ORDER

ROBERT J. CONRAD, JR., District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Pamela Fletcher's ("Plaintiff's") Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 8), her Memorandum in Support, (Doc. No. 9); Nancy A. Berryhill's ("Defendant's" or "Commissioner's") Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 10), her Memorandum in Support, (Doc. No. 11); the Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Recommendation ("M&R"), (Doc. No. 12), recommending the Court grant Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and remand the ALJ's decision for further proceedings. Defendant filed a timely Objection to the M&R, (Doc. No. 13), but Plaintiff did not file a Response. The Motion is now ripe for the Court's consideration.

I. BACKGROUND

No party has objected to the Magistrate Judge's statement of the factual and procedural background of this case. Therefore, the Court adopts the facts as reproduced below.

(Doc. No. 12 at 2).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Review of the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation.

A district court may assign dispositive pretrial matters, including motions to dismiss, to a magistrate judge for "proposed findings of fact and recommendations." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) & (B). The Federal Magistrate Act provides that a district court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." Id. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). However, "when objections to strictly legal issues are raised and no factual issues are challenged, de novo review of the record may be dispensed with." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). De novo review is also not required "when a party makes general or conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations." Id.

B. Review of a Final ALJ Decision under the Social Security Act.

The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3), limits this Court's review of a final decision of the Commissioner to: (1) whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The District Court does not review a final decision of the Commissioner de novo. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986); King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979); Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972). As the Social Security Act provides, "[t]he findings of the [Commissioner] as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In Smith v. Heckler, the Fourth Circuit noted that "substantial evidence" has been defined as being "more than a scintilla and do[ing] more than creat[ing] a suspicion of the existence of a fact to be established. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 782 F.2d 1176, 1179 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Perales, 402 U.S. at 401); see also Seacrist v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 1054, 1056-57 (4th Cir. 1976) ("We note that it is the responsibility of the [Commissioner] and not the courts to reconcile inconsistencies in the medical evidence. . . .").

The Fourth Circuit has long emphasized that it is not for a reviewing court to weigh the evidence again, nor to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, assuming the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456; see also Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d at 345; Blalock, 483 F.2d at 775. Indeed, this is true even if the reviewing court disagrees with the outcome—so long as there is "substantial evidence" in the record to support the final decision below. Lester v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 838, 841 (4th Cir. 1982).

III. DISCUSSION

In his M&R, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the ALJ erred in formulating Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") in light of her moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace ("CPP"). (Doc. No. 12). The Magistrate Judge found that the ALJ violated the rule set forth in Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 639-40 (4th Cir.2015), when he,

(Id. at 5). Defendant objected to the Magistrate Judge's M&R, arguing that "under the correct law, the RFC in this case reasonably accounts for Plaintiff's difficulties in the broad functional area of [CPP]." (Doc. No. 13 at 3). Specifically, Defendant argues that "[t]he ALJ . . . made an RFC finding as to Plaintiff's ability to sustain attention, finding that she could maintain attention long enough to complete simple tasks." (Id.).

An RFC "is an assessment of an individual's ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis." S.S.R. 96-8p. By now, it is well-established that "the ability to perform simple tasks differs from the ability to stay on task." Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638. "Only the latter limitation would account for a claimant's limitation in [CPP]." Id. Therefore, limiting a claimant's RFC to simple, routine tasks or unskilled work does not alone address moderate limitations in that claimant's CPP. The ALJ does not explicitly include "simple, routine, repetitive tasks" in Plaintiff's RFC, but states Plaintiff has the ability to "understand and follow simple instructions, sustain attention long enough to complete simple tasks, and perform in an environment with few and infrequent changes."2 (Tr. 54).

Defendant argues that the ALJ's phrase "sustain attention long enough to complete simple tasks" adequately addresses Plaintiff's ability to stay on task. (Doc. No. 13 at 3). The Court disagrees. While this phrase mentions Plaintiff's ability to sustain attention, it does so only in relation to completing simple tasks, not completing simple tasks for an entire work day, five days a week. See S.S.R. 96-8p (defining "regular and continuing basis" for the purposes of an RFC to "mean[ ] 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule."). "Sustain attention long enough to complete simple tasks" does little more than limit a plaintiff to simple tasks. After all, a claimant must be able to "sustain attention long enough to complete simple tasks" in order to be eligible for a limitation of simple, routine, repetitive tasks. If the Court were to accept Defendant's argument, it would necessarily sanction the application of simple, routine, repetitive tasks to adequately address moderate limitations in CPP—a practice explicitly prohibited in Mascio.

Acknowledging that the ALJ limited Plaintiff to jobs with simple instructions, simple tasks, and infrequent changes, the question becomes whether these limitations, on their face, properly address a moderate limitation in CPP. The Court concludes they do not. Courts in the Fourth Circuit have held that a moderate limitation in CPP is adequately addressed by limiting a plaintiff in both pace and simple routine, repetitive tasks.3 Courts have therefore found that pace addresses a claimant's ability to stay on task.4 Infrequent changes in the work environment may account for Plaintiff's concentration and persistence, but it does not address pace.5

Because the RFC fails to address pace or the ability to stay on task on its face, the Court next turns to the ALJ's function-by-function analysis to determine if the ALJ properly explained why such a limitation is not needed. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638 ("Perhaps the ALJ can explain why Mascio's moderate limitation in [CPP] at step three does not translate into a limitation in [the plaintiff's] residual functional capacity."). The Court finds that the opinion lacks sufficient explanation. Indeed, the ALJ's most in-depth analysis of Plaintiff's CPP occurred while assigning the moderate limitation itself. Even then, however, the ALJ focused on Plaintiff's concentration and attention rather than his limitations (or lack thereof) in pace. (Tr. 53) ("Contemporaneous treatment notes do not describe significant deficits in attention, concentration, or focus. Indeed, mental status examinations have remained generally normal.").

In making his RFC determination, the ALJ afforded great weight to the opinions of two non-examining State agency physicians. (Tr. 56). Both opinions found moderate limitations in Plaintiff's "[a]bility to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods." (Tr. 254, 275). When prompted to narratively explain their conclusions, both opinions stated, "[Plaintiff] may have difficulty with attention for detailed tasks, but would be able to sustain attention for simple tasks." (Tr. 255, 275). The Court finds that, while the ALJ relied on these State agency opinions, they themselves fail to address pace despite explicitly assigning a moderate limitation in performing at a consistent pace. The ALJ's opinion reflects the findings of the State agency opinions and therefore reflects those decisions' inconsistencies.

IV. CONCLUSION

Upon review, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly recommended the Court to remand this case pursuant to Mascio v. Colvin. The ALJ failed to address Plaintiff's moderate limitation in CPP within the RFC. Specifically, the ALJ did not mention Plaintiff's pace and why such a limitation should or should not be included in the RFC.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that: