RICHARD L. VOORHEES, District Judge.
KCA Penland commenced this action on September 18, 2014 by filing a complaint in the Iredell County Superior Court. (See Doc. 1-1). GLDD removed the action to this Court and timely filed an Answer, which included a five-count counterclaim. (See Doc. 3). KCA Penland filed a motion to dismiss Count Two of GLDD's counterclaim. (Doc. 5). Following GLDD's response not opposing KCA Penland's motion, this Court issued an order dismissing Count Two of GLDD's counterclaim. (Docs. 7, 8).
In September of 2015, the parties submitted a certification of initial attorney conference and discovery plan. (Doc. 9). Shortly thereafter, Magistrate Judge David C. Keesler issued the Pretrial Order and Case Management Plan, setting a discovery deadline of June 15, 2016, a motions and alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") deadline of August 31, 2016, and a trial date of January 9, 2017. (Doc. 10 at 2-4). The deadline for motions and ADR passed without the filing of any motions or the filing of a report on the results of ADR. On September 19, 2016, GLDD changed counsel. (See Docs. 12, 13). Approximately two-and-a-half months later, new counsel for GLDD moved to withdraw, citing GLDD's failure to pay for services as the basis for withdrawal. (Doc. 14). Noting that GLDD's status as a corporation prevented it from proceeding pro se, Magistrate Judge Keesler issued an order requiring a response indicating whether GLDD consented or opposed the motion to withdraw. (Doc. 15). The order further amended the deadline for the parties to file their ADR report and advised the parties that they could seek a continuance of the trial date but that "[t]he Court will not extend the trial date beyond March 2017." Id. at 2.
The parties filed a consent motion to amend several deadlines in the Pretrial Order and Case Management Plan, specifically seeking to reset the trial for March 31, 2017, to extend the once-extended ADR deadline, and to extend the already elapsed deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.
Subsequent to the order amending the pretrial order and case management plan, counsel for GLDD filed a response indicating that GLDD consented to the withdrawal of counsel.
"Whether a corporate party may proceed pro se is a procedural inquiry governed by federal law and the rules of the court." Gilley v. Shoffner, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 18, 2004). "It has been the law for the better part of two centuries . . . that a corporation may appear in federal courts only through licensed counsel." Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993) (citing Osborn v. President of Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824) (other citations omitted)). Based on this limitation on a corporation's ability to appear in federal court, a court may, after warning the corporate party of the consequences of not obtaining counsel and permitting the corporate party reasonable time to obtain counsel, dismiss the unrepresented corporation's claims or enter judgment against the unrepresented corporation. See Barr v. Prince George's Cty., Md., 115 F. App'x 609, 610-11 (4th Cir. 2004) (dismissing appeal by corporate party after original counsel withdrew and corporate party failed to obtain new counsel despite being "admonished" of consequences of failing to obtain counsel); Dove Air, Inc. v. Joda, LLC, 2011 WL 4712316, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 6, 2011) (dismissing corporate party's suit for failure to have new counsel file an appearance after motion granted permitting original counsel to withdraw); Gilley, 345 F. Supp.2d at 566-67 (dismissing corporate party from action where corporate party was on notice of need to have counsel make an appearance but did not do so or otherwise seek an extension to obtain counsel); Microsoft Corp. v. Comput. Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 783 (E.D.N.C. 2004) (entry of default judgment against corporate defendant for no appearance of counsel).
This Court has placed GLDD on notice four times that a corporation cannot proceed pro se and that GLDD needed to obtain new counsel and have new counsel file an appearance. (See Docs. 15, 17, 19, 21). Of particular note, the Court advised GLDD of the need to employ new counsel before GLDD consented to the withdrawal of its most recent counsel. (Doc. 15). Although the record affirmatively establishes that GLDD received several of the Court's orders providing notice and setting deadlines for new counsel to file an appearance, new counsel has not filed an appearance on GLDD's behalf and GLDD has not otherwise responded to the Court's orders. Accordingly, the Court finds it appropriate to dismiss, without prejudice, the four counts of GLDD's counterclaim that survived this Court's order granting KCA Penland's motion to dismiss.
The Court is further inclined to enter a default judgment against GLDD as to the claims raised in KCA Penland's complaint. The Court, however, recognizes that the entry of a default judgment constitutes a stiff sanction, that the dismissal of GLDD's counterclaim is the first sanction imposed against GLDD, that GLDD timely participated in this litigation at early stages in the proceeding, and that KCA Penland has contributed to some of the missed deadlines. Accordingly, instead of granting a default judgment sua sponte, the Court amends the motions deadline in the Pretrial Order and Case Management Plan to permit KCA Penland to file a motion for default judgment by February 7, 2017.
(1) Counts One, Three, Four, and Five of GLDD's counterclaim are
(2) The Pretrial Order and Case Management Plan (Doc. 10) is