALJ are proper reasons for discounting medical opinions. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2)-(6). In addition, the reasons are supported by substantial evidence, including the evidence the ALJ cites. Notably, plaintiff mischaracterizes the ALJ as discounting Dr. Morris's opinions solely on the basis of plaintiff's having a flare-up at the time— which plaintiff does not dispute he was experiencing—and does not directly challenge the other reasons the ALJ gave for her assessment of Dr. Morris's opinions. Thus, Dr. Morris's opinions do not compel the conclusion that plaintiff was more limited than the ALJ determined him to be. Rather, plaintiff's arguments amount to a request to the court to reweigh the evidence, which it may not, of course, properly do.
Plaintiff cites to his statement to Dr. Watson at his 30 October 2017 visit that "that he gets flares nearly any time he does more than 30 minutes of activity" and argues that flare-ups would therefore preclude him from meeting the requirement of up to six hours of walking or standing in an eight-hour workday provided for in the ALJ's RFC determination, which does not include any allowances for absences or time off task due to the flare-ups. Tr. 500; see also Tr. 54 (vocational expert's testimony that a person with plaintiff's RFC would be unemployable if he was off task 25 percent of the workday or absent three or more days per month). As discussed, however, the ALJ did not find the flare-ups as limiting as plaintiff alleges.
In addition, the ALJ found that while plaintiff's "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms," his "statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record." Tr. 22 ¶ 4. Particularly in light of this determination, it is apparent that the ALJ did not credit plaintiff's statement that he experienced flare-ups simply after more than 30 minutes of activity given her determinations that the flare-ups are "infrequent" and "rare" (Tr. 24 ¶ 4; 26 ¶ 4) and that plaintiff engaged in a relatively broad range of activities of daily living activities, including occasionally doing heavy housework, doing smaller outdoor paint projects, washing his children's clothes, and feeding his two dogs (Tr. 25-26 ¶ 4). Plaintiff does not directly challenge the ALJ's assessment of his symptoms, and the court finds the assessment to be proper. See, e.g., Williams v. Berryhill, No. 5:18-CV-394-FL, 2019 WL 5068467, at *4 (E.D.N.C. 21 May 2019) (citing, e.g., Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *2 (25 Oct. 2017) (effective 28 Mar. 2016); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(b), (c)(1); Craig, 76 F. 3d at 594-95), mem. & recomm. adopted, 2019 WL 4567547 (20 Sept. 2019).
For this and the other reasons stated, the court concludes that the ALJ adequately accommodated in her RFC determination the effects of plaintiff's rheumatoid arthritis flare-ups. Plaintiff's challenge to the ALJ's decision accordingly fails.
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner's motion (D.E. 17) for judgment on the pleadings be GRANTED, plaintiff's motion (D.E. 15) for judgment on the pleadings be DENIED, and the Commissioner's final decision be AFFIRMED.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on each of the parties or, if represented, their counsel. Each party shall have until 10 January 2020 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D.N.C.
Any response to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of the objections on the responding party.
