CHARLES S. MILLER, Jr., Magistrate Judge.
Before the court is plaintiff's motion for sanctions for defendant's counsel having cancelled a deposition on less than 24-hours notice.
The underlying disputes between the parties have been explained in prior orders of this court as well as by the federal district court for the Eastern District of California in its remand of plaintiff's removal of a related action pending in state court in California. At bottom, this case is like a number of others filed in this District where out-of-state investors claim they have been misled or are the victims of fraud with respect to investments made in businesses touted as being able to "cleanup" off of the Bakken oil play in North Dakota.
On Thursday, January 22, 2015, defendant's counsel, Robin Perkins, served a notice for taking the deposition of Ken Silva, plaintiff's CFO, for the following Tuesday, January 27, 2015, at Perkins' office in Sacramento, California. Plaintiff's counsel had already scheduled the depositions of defendant Gary Vesci and his father for January 29-30, 2015, the Thursday and Friday of the same week, that were going to be taken by plaintiff's California attorney, Bill Warne of the firm of Downey Brand LLP.
On January 26, 2015, at 1:22 p.m. (less than 24 hours prior to the scheduled deposition), Perkins cancelled the Silva deposition by sending an email to Warne. This was after attorney Edmund Searby of the firm of Baker & Hostetler, which was also representing plaintiff, had traveled from his office in Cleveland, Ohio to defend the deposition.
Plaintiff in this case is represented by three separate law firms. The firm that initially took the lead role and initiated the action is Baker & Hostetler, a large national firm. Three attorneys from its Cleveland, Ohio office have entered appearances in this action: Searby; Darren Crook; and Ruth Hartman. Plaintiff later retained Downey Brand, a regional law firm headquartered in Sacramento, California. From this firm, attorney Warne has entered an appearance and appears now to be taking a lead role in the case. The third firm is the Vogel Law Firm, another regional law firm headquartered in North Dakota, which presumably was retained simply to act as local counsel.
Defendant is represented by Perkins & Associates, a small Sacramento law firm. Two attorneys from the firm, Perkins and Michael Shoff, have entered appearances. However, it appears that they may be assisted by another attorney from their firm. Before turning to the merits of the motion, it is helpful first to consider some of the more relevant correspondence exchanged between counsel for the parties:
Should you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact me, Ned or Bill.
There is no record of any further communication from Warne to Perkins after Perkins' last email at 2:00 p.m. on the 26th. In other words, while perhaps under no obligation to do so, Warne did not correct Perkins' impression that Searby would be attending the depositions of his client and his client's father by informing him that Searby was in town only to defend the Silva deposition.
Searby, who traveled from Cleveland to Sacramento on Sunday, January 25, presumably to meet with Silva in advance of his deposition the next day, returned to Cleveland on January 27th without staying for the depositions of defendant and defendant's father scheduled for the 29th and 30th.
There is no dispute that Perkins cancelled the Silva deposition at the last moment after having been informed that Searby was in town for the deposition and that plaintiff's counsel objected to its cancellation. Hence, the court will focus upon the excuses offered by Perkins for why sanctions should not be imposed for this precipitous action.
One of the excuses Perkins offers for cancelling the deposition is that the parties were actively involved in settlement negotiations and that he cancelled the deposition with an eye toward saving litigation expense if the case settled. The problem with this is that no settlement was reached when the deposition was cancelled. In fact, not only did the case not settle, the two other depositions scheduled for that week went forward.
Perkins contends he was not aware that Searby would be coming to Sacramento for the deposition of Silva when he scheduled it at the last moment, given that Warne, whose office is also in Sacramento, had assumed a leading role in the case and was going to be deposing the defendant and the defendant's father later in the week. The problem with this argument is that, whatever impression Perkins may have been under during the week leading up to the Silva deposition as to which of plaintiff's numerous attorneys would be handling the Silva deposition, it is clear that Perkins was aware when he cancelled the Silva deposition that Searby had traveled from Cleveland for the deposition.
Perkins also appears to suggest that he was not aware when he cancelled the Silva deposition that Searby had traveled only for the Silva deposition. That also, however, is no excuse. Even if Perkins believed Searby's time would not be wasted by his being able to attend the depositions of his client and his client's father, that was not for Perkins to decide. And, his failure to get a clearer picture of what was going on (which he could have done by simply picking up the phone and discussing the matter directly with Warne) is his own fault.
Finally, Perkins appears to suggest that he noticed the Silva deposition because (1) the deadline for completing discovery was approaching and there was no guarantee the court would extend the deadlines, and (2) plaintiff had jammed him up by the late production of some 9,500 pages of information relevant to Silva's deposition less than two weeks prior. But, even if that was true,
In short, Perkins' cancellation of the deposition at the last moment was not appropriate and warrants sanction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 30(g).
Plaintiff claims it should be reimbursed for Searby's travel expenses for his trip to Sacramento from Cleveland, including first class round-trip air fare, hotel for two nights, meals, and miscellaneous expenses (including hotel room minibar), for a total of $1,996.05. Plaintiff also seeks $5,450.00 for ten hours of travel time based on a billing rate of $545.00 per hour.
If plaintiff wants to employ counsel from Ohio to litigate a business dispute centered in California where both parties are located — three time zones away,
After considering all of the circumstances, the court concludes that payment of $1,500 is appropriate. On the one hand, it provides plaintiff with some compensation without fully rewarding its champagne tastes. On the other hand, it imposes more than a nominal sanction upon Perkins.
Plaintiff's motion for sanctions (Doc No. 97) is
As for the last point (and somewhat curiously), Searby purchased the first class travel tickets for which reimbursement is being sought on December 26, 2014, for travel to Sacramento on January 25 and return on the 29th. This was prior to the actual noticing of the three depositions for the last week of January. And, while this may have been because the parties had blocked off the last week of January for scheduling depositions prior to their being noticed, the point is plaintiff's counsel had enough time to either allocate the work more efficiently or seek the extension that was later sought on January 23, 2015.
Finally, and this is a much smaller point, the first class air travel booked a month in advance may have been necessary. But, if so, one would have thought that Searby, who claims here to have been "on the clock" while traveling, could have managed to do some work — even if only reading for another case. During a recent three hour flight to the West Coast for a judicial meeting, the undersigned managed to do some court-related reading, even though jammed in the middle seat in coach.
It is no wonder that the costs of the civil litigation are so high and out-of-reach for all but the wealthy save in contingency-fee cases.