DAVID C. KEESLER, Magistrate Judge.
Angela Shoemake ("Shoemake" or "Plaintiff"), individually, and as parent and guardian of minor child, J.S., filed this action on January 23, 2013. (Document No. 1). Plaintiff contends that J.S. developed a cardiac anomaly as a result of Shoemake's ingestion of Defendant Eli Lilly and Company's ("Defendant") prescription anti-depressant Prozac during her pregnancy with J.S.
On May 7, 2013, the Court entered a "Pretrial Order And Case Management Plan" (Document No. 24). The "...Case Management Plan" was most recently amended on August 21, 2014, setting the following deadlines: discovery completion — January 16, 2015; ADR report — January 27, 2015; motions — February 6, 2015; and trial — May 4, 2015. (Document No. 47).
"Plaintiff's Motion To Rule On 3rd Party Motion To Quash Subpoena And Motion For Protective Order" (Document No. 50) was filed on November 7, 2014. Apparently, Plaintiff is seeking a ruling by this Court on "Patrizia Cavazzoni's Notice Of Motion To Quash Subpoena And Motion For Protective Order" (Document No. 50-3) and "Patrizia Cavazzoni's Memorandum Of Law In Support . . ." (Document No. 50-4), filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District Of New York, on June 26, 2014. "Plaintiff's Motion To Rule..." fails to indicate that the requirement of consultation was satisfied pursuant to Local Rule 7.1 (B).
"Patrizia Cavazzoni's Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion . . ." (Document No. 51) was filed on November 21, 2014. Non-party Patrizia Cavazzoni, M.D. ("Cavazzoni") asserts that "Plaintiff's Motion . . ." (Document No. 50) is not properly before this Court under Fed.R.Civ.P. 45. "Plaintiff's Reply..." was filed on November 28, 2014, and suggests that this matter was properly transferred pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(f).
The pending motion was referred to the undersigned on January 6, 2015, and is fully briefed and ripe for review and disposition.
There is no dispute that Plaintiff served an amended subpoena on Cavazzoni on or about June 20, 2014, commanding her to appear for a deposition on June 27, 2014, in the Southern District of New York.
Following briefing for and against "Patrizia Cavazzoni's Notice Of Motion To Quash Subpoena And Motion For Protective Order" (Document No. 50-3), and after a hearing date of July 29, 2014 was set to consider the motion, the Honorable George B. Daniels issued an Order on July 26, 2014 that stated in full:
(Document No. 50-1, p.2) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff's pending motion, filed
Rule 45 provides in pertinent part that "[w]hen the court where compliance is required did not issue the subpoena, it may transfer a motion under this rule to the issuing court if the person subject to the subpoena consents or if the court finds exceptional circumstances. Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(f). Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, there is no indication in Judge Daniels' Order that he found "exceptional circumstances," intended to transfer the pending motion, or even considered Rule 45(f). (Document No. 50-1, p.2). As shown above, Judge Daniels' Order does not mention: (1) any finding regarding the circumstances, (2) transfer, (3) Rule 45, or (4) jurisdiction. Rather, it appears that Judge Daniels cancelled the hearing on the motion to quash after concluding that "Cavazzoni need not comply with the subpoena." It is unclear what Judge Daniels intended with the language "unless the presiding judge . . . approves," but neither his Order, nor the docket in the S.D.N.Y. or the docket in this Court, show that anything was transferred.
To date, neither party has sought clarification or re-consideration regarding Judge Daniels' "Order" (Document No. 50-1). In fact, this situation only came to this Court's attention more than three months later when Plaintiff filed the pending motion. (Document No. 50).
Under the circumstances, the undersigned is not persuaded that this Court has jurisdiction to rule on "Patrizia Cavazzoni's Notice Of Motion To Quash Subpoena And Motion For Protective Order" (Document No. 50-3) filed in the Southern District of New York, regarding a deposition to be held in New York. Although the undersigned regrets any subsequent inefficiency, or additional burden on the S.D.N.Y., it appears that clarification of that Court's ruling may be necessary.
In the alternative, and what the undersigned strongly encourages, is that the parties reach an agreement as to Dr. Cavazzoni's deposition without further court intervention and delay. Apparently, for a considerable period of time the parties had agreed that Dr. Cavazzoni would participate in a deposition of up to three (3) hours. Rather than spend more energy and resources litigating this discovery dispute, the parties are respectfully encouraged to agree on a deposition of at least three (3) hours (if necessary), but less than seven (7) hours.