ORDER

RICHARD L. VOORHEES, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court following receipt of Petitioner's response to the Court's prior Order requiring Petitioner to explain why his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate is not time-barred and, if it is time-barred, why equitable tolling should apply. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses the § 2255 petition as time-barred.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 31, 2013, Pro se Petitioner Jose Remigio Martinez-Zambrano pled guilty to reentry of a deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2). (Criminal Case No. 5:13-cr-95-RLV-DCK-1, Doc. No. 16: Judgment; Doc. No. 9: Acceptance and Entry of Guilty Plea). On October 6, 2014, this Court sentenced Petitioner to 41 months of imprisonment, plus one year of supervised release. Judgment was entered on October 15, 2014, and Petitioner did not appeal. (Id.). Petitioner placed the Section 2255 motion to vacate in the prison system for mailing on November 18, 2015. Petitioner contends in the petition that because he is a deportable alien, he should have been entitled to a downward departure, and he seeks to have this Court reduce his sentence by four months, to 37 months of imprisonment. He also contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a downward departure based on his status as a deportable alien. In support of his claim, Petitioner cites a 1994 case from the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, in which that court noted that "we conclude that a downward departure may be appropriate where the defendant's status as a deportable alien is likely to cause a fortuitous increase in the severity of his sentence." United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 651-52 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings provides that courts are to promptly examine motions to vacate, along with "any attached exhibits and the record of prior proceedings . . ." in order to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief on the claims set forth therein. After examining the record in this matter, the Court finds that the motion to vacate can be resolved without a response from the Government and without an evidentiary hearing based on the record and governing case law. See Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 529 (4th Cir. 1970).

III. DISCUSSION

In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (the "AEDPA"). Among other things, the AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by imposing a one-year statute of limitations period for the filing Of a motion to vacate. Such amendment provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).

Here, as noted, Petitioner's judgment on his conviction was entered on October 15, 2014, and Petitioner did not appeal. (Id.). Petitioner's conviction, therefore, became final fourteen days later on October 29, 2014, when his time to appeal expired. See United States v. Clay, 537 U.S. 522, 524-25 (2003) (when a defendant does not appeal, his conviction becomes final when the opportunity to appeal expires); FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A). Petitioner then had one year, or until October 29, 2015, in which to file a timely petition. Petitioner did not place the § 2255 motion to vacate, however, in the prison system for mailing until November 18, 2015. Because Petitioner filed his motion to vacate more than one year after his conviction became final, his motion to vacate is untimely under § 2255(f)(1), and none of the other time periods set forth under § 2255(f) appears to apply to render the petition timely.

On December 7, 2015, this Court entered an Order giving Petitioner 20 days in which to submit a memorandum explaining why his petition is timely or, if not, the reasons for why the Court should apply equitable tolling. See Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 706 (4th Cir. 2002). Petitioner has filed a response to the Court's order, in which he contends that the petition is timely under 2255(f)(4) because he filed the petition within one year of discovering United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 651-52 (D.C. Cir. 1994), which he contends supports his claims. (Doc. No. 3 at 2). Section 2255(f)(4) does not apply to render the petition timely, as a judicial opinion such as Smith, which merely "establish[ed] an abstract proposition of law arguably helpful to the petitioner's claim," is not a "fact" within the meaning of § 2255(f)(4). See Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180, 184 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Therefore, that Petitioner filed his motion to vacate within one year of discovering the Smith case does not render his motion to vacate timely. Furthermore, Petitioner asserts no other ground for timeliness, and he does not present circumstances warranting equitable tolling. Thus, the petition will be dismissed as time-barred.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner's Section 2255 motion is time-barred.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

JUDGMENT IN CASE

DECISION BY COURT. This action having come before the Court by Motion and a decision having been rendered;

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Judgment is hereby entered in accordance with the Court's January 8, 2016 Order.