ROBERT J. CONRAD, JR., District Judge.
Neither party has objected to the Magistrate Judge's statement of the factual and procedural background of this case. Therefore, the Court adopts the facts as set forth in the M&R.
A district court may assign dispositive pretrial matters, including motions to dismiss, to a magistrate judge for "proposed findings of fact and recommendations." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) & (B). The Federal Magistrate Act provides that a district court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made."
Defendants have moved to dismiss this case alleging that (1) Plaintiffs' release from detention renders their claims moot and deprives them of standing to bring this action and (2) this Court lacks federal subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' case. The Magistrate Judge disagreed with Defendants' first argument and found that the relation back doctrine applies in this case, giving Plaintiffs standing. (Doc. No. 26 at 6). No parties challenged this determination, so the Court need not analyze the M&R's standing determination. Regarding Defendants' second argument, the Magistrate agreed with Defendants and held that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims. (
Plaintiff now objects to the Magistrate Judge's M&R, (Doc. No. 26), arguing that the M&R erred in the following ways: (1) the M&R mischaracterized the challenged policy and erred in finding Plaintiffs' claims are based on discretionary determinations; (2) due to the M&R's mischaracterization of the challenged policy as discretionary, the M&R incorrectly found that this Court does not have jurisdiction; and (3) the M&R incorrectly neglected to adjudicate Defendant White's Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees with Plaintiffs' objections,
Plaintiffs first argue that the M&R mischaracterizes the challenged policy of the IJs as discretionary in nature. Specifically, Plaintiffs state that this Court should reject the M&R's findings that "(1) Plaintiffs are challenging IJ Defendants' `discretionary determinations' in their individual cases, (2) the IJ Defendants have `sen[t]' the bond motions of Plaintiffs and proposed class members `to another venue for hearing,' and (3) that the policy and/or practice at issue in this case is `properly in the province of the [immigration courts].'" (Doc. No. 27 at 10) (quoting the M&R, Doc. No. 26, at 6). Plaintiffs challenge the M&R's finding that Plaintiffs challenge individual bond decisions "and not Defendants' uniform refusal to conduct bond hearings."
First, the Court notes that determining whether the IJ Defendants' actions are discretionary is the threshold inquiry that resolves this dispute. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e),
Under this statute, any discretionary decisions made by the Attorney General or his designees regarding the arrest, detention, and release of aliens—including bond hearing determinations—are shielded from judicial review. Because immigration judges are considered the Attorney General's designees, any discretionary decisions they make regarding bond hearings are barred from federal judicial review. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 ("[I]mmigration judges are attorneys whom the Attorney General appoints as administrative judges within the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge to conduct specified classes of proceedings, including hearings under the [Immigration and Nationality Act]."); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 ("Custody and bond determinations . . . may be reviewed by an Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 CFR part 1236.");
In Plaintiffs' Objections to the Magistrate Judge's M&R, Plaintiffs charge IJ Defendants with a duty to "expeditiously conduct bond hearings for individuals who properly file requests with the Charlotte Immigration Court while detained in the Carolinas," regardless of the detainee's ability to attend the hearing. (Doc. No. 27 at 11). Plaintiffs argue that because IJ Defendants have the ability to conduct hearings via telephone or video conferencing, yet choose not to do so, refusing to hold bond hearings because of the detainee's inability to be physically present is inexcusable. (
The Court agrees that the IJ Defendants were required to consider Plaintiffs' requests for bond hearings. But, unlike Plaintiffs contend, the Court finds that they did consider their requests. The Court comes to this conclusion by examining whether the IJ Defendants had reasons underlying their decisions to decline Plaintiffs' bond hearing requests, or alternatively, whether the IJ Defendants summarily denied these requests without reason. In other words, the Court looks to see if the IJ Defendants actually exercised individual discretion in their decision-making process, or if they were merely rubber-stamping denials across the board, as Plaintiffs allege. The Court finds that the IJ Defendants had a reasonable—and particularized—basis for declining to exercise its authority over Plaintiffs' cases: namely, finding that Charlotte was not the proper venue for the hearings. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(c)(1), the proper locale to hold bond hearings for individuals who are detained is, first and foremost, "the Immigration Court having jurisdiction over the place of detention." Thus, the place of detention is central to the determination of the bond hearing location.
In Plaintiff Palacios's case, Palacios was taken into custody at the Mecklenburg County Jail on January 17, 2018 pending transfer to permanent detention space at the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia for removal proceedings. (Doc. No. 21-2, Ex. A ¶ 6). That same day, Palacios filed a motion for a bond hearing, which included a signed waiver of appearance authorizing his attorney to represent him at a bond hearing in his absence. (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 46). Nevertheless, on January 22, 2018, the IJ declined to exercise his authority to hold Palacios's bond hearing due to Palacios's pending relocation to the Stewart Detention Center. (
(Doc. No. 21-3, Ex. B at 4). The IJ elaborated and grounded this finding in rules relating "to venue, not jurisdiction." (
The IJ in the Lozoya case made a similar determination, based on venue considerations. Lozoya was taken into administrative ICE custody at the Wake County Detention Center on January 4, 2018, and he filed a motion for bond redetermination with the Charlotte Immigration Court on this day. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 47; Doc. No. 21-2, Ex. A ¶ 16). On January 5, 2018 the Charlotte Immigration Court scheduled a bond hearing for January 10, 2018. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 47). Lozoya signed a waiver of appearance authorizing his attorney to represent him at a bond hearing in his absence on January 5, 2018. (
This Court finds that the reasons the IJs chose not to conduct bond hearings in Plaintiffs' cases were reasonable and were not part of a larger scheme to mechanically deny detainees' requests for bond hearings. As is evidenced in the IJ's Order, just because the Charlotte IJs have the authority (jurisdiction) to hold these bond hearings does not mean that they have the obligation to hold these hearings in their particular court (venue).
Plaintiffs emphasize that Plaintiffs Palacios and Couch waived the right to appear, and thus Plaintiffs' physical location and site of detention were immaterial to conducting the hearing since Plaintiffs did not demand that they be physically present at the hearing. Nevertheless, the Court still finds that the Charlotte IJs had legitimate reasons for choosing to decline conducting the bond hearings in Charlotte Immigration Court.
Next, Plaintiff argues that because the M&R mischaracterized Plaintiffs' claims as discretionary in nature, the M&R also erred in declining to exercise subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) and 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Having decided that the M&R properly characterized the challenged actions of IJ Defendants as discretionary, the rest of the Court's analysis is straightforward.
The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue the court must address before considering the merits of the case.
Here, Defendants properly raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in their Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 21-1 at 10-12). They based their arguments on two key statutory provisions, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) and 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), that indicate the clear intention of Congress to strip federal district courts of the ability to engage in judicial review over Plaintiffs' case. The M&R agreed with Defendants, and so does this Court: this Court has no authority to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' case.
Congress has delegated decisions to detain or release an alien on bond to the Attorney General.
Plaintiffs argue that "federal courts regularly find that they have jurisdiction over challenges to detention policies and practices" and cite various, non-binding federal cases to support this proposition. (Doc. No. 27 at 16). However, because this Court determined that Plaintiffs challenge individual, discretionary IJ determinations, and not a uniform detention policy and practice, the Court's decision that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction is consistent with these non-binding, federal cases. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that even if the IJ Defendants' actions were discretionary and thus fell within the purview of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), "multiple federal courts, including four courts of appeals, have held that § 1226(e) does not demonstrate clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to allow IJs to evade federal court review for violations of the Constitution, the [Immigration and Naturalization Act], or [Executive Office for Immigration Review]'s regulations." (Doc. No. 27 at 17) (citing various federal cases and noting that the Fourth Circuit has yet to rule on the matter). Again, the Court's decision today is not inconsistent with these decisions because Plaintiffs are not alleging that Defendants violated any statutes, regulations, or the Constitution, although the Complaint attempts to couch Plaintiffs' grievances invoking these terms. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 86-113). In reality, Plaintiffs' Complaint challenges a "No Bond Hearing Policy" that IJ Defendants supposedly apply to all bond hearing requests in a mechanical fashion. But as demonstrated, this supposed policy is nonexistent; rather, Plaintiffs disagree with the individualized determinations the IJ Defendants made regarding their particular bond hearing requests. This is not a constitutional, statutory, regulatory claim; it is a claim challenging the Attorney General's discretionary action—something this Court has no power to adjudicate.
Yet, Plaintiffs persist in their objections. They also challenge the M&R's finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes federal subject matter jurisdiction. This Section provides that "no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action of the Attorney General . . . the authority for which is specified under this subchapter." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). As the M&R correctly notes, this statutory provision also withholds subject matter jurisdiction over challenges like the ones Plaintiffs make. (Doc. No. 26 at 7) (citing cases).
Finally, Plaintiffs object to the M&R failing to adjudicate the merits of Defendant White's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 27 at 25). However, because the Court finds that the M&R correctly recommended that Plaintiffs' claims be dismissed since this Court lacks federal subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims, the M&R also properly recommended that Defendant White's Motion to Dismiss be denied as moot.