MARTIN REIDINGER, District Judge.
The Plaintiff Robert Gambuti filed an application for disability insurance benefits on October 7, 2010, alleging that he had become disabled as of June 1, 2008. [Transcript ("T.") 180-181]. The Plaintiff's application was denied initially. [T. 127]. The Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") which occurred on November 10, 2011. [T. 36-91]. On November 22, 2011, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. [T. 22-35]. On June 17, 2013, the Appeals Council denied the Plaintiff's request for review, thereby making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. [T. 5-10]. The Plaintiff has exhausted all available administrative remedies, and this case is now ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Court's review of a final decision of the Commissioner is limited to (1) whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision,
The Social Security Act provides that "[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Fourth Circuit has defined "substantial evidence" as "more than a scintilla and [doing] more than creat[ing] a suspicion of the existence of a fact to be established. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
The Court may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner, even if it disagrees with the Commissioner's decision, so long as there is substantial evidence in the record to support the final decision below.
In determining whether or not a claimant is disabled, the ALJ follows a five-step sequential process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. If the claimant's case fails at any step, the ALJ does not go any further and benefits are denied.
First, if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the application is denied regardless of the medical condition, age, education, or work experience of the applicant. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Second, the claimant must show a severe impairment. If the claimant does not show any impairment or combination thereof which significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform work activities, then no severe impairment is shown and the claimant is not disabled.
On November 22, 2011, ALJ Gonzalez issued a decision denying the Plaintiff's claim. [T. 22-35]. Proceeding to the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff's date last insured was December 31, 2014 and that he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 28, 2009. [T. 27]. The ALJ then found that the medical evidence established the following severe impairments: status-post partial left knee replacement and lumbar disc bulges. [T. 27]. The ALJ determined that none of Plaintiff's impairments met or equaled a listing. [T. 29].
The ALJ then assessed the Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC), finding that the Plaintiff had the ability to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) "except that he suffers from nonexertional limitations that preclude more than occasional crawling, crouching, stooping and the climbing of stairs or ladders." [T. 29]. The ALJ found that the Plaintiff was capable of performing his past relevant work as a 911 call dispatcher, and that he was not under a disability. [T. 34].
The Plaintiff asserts the following assignments of error: (1) that "[t]he ALJ erred by evaluating and failing to weigh the medical opinion evidence from Dr. Jones, thereby failing to support the residual functional capacity determination by substantial evidence"; (2) that "[t]he ALJ's credibility determination is unsupported by substantial evidence because the ALJ erred in assessing the required factors in determining Plaintiff's credibility"; and (3) that "[t]he ALJ's Step 4 determination is unsupported by substantial evidence." [Doc. 13]. The Court will address each of these assignments of error in turn.
The Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred in failing to evaluate and weigh the opinion of Dr. Jones. [Doc. 13]. Particularly, the Plaintiff argues that proper consideration of Dr. Jones's opinions would have resulted in a more restrictive RFC determination. [Doc. 13 at 11].
An ALJ must evaluate every medical opinion received in the record, regardless of its source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). A "medical opinion" is a "judgment [] about the nature and severity of [the claimant's] impairment(s), including [the claimant's] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant's] physical or mental restrictions." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2). In evaluating the weight of a medical source, the ALJ must consider certain factors including: the examining relationship, the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, the supportability of the medical source, the consistency of the medical source, the specialization of the provider, and any other factors which tend to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1-6).
An ALJ must give controlling weight to the opinion of a claimant's treating physician when the opinion concerns the nature and severity of an impairment, is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Thus, an opinion of a treating physician is not entitled to controlling weight if it is unsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and/or inconsistent with other substantial evidence of record.
Here, the ALJ adequately assessed Dr. Jones's opinions. He noted Dr. Jones's findings, as follows:
[T. 28]. The ALJ then discussed the findings of Dr. Newman and Chiropractor Donohue, and afforded little weight to both of their findings. [T. 28, 32]. The ALJ noted the following regarding Mr. Donohue's opinion:
[T. 32]. Thus, the ALJ relied on the findings of Suraj Malhotra, M.D., findings which were "fairly mild." [
Upon consideration and discussion of the Plaintiff's evidence of record, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff had the RFC "to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except that he suffers from nonexertional limitations that preclude more than occasional crawling, crouching, stooping and the climbing of stairs or ladders." [T. 29]. Although the ALJ did not specifically discuss how he weighed Dr. Jones's opinions and why he failed to include all functional limitations noted by Dr. Jones in the RFC determination, any such error was rendered harmless by the ALJ's consideration and discussion of substantial medical evidence of record in this case. Indeed, the ALJ's RFC determination adopted many of Dr. Jones's findings with respect to the Plaintiff's functional limitations. For example, the ALJ's noted restrictions encompassed Dr. Jones's findings concerning the Plaintiff's ability to squat, bend, and climb stairs and ladders. [T. 405, 409]. The ALJ failed to note restrictions on the Plaintiff's ability to lift, stand, and walk, but he explained why he gave only little weight to Chiropractor Donohue's findings with regard to the same restrictions. [T. 32]. The ALJ noted that Chiropractor Donohue is not a medical doctor and is thus not entitled to treating physician deference. [
Thus, the Plaintiff's first assignment of error is without merit.
The Plaintiff next argues that "[t]he ALJ's credibility determination is unsupported by substantial evidence because the ALJ erred in assessing the required factors in determining Plaintiff's credibility." [Doc. 13].
As previously noted, it is not the task of this Court to make a new credibility determination in this case but rather to assess whether the ALJ followed the proper legal standard in his credibility determination.
The Plaintiff first takes issue with the ALJ's mention that the Plaintiff noted that he had not been prescribed narcotic medication for his back and that he only used such medication for his knee sporadically. [Doc. 13 at 15]. The Plaintiff testified at his hearing that his hydrocodone was only prescribed for his knee pain. [T. 46]. Thus, this argument has no merit.
The Plaintiff next takes issue with the ALJ's note that "the limited use of narcotic medication undermines the [Plaintiff's] statements purporting to a high level of chronic pain." [T. 33]. The Plaintiff argues that he did not want to use too much narcotic medication for fear of addiction, that narcotic medication caused intimacy issues with his wife, and that he could not use pain medication due to gastrointestinal problems. The Plaintiff had testified, however, that he was "self-medicating" himself, as he had "amassed some of the pain medicine during the course of [his] treatment" by "just renew[ing] the prescription and then sav[ing] some." [T. 45]. Thus, this argument is without merit.
Further, the Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly considered the Plaintiff's testimony "that he visited the chiropractor less frequently since the number of chiropractic visits allowed by workman's compensation had been reduced and since he did not want to pay for additional visits out of pocket or through his own health insurance." [T. 33]. The ALJ noted: "It is hard to believe that the same [Plaintiff] who retains the means and resources to continue treatment would fail to do so if he were experiencing the debilitating symptoms reported." [
[Doc. 13 at 16, T. 423]. The Plaintiff testified that he had stopped treating his back as frequently because he "was the only salary paying all the bills." [T. 78]. The Plaintiff also testified, however, that he was "earning a nice salary per month and [had] health insurance" [T. 76] but was not getting more treatment for his back "probably . . . because I feel work should pay for it because I got hurt at work." [T. 77]. Thus, the ALJ did not err in this regard.
Fourth, the Plaintiff argues that "the ALJ discredited Plaintiff's willingness to work on the basis he is still receiving compensation from the police department and Workers' Compensation." [T. 33-34]. The ALJ also noted that the Plaintiff worked as an emergency dispatcher for Orange County during part of the time he alleged disability. [T. 34]. The ALJ did not err in his mention of such facts, as it is the ALJ's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence.
Fifth, the Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly found his testimony regarding his ability to sit and stand as unsupported by the record. [Doc. 13 at 17]. The Plaintiff suggests that the opinions of Chiropractor Donohue, Dr. Jones, and Dr. Mazella highly support his testimony in this regard. [
Finally, the Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that the Plaintiff's "extensive activities of daily living" undermined his credibility. The ALJ noted that the Plaintiff "watches television, lets the dog out, . . . has been to North Carolina on vacation, flew on an airplane on vacation, prepares meals at home, and sometimes attends meetings at a local volunteer firehouse where he once was a volunteer firefighter." [T. 34]. The Plaintiff has noted that he has restrictions on those daily activities that he can perform. [Doc. 13 at 17]. The ALJ properly considered the Plaintiff's daily activities as part of his credibility determination according to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). The ALJ did not find that such activities rendered the Plaintiff conclusively able to work, but he did consider the Plaintiff's ability to perform such activities as a factor in his credibility determination.
Thus, the Plaintiff's second assignment of error concerning the ALJ's credibility determination is likewise without merit.
The Plaintiff finally argues that the ALJ erred in his Step Four analysis finding that the Plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant work as a 911 emergency call dispatcher. Specifically, the Plaintiff argues that the ALJ "did not meet the requisite detail required when inquiring to Plaintiff's past relevant work, particularly the strength, endurance manipulative ability, and mental demands of the work." [Doc. 13 at 18]. The Plaintiff had testified that he had difficulty meeting the mental demands of being a 911 call operator due to emotional hardship dealing with people on the phone after the death of his baby brother. [
At Step Four in the ALJ's analysis, the ALJ reviews the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC) and the physical and mental demands of work done in the past. If the claimant can still perform that work, then a finding of not disabled is mandated. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. According to Social Security Ruling 82-62, the ALJ must make particular considerations when assessing a claimant's past work:
SSR 82-62.
Here, the ALJ considered the Plaintiff's residual functional capacity based upon his medical evidence of record and found that the Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a 911 dispatcher. The ALJ noted that the Plaintiff's work as a 911 dispatcher consisted of answering incoming calls and dispatching emergency vehicles while entering information into the computer. The ALJ indicated that the Plaintiff "remained seated in a cubicle, but could sit and stand as needed." [T. 34]. Although the ALJ did not explicitly note the mental demands of the Plaintiff's past work, he had previously assessed the Plaintiff's mental conditions and had noted:
[T. 32]. An evaluation of the ALJ's decision reveals that the ALJ followed SSR 82-62 and made findings of fact regarding (1) the Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, (2) the physical and mental demands of the Plaintiff's past job, and (3) whether the Plaintiff's residual functional capacity would allow him to return to his past relevant work. [Doc. 15 at 17]. There is no indication that a more detailed analysis of the Plaintiff's past relevant work would have rendered a different outcome in this case. Thus, any error made by the ALJ in this regard was harmless.
Therefore, the Plaintiff's third assignment of error is without merit.
Accordingly,
A judgment shall be entered simultaneously herewith.
