MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DAVID S. CAYER, Magistrate Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's "Motion for Summary Judgment" (document #13) and Defendant's "Motion for Summary Judgment" (document #14), as well as the parties' briefs and exhibits.

The parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and these Motions are ripe for disposition.

Having considered the written arguments, administrative record, and applicable authority, the Court finds that Defendant's decision to deny Plaintiff Social Security benefits is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; and affirm the Commissioner's decision.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Court adopts the procedural history as stated in the parties' briefs.

Plaintiff filed the present action on September 26, 2018. She assigns error to the Administrative Law Judge's evaluation of her Residual Functional Capacity and specifically to her evaluation of Plaintiff's credibility.1 See Plaintiff's "Memorandum ..." at 3-9 (document #12).

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ's decision must be vacated because her appointment was made in violation of the Appointments Clause. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S.Ct. 2044 (`) (ALJs of the Securities and Exchange Commission are inferior officers subject to the Appointments Clause and must be appointed by the President, Courts of Law, or Head of Department). See Plaintiff's "Memorandum ..." at 3, 9-13 (document #12). Plaintiff failed to raise this issue during the administrative process and it is now waived. Garrison v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-cv-00302-FDW, 2018 WL 4924554, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 10, 2018) ("To the extent Lucia applies to Social Security ALJs, Plaintiff has forfeited the issue by failing to raise it during her administrative proceedings"). See also Burgin v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-cv-00346-FDW, 2019 WL 1139500, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 12, 2019) (same); Shipman v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-cv-00309-MR, 2019 WL 281313, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 22, 2019) (same); Britt v. Berryhill, No. 1:18-cv-00030-FDW, 2018 WL 6268211, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 30, 2018) (same). Accordingly, that assignment of error is overruled.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3), limits this Court's review of a final decision of the Commissioner to: (1) whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The District Court does not review a final decision of the Commissioner de novo. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986); King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979); Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972).

As the Social Security Act provides, "[t]he findings of the [Commissioner] as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1179 (4th Cir. 1986), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), the Fourth Circuit defined "substantial evidence" thus:

See also Seacrist v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 1054, 1056-57 (4th Cir. 1976) ("We note that it is the responsibility of the [Commissioner] and not the courts to reconcile inconsistencies in the medical evidence").

The Fourth Circuit has long emphasized that it is not for a reviewing court to weigh the evidence again, nor to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, assuming the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d at 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d at 345; and Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d at 775. Indeed, this is true even if the reviewing court disagrees with the outcome — so long as there is "substantial evidence" in the record to support the final decision below. Lester v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 838, 841 (4th Cir. 1982).

III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIM

The question before the ALJ was whether Plaintiff became "disabled" as that term is defined for Social Security purposes.2

Plaintiff assigns error to the ALJ's RFC analysis. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work with limitations to frequent postural activities and frequent exposure to hazards. (Tr. 24). Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's failure to include additional unspecified limitations related to her subjective complaints of hip pain and depression. See Plaintiff's "Memorandum ..." at 3-9 (document #12).

The ALJ is solely responsible for assessing a claimant's RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c) & 416.946(c). In making that assessment, the ALJ must consider the functional limitations resulting from the claimant's medically determinable impairments. SSR96-8p at *2. However, it is the claimant's burden to establish his RFC by demonstrating how those impairments impact his functioning. See 20 C.F.R. §§404.1512(c) & 416.912(c); see also, e.g., Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004) ("[t]he burden of persuasion . . . to demonstrate RFC remains on the claimant, even when the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner at step five"); Plummer v. Astrue, No. 5:11-cv-00006, 2011 WL 7938431, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2011) (Memorandum and Recommendation) ("[t]he claimant bears the burden of providing evidence establishing the degree to which her impairments limit her RFC") (citing Stormo), adopted, 2012 WL 1858844 (May 22, 2102), aff'd, 487 F. App'x 795 (4th Cir. Nov. 6, 2012).

The Fourth Circuit has held that "remand may be appropriate . . . where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant's capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful review." Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013). This explicit function-by-function analysis is not necessary when functions are irrelevant or uncontested. It is only after that function-by-function analysis has been completed that RFC may "be expressed in terms of the exertional levels of work, sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy." Id.

The ALJ gave significant weight to the State agency medical experts whose reports support the physical RFC. (Tr. 22, 27, 94-95, 106-08). The ALJ also gave significant weight to the State agency psychological experts who found that Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment. (Tr. 26-27, 93-94, 103-04). An ALJ may satisfy the "function-by-function" requirement by referencing a properly conducted analysis by State agency medical consultants. See Settlemyre v. Colvin, No. 5:14-CV-00199-MOC, 2015 WL 5457950, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2015); Linares v. Colvin, No. 5:14-CV-00120, 2015 WL 4389533, at *3 (W.D.N.C. July 17, 2015) ("Because the ALJ based his RFC finding, in part, on the function-by-function analysis of the State agency consultant, the ALJ's function-by-function analysis complied with SSR 96-8p.) (citing Lemken v. Astrue, No. 5:07-CV-33-RLV-DCK, 2010 WL 5057130, at *8 (W.D.N.C. July 26, 2010); Onishea v. Barnhart, 2004 WL 1588294, at *1 (5th Cir. July 16, 2004)). The ALJ's RFC determination here is supported by substantial evidence including Plaintiff's testimony, medical records and treatment history.

To the extent that Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's credibility determination, the Court finds that she applied the correct legal standard and her credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. Consistent with the governing regulations, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's subjective statements as to the limitations caused by her impairments (Tr. 24-27); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (setting out a two-part standard for evaluating a claimant's subjective complaints). After summarizing those subjective statements, the ALJ discussed the objective evidence of record as well as the opinion evidence of record. Id. The ALJ adequately explained her conclusion that the evidence did not support the limitations claimed by Plaintiff.

Although the medical records establish that Plaintiff experienced health issues to some extent, as the Fourth Circuit has noted, it is the ALJ's responsibility, not the Court's, "to reconcile inconsistencies in the medical evidence." Seacrist, 538 F.2d at 1056-57. Substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's assessment of the medical records, Plaintiff's credibility, and her ultimate determination that Plaintiff was not disabled.

IV. ORDER

NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's "Motion For Summary Judgment" (document #13) is DENIED; Defendant's "Motion for Summary Judgment" (document #14) is GRANTED; and the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.

2. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum and Order to counsel for the parties.

SO ORDERED.