PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a March 21, 2012, order of the district court for Lancaster County in a special proceeding brought pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 32-624 (Reissue 2008). That order dismissed with prejudice a "Petition for Review of Secretary of State Determination Opinion" filed by appellant, the Nebraska Republican Party, against the Nebraska Secretary of State, John A. Gale.
The district court proceeding arose from a March 6, 2012, objection filed by appellant with the Nebraska Secretary of State in which it challenged, pursuant to § 32-624, the candidate filing of Bob Kerrey for the U.S. Senate. On March 16, the Secretary of State issued his determination opinion concluding that Kerrey's name could appear on the May 15, 2012, primary election ballot.
On March 20, 2012, appellant herein filed its petition in the district court for
Upon filing of that March 21, 2012, judgment, the Nebraska Republican Party electronically filed a notice of appeal and docket fee in the district court on that same date. On March 22, the district court for Lancaster County electronically filed the appeal with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, and the appeal was then docketed in the Nebraska Court of Appeals on March 22. This court thereafter, on its own motion, moved the appeal to its docket pursuant to its authority under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2008).
For the sake of completeness, the court notes that appellant filed in this court a notice pursuant Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(E) (rev. 2008) and asserts therein that this is an appeal which "involves the constitutionality of Nebraska statutes." Appellant's brief on appeal fails to assign as error an issue regarding the unconstitutionality of any specific state statute.
This court entered an order to show cause on March 22, 2012, directing that the parties address its jurisdiction in this matter. Further, the parties were ordered to address the issue of whether § 32-624, which requires that an order shall be made by a judge "`on or before the fifty-fifth day preceding the election'" in order to reverse a decision of the Secretary of State, would prohibit this court from granting relief to appellant after that 55-day limitation period had run, because such relief would violate the legislative mandate of § 32-624.
In response to the order to show cause, all parties responded to the court's order and the issues raised therein.
Past reported decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court support the view that appellate jurisdiction seems to exist in this "§ 32-624" type of proceedings, albeit under the predecessor statutes to current Nebraska law, at least where such appeal is taken from a judge of the district court.
Despite the uncertainty in our case law and orders of this court in appeals from such proceedings, we will assume without deciding that subject matter jurisdiction does exist in the matter before this
A court may have subject matter jurisdiction in a matter over a certain class of case, but it may nonetheless lack the authority to address a particular question or grant the particular relief requested.
Section 32-624 directs that a decision of the Secretary of State shall become final unless an order shall be made by a judge "on or before the fifty-fifth day preceding the election" changing that decision. An order by any court made after that time period would violate such legislative mandate, and no relief may be afforded to the party from such an order after the 55th day.
In election cases, this court has no authority to grant relief where the Legislature has established by statute strict deadlines which must be met in order to guarantee that the state's election process is safeguarded against uncertainty and disruption. Section 32-624 and Neb. Rev.Stat. § 32-801 (Reissue 2008) are such statutes. As stated in the affidavit of the Secretary of State, attached to his response to this court's order to show cause,
That certification duty is imposed upon the Secretary of State by § 32-801, and no one asserts he should disregard that statutory obligation.
Thus, for the reasons stated above, this court determines that under the statutory procedure established by the Legislature, it lacks authority to grant the relief sought by appellant. This appeal is therefore dismissed.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
WRIGHT and STEPHAN, JJ., not participating.