VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1] Nancy Mathews and Paul Mathews appealed from a judgment determining the ownership and control of certain property in Sargent County. We reverse, concluding the plain language of the 1917 and 1918 right-of-way deeds at issue conveyed easements.
[¶ 2] In November 2012, the Sargent County Water Resource District ("District") commenced an action seeking declaratory relief regarding the ownership
[¶ 3] The District sought declaratory relief because Paul Mathews sought to exert control over the property, claiming a property interest through his rental agreement with Phyllis Delahoyde and Nancy Mathews, the purported owners of the property. Nancy Mathews and Paul Mathews answered the complaint and raised a number of defenses and a counterclaim against the District. Delahoyde did not claim an interest in the disputed property, nor did she join the codefendants in the appeal.
[¶ 4] In January 2014, the district court held a bench trial. After trial, the court found the 1917 deed and 1918 deed were ambiguous on their face and considered extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties to the deeds. The court subsequently entered judgment declaring that the 1917 and 1918 deeds granted fee title in the property to the District's predecessor.
[¶ 5] Nancy Mathews and Paul Mathews argue the plain language of the right-of-way deeds from 1917 and 1918 unambiguously show an intent to convey easements for a right of way and not fee simple. They further contend that if this Court decides the deeds are ambiguous, the district court's interpretation of the parol evidence is clearly erroneous.
[¶ 6] We interpret deeds in the same manner as contracts. N.D.C.C. § 47-09-11. In construing a deed, the primary purpose is to ascertain and effectuate the grantor's intent. EOG Res., Inc. v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 2015 ND 187, ¶ 15, 867 N.W.2d 308; Wagner v. Crossland Constr. Co., Inc., 2013 ND 219, ¶ 8, 840 N.W.2d 81. The intent must be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible. Wagner, at ¶ 8. When a deed is unambiguous, this Court decides the parties' intent from the instrument itself. Id. "A deed is ambiguous if rational arguments can be made in support of contrary positions as to the meaning of the term, phrase, or clause in question." EOG Res., at ¶ 15. Whether a deed is ambiguous presents a question of law and is fully reviewable on appeal. Id.
[¶ 7] When a deed is ambiguous, the district court may consider extrinsic evidence to decide the parties' intent. EOG Res., 2015 ND 187, ¶ 16, 867 N.W.2d 308. The district court's resolution of an ambiguity in a deed by extrinsic evidence is a finding of fact, which this Court reviews under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. "A finding is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or if an appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made." Freidig v. Weed, 2015 ND 215, ¶ 13, 868 N.W.2d 546.
[¶ 8] The Mathews assert that numerous courts have held right-of-way deeds similar to the two deeds in this case conveyed easements. See, e.g., Midland Valley R. Co. v. Jarvis, 29 F.2d 539, 539-40 (8th Cir.1928); El Dorado & Wesson Ry. Co. v. Smith, 233 Ark. 298, 344 S.W.2d 343, 344-45 (1961); N. Sterling Irrigation Dist. v. Knifton, 137 Colo. 40, 320 P.2d 968,
[¶9] The Mathews contend the deeds are integrated documents and missing plats do not inject ambiguity into the type of interest conveyed by the deeds. They argue the parties' intent is further shown by the eminent domain statute available to the Water District in 1918, which would have only allowed for an easement. N.D. Comp. Laws § 8204 (1913). They argue, in the alternative, that if the deeds are ambiguous, the district court's interpretation of parol evidence is clearly erroneous because the record does not support the court's factual finding that Sargent County only removes acres deeded in fee from the tax rolls and the court did not account for high inflation that occurred from 1914 to 1918 when it compared sales of nearby land in fee.
[¶10] In the context of railroad rights of way, this Court addressed the issue of whether purported right-of-way deeds conveyed an easement or an estate in fee in EOG Res., 2015 ND 187, 867 N.W.2d 308. A majority of the Court stated:
EOG Res., at ¶ 24. Regarding use of the phrase "right of way," the Court further explained:
EOG Res., at ¶29 (citations and quotation marks omitted). See also N.D.C.C. § 47-10-13 ("A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a grant of real property unless it appears from the grant that a lesser estate was intended." (emphasis added)); N.D. Comp. Laws § 5527 (1913).
[¶11] In this case, the 1917 and 1918 deeds are captioned "right of way" deeds and state, in relevant part, that the property owners:
(Emphasis added.)
[¶12] Although the District argues that the deeds are ambiguous and the district court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous when it found parol evidence showed the intent was to convey a fee simple interest, based on the Court's decision in EOG Res., 2015 ND 187, 867 N.W.2d 308, we conclude the plain language of the deeds conveys an easement, not an estate in fee. Rather than granting and conveying a strip, piece, parcel, or tract of land, the deeds here explicitly state that they grant a "right of way" through the specified land. Moreover, the deeds specifically limit the purposes of the right of way for the laying out, construction and maintenance of a public drain.
[¶13] We conclude as a matter of law that the district court erred in holding an ambiguity existed in the right-of-way deeds and conclude the deeds plainly establish the intent to convey only an easement "through" the described property.
[¶14] The district court judgment is reversed.
[¶15] CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, LISA FAIR McEVERS, DANIEL J. CROTHERS and DALE V. SANDSTROM, JJ., concur.