SANDSTROM, Justice.
[¶ 1] Patricia Capps and others ("Capps") appeal, and Colleen Weflen and others ("Weflens") cross-appeal, from a judgment quieting title to certain Mountrail County mineral interests in the Capps and the heirs of Ruth Nelson's estate ("Hassans"). Because the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling the Weflens did not comply with the notice requirements in the abandoned mineral statutes, N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1, and because those requirements are constitutional, we reverse and remand for entry of judgment quieting title to the subject mineral interests in the Weflens.
[¶ 2] In 1975, Ruth Nelson conveyed the subject real property in Mountrail County to Olaf and Rose Weflen, reserving to herself one-half of the minerals in the property. The deed was recorded the same year. In 1979, Nelson granted to Patricia Capps and Terrel Anderson "an undivided 1/2 mineral interest" in the property, and the deed explained "[i]t is the intent hereof to transfer a 1/2 interest in and to the remaining minerals." Nelson died later in 1979, and this 1979 mineral deed was not recorded until 2009.
[¶ 3] The Weflens, who are the successors-in-interest to Olaf and Rose Weflen, currently own the subject property. On December 28, 2005, the Weflens published in the Mountrail County Promoter a notice of lapse of mineral interest dated November 29, 2005. Subsequent notices were published on January 4 and 11, 2006. On January 13, 2006, the Weflens sent copies of the notice of lapse by certified mail, return receipt requested, with restricted delivery to the two last known addresses of Nelson which appeared in the recorded 1975 deed, in Tacoma, Washington, and a recorded 1973 oil and gas lease, in Lyons, Oregon. Both mailings were returned undelivered, and no statement of claim was filed within 60 days after the first publication of the notice of lapse. On March 6, 2006, the Weflens recorded a termination of mineral interest, affidavit of publication, affidavit of mailing, and notice of lapse of mineral interest with the Mountrail County recorder.
[¶ 4] While on a North Dakota hunting trip in 2008, Patricia Capps' husband and her brother noticed oil wells in the area of the Weflens' property. Patricia Capps contacted an attorney and filed a statement of claim in 2008. In 2009, the Capps
[¶ 5] The district court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06. The appeal and cross-appeals were timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4. We have jurisdiction under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 6, and N.D.C.C. § 28-27-01.
[¶ 6] The dispositive issue raised by the Weflens in their cross-appeal is whether the district court erred in ruling on summary judgment that the Weflens failed to comply with the notice provisions of the abandoned mineral statutes, N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1, as they existed during the abandonment procedure in 2005 and 2006. See Larson v. Norheim, 2013 ND 60, ¶ 10, 830 N.W.2d 85 (law in effect at time of abandonment procedure governs).
[¶ 7] This Court's standard of review for summary judgment is well-established:
Anderson v. Zimbelman, 2014 ND 34, ¶ 7, 842 N.W.2d 852 (quoting Arndt v. Maki, 2012 ND 55, ¶ 10, 813 N.W.2d 564).
[¶ 8] "Rights of property and of person may be waived, surrendered, or lost by neglect in the cases provided by
[¶ 9] Because the abandoned mineral statutes are in derogation of the common law, courts "must review for strict construction and application of statutory requirements." Spring Creek Ranch, LLC v. Svenberg, 1999 ND 113, ¶ 10, 595 N.W.2d 323. The district court listed three reasons why the Weflens failed to comply with the statutory provisions: 1) the Weflens "had knowledge that Ruth Nelson was dead at the time they mailed" the notice of lapse to her addresses of record, and "[m]ailing notice to a dead person at their address of record is absurd;" 2) "[m]ailing notice certified, restricted delivery is not required and mailing notice to a dead person by certified, restrictive delivery guarantees notice will not be received by the mineral owner;" and 3) because "property devolves to the deceased's heirs upon death" under the provisions of the North Dakota Uniform Probate Code, N.D.C.C. tit. 30.1, the record owner was no longer the actual owner, and therefore the actual owner's address "did not appear of record" which necessitated a "reasonable inquiry" for the address of the actual mineral interest owner. The court's rationale conflicts with N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1 and our interpretations of those provisions.
[¶ 10] First, whether the Weflens had actual knowledge of Nelson's death at the time of mailing is disputed, but this is not a material fact. This Court held in a series of 2011 cases that a surface owner is required to conduct a "reasonable inquiry" under N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-06(2) only if the mineral owner's address does not appear of record. See Johnson v. Taliaferro, 2011 ND 34, ¶ 11, 793 N.W.2d 804; Sorenson v. Felton, 2011 ND 33, ¶ 14, 793 N.W.2d 799; Sorenson v. Alinder, 2011 ND 36, ¶ 6, 793 N.W.2d 797. Here the Weflens attempted to notify Nelson by mail through two of her addresses that were "of record." The question about actual knowledge of an incorrect record address we left open in Felton, at ¶ 14, was quickly answered in the Alinder case, which defeats the court's reliance on the Weflens' alleged knowledge of Nelson's death to require a reasonable inquiry here. This Court in Alinder, at ¶ 6, relied upon Felton and Taliaferro in ruling no reasonable inquiry was required where the surface owner mailed the notice
[¶ 11] Second, the district court's conclusion that the Weflens' use of certified mail with restricted delivery violates N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-06(2) is not supported by the law. "Where constitutional and statutory provisions are clear and unambiguous, it is improper for the courts to attempt to construe the provisions so as to legislate additional requirements or proscriptions which the words of the provisions do not themselves provide." Haggard v. Meier, 368 N.W.2d 539, 541 (N.D. 1985); see also N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05; Aanenson v. Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151, 153 (N.D.1989). The abandoned mineral statutes do not specify what type of "mailing" is required and do not prohibit any particular type of mailing. Because certified mail is not prohibited, the Weflens were free to use certified mail for mailing the notice of lapse. While restricted delivery may or may not be problematic, we need not decide the issue because there is no evidence in the record the omission of this phrase would have made any difference.
[¶ 12] Third, the obvious purpose of statutory schemes like N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1 for the reversion of severed mineral interests to the owner of the surface interests is "to encourage the exploitation of mineral resources and clear title of old, unused mineral claims." V. Gulbis, Annot., Validity and construction of statutes providing for reversion of mineral estates for abandonment or nonuse, 16 A.L.R.4th 1029, 1034 (1982); cf. Schwab v. Zajac, 2012 ND 239, ¶ 28, 823 N.W.2d 737 ("One purpose of the Marketable Record Title Act is to simplify and facilitate land transactions from the record itself."). The district court's ruling that the owner's address did not appear of record because the mineral interests devolved to Nelson's heirs upon her death under the Uniform Probate Code again ignores this Court's precedent and strips the abandoned minerals statutes of their utility. In Alinder, 2011 ND 36, ¶ 6, 793 N.W.2d 797, this Court made it clear that when the mineral interest owners of record are deceased, the notice must still be mailed to the address of the deceased owners of record. Moreover, the court's interpretation would place an impossible burden on surface owners and essentially relieve mineral interest owners and their heirs of any obligation to make minimal uses of their interests under N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-03 to prevent lapse. See generally Estate of Christeson v. Gilstad, 2013 ND 50, ¶¶ 8-9, 829 N.W.2d 453. Because the possibility of death is not
[¶ 13] We conclude a surface owner is required to conduct a reasonable inquiry only if the mineral owner's address does not appear of record, even if the surface owner knows the mineral owner whose address appears of record is deceased. The district court erred as a matter of law in ruling the Weflens did not comply with the notice requirements in the abandoned mineral statutes.
[¶ 14] The Capps argue in the alternative that the notice provisions of the abandoned minerals statutes violate due process and are unconstitutional as applied in this case. Early in these proceedings, before the district court vacated its prior order on reconsideration, see Capps, 2013 ND 16, ¶ 4, 826 N.W.2d 605, the court ruled these provisions pass constitutional muster.
[¶ 15] In Simons v. State, 2011 ND 190, ¶ 23, 803 N.W.2d 587, we explained:
[¶ 16] The Capps rely upon Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), in which the United States Supreme Court stated, "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is
[¶ 17] The Weflens and the district court relied upon Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982), which held constitutional the Indiana Dormant Mineral Interests Act. The Indiana Act is "similar" to N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1. Svenberg, 1999 ND 113, ¶ 21 n. 2, 595 N.W.2d 323. The Indiana Act provided that a severed mineral interest that is not used for a period of 20 years automatically lapses and reverts to the current surface owner of the property unless the mineral owner files a statement of claim in the local county recorder's office. Short, at 518, 102 S.Ct. 781. The Act did not require that any specific notice be given to a mineral owner prior to a statutory lapse of a mineral estate, but did set forth a procedure by which a surface owner who had succeeded to the ownership of a mineral estate under the statute "may" give notice that the mineral interest had lapsed. Id. at 520, 102 S.Ct. 781. It behooved a surface owner to provide notice by publication that the interest had lapsed because, if the surface owner did not, the mineral interest owner had 60 days after receiving actual knowledge to file a statement of claim. Id. at 520 n. 8, 102 S.Ct. 781. In each of the consolidated cases considered in Short, the surface owner gave notice by publication and mail. Id. at 521-22, 102 S.Ct. 781.
[¶ 18] After concluding the "State surely has the power to condition the ownership of property on compliance with conditions that impose such a slight burden on the owner while providing such clear benefits to the State," Short, 454 U.S. at 529-30, 102 S.Ct. 781 (footnote omitted), the Court addressed the due process question whether "appellants had a constitutional right to be advised — presumably by the surface owner — that their 20-year period of nonuse was about to expire." Id. at 533, 102 S.Ct. 781. The Court explained:
Id. at 533-34, 102 S.Ct. 781.
[¶ 19] In upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the Court distinguished Mullane, 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652:
Short, 454 U.S. at 535-36, 102 S.Ct. 781.
[¶ 20] The Capps' attempts to distinguish Short are unavailing. The Capps argue that "[i]n North Dakota, the severed mineral interest never lapses without publication and notice to the [mineral] owner and filing with the County Recorder." Section 38-18.1-06(1) requires "notice of the lapse" after it has already occurred to allow the mineral interest owner 60 days to reclaim the mineral interest under N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-05(3). The Indiana statutory scheme analyzed in Short contained a similar feature, only the giving of notice was discretionary with the surface owner. See 454 U.S. at 520 n. 8, 102 S.Ct. 781. The Capps argue Short is distinguishable because North Dakota requires notice of lapse but the Indiana law did not. The Capps have not explained how a statutory scheme requiring notice that a mineral interest has lapsed is unconstitutional while a statutory scheme allowing discretionary notice is constitutional.
[¶ 21] The Capps argue North Dakota's statutory scheme is not self-executing, but we have observed "[t]he statutory procedure is wholly self-executing." Peterson, 2014 ND 40, ¶ 12, 842 N.W.2d 920. The Capps rely on Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988), in which the Supreme Court invalidated on due process grounds Oklahoma's use of publication only to notify creditors of estates of the time to file their claims under the state's nonclaim statute. However, the Pope Court explained:
Id. at 486-87, 108 S.Ct. 1340.
[¶ 22] The abandoned mineral statutes do not require any judicial action before a mineral interest is deemed to have lapsed. Compliance with the statutory procedure is all that is required. See Peterson, 2014 ND 40, ¶ 12, 842 N.W.2d 920 ("once the notice procedure under the statute is completed, title to the mineral interest vests in the surface owner as of the date of abandonment, without the necessity of a subsequent quiet title action."). Although the Capps argue there is "state action" because the county recorder files the necessary documents under the abandoned mineral statutes, recording documents is a ministerial action on the part of a county recorder. See Loran v. Iszler, 373 N.W.2d 870, 874 (N.D.1985). A county recorder makes no judicial adjudication in filing documents. If the filing of documents with a county recorder constituted "significant state action," the Indiana statutory scheme would not have survived the constitutional challenge waged in Short.
[¶ 23] We conclude the Capps have failed to establish that the notice provisions of N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1 are unconstitutional on their face or as applied in this case.
[¶ 24] It is unnecessary to address the controversy between the Capps and the Hassans over the interpretation of the 1979 deed. Those mineral interests were abandoned and vested in the Weflens. We reverse and remand for entry of judgment quieting title to the subject mineral interests in the Weflens.
[¶ 25] BENNY A. GRAFF, S.J., GERALD W. VANDEWALLE, C.J., DANIEL J. CROTHERS, and LISA FAIR McEVERS, JJ., concur.
[¶ 26] The Honorable BENNY A. GRAFF, S.J., sitting in place of KAPSNER, J., disqualified.