CASSEL, Judge.
Davenport Limited Partnership (Davenport) filed an action against 75th & Dodge II, L.P. (Dodge II), for forcible entry and detainer and for rent. The district court entered an order for restitution and later entered summary judgment in Davenport's favor on the issue of damages. Because Dodge II failed to rebut Davenport's prima facie case showing its entitlement to rent and expenses, we affirm.
In a previous action commenced in December 2007, Davenport sought a declaratory judgment against 75th & Dodge I, L.P. (Dodge I); Dodge II; and Dodge Mortgage, L.L.C. (collectively Dodge). The facts of that case are set forth in Davenport Ltd. Partnership v. 75th & Dodge I, L.P., 279 Neb. 615, 780 N.W.2d 416 (2010), from which we summarize. Davenport sought a declaration that Dodge had no rights in a lease of property near 75th and Dodge Streets in Omaha, Nebraska. Through various assignments and transfers, Davenport and Dodge became parties to a "Ground Lease" and a "Space Lease." Davenport was the landlord of the Ground Lease, with Dodge I as lessee. Dodge I was landlord of the Space Lease, with Dodge II and Dodge Mortgage as lessees. The Ground Lease was originally for a 32-year term, expiring in 1998, and it allowed for renewal in a minimum of 10-year increments, not to extend past 2059. As to extending the lease, the Ground Lease stated:
Henry Singer, the president and sole owner of a corporation which is the general and managing partner of Dodge II, testified that he had a telephone conversation in 1995 with a predecessor in interest to Davenport's rights and stated that he would be renewing the Ground Lease to be coterminous with Dodge II's Space Lease, which ran at least until 2017. No written evidence memorialized the conversation, and there is no evidence that Dodge I ever told Davenport of such a conversation prior to May 31, 2007. Davenport continued to accept rent from Dodge I after the end of the original lease term. In late 2007, Davenport advised Dodge I that it had not received timely written notice from Dodge I regarding its intent to exercise its right to renew the Ground Lease for 10 years and that it was Davenport's understanding that Dodge I's possessory interest would expire on May 31, 2008.
On March 10, 2009, the district court for Douglas County entered judgment on Davenport's December 2007 complaint. The district court stated that Dodge I and Dodge II were run by the same general partner of which Singer was the president and sole owner. The court found that Dodge had no continuing rights to the property, that Dodge I failed to give written notice to renew, that Davenport did not waive the written notice requirement, and that Davenport's acceptance of rent from Dodge I after 1998 operated as an extension of the lease for the 10-year minimum period. Dodge appealed, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment on March 26, 2010.
Meanwhile, on April 28, 2009, Davenport filed a first amended complaint for forcible entry and detainer and for rent against Dodge II. Davenport alleged that because Dodge I's leasehold interest under the Ground Lease expired as of May 31, 2008, as ordered by the district court in its March 2009 judgment, Davenport was the landlord under the Space Lease and Dodge II was the tenant. Davenport alleged that Dodge II failed to pay monthly rent and other fees and charges under the Space Lease. Davenport alleged that on March 12, 2009, it mailed to Dodge II, via registered mail, return receipt requested, a written notice of default as required under the Space Lease. On March 30, Davenport mailed a second notice to Dodge II. On April 9, Davenport served upon Dodge II a written 3-day notice to quit. Although more than 3 days had elapsed, Dodge II continued to occupy the premises. Davenport alleged that it was entitled to the immediate possession of the premises. Davenport's second cause of action sought damages for rent. It alleged that it was owed unpaid rent of $400,716.30 for June 2008 through April 2009. Davenport further alleged that rent and other charges continue to accrue under the Space Lease.
On June 23, 2009, the district court entered an order of restitution. The court found that under the Space Lease, Davenport was the landlord and Dodge II was the tenant. The court further found that Dodge II failed to pay rent to Davenport under the terms of the Space Lease, that the premises were being unlawfully occupied by Dodge II, and that Davenport had provided all notices required by the Space Lease and by law. Dodge II appealed that order, and on September 3, 2009, we dismissed the appeal—which was docketed as case No. A-09-739—for lack of jurisdiction.
On November 12, 2009, Davenport moved for summary judgment on its cause of action for damages. During a hearing on the motion, the court received Dodge II's responses to Davenport's request for admissions in which Dodge II admitted that it had not paid any rent to Davenport under the Space Lease. Singer stated in an affidavit that Dodge II had never received any type of notice from Davenport directing that payments were due to Davenport prior to March 12, 2009. In Dodge II's answers to Davenport's first set of interrogatories, Dodge II stated that it was obligated to pay rent of $30,883 for June 2008, that it was not obligated to pay the rent to Davenport, and that it paid $30,883 for June 2008 rent to Dodge I. Similarly, Dodge II stated that it was obligated to pay rent in the amount of $36,983.33 per month for the months of July 2008 to June 2009, that it was not obligated to pay Davenport that rent, that it paid rent for those months of approximately $34,000 per month to Dodge I and Dodge Mortgage, and that it had not been declared in default by Dodge I for paying an amount less than the total amount due.
Steven W. Seline, the attorney and registered agent for Davenport, stated in an affidavit that under the terms of the Space Lease, Dodge II was required to pay Davenport's share of the cost of determining the amount of the rent adjustment that went into effect in July 2008, that Davenport's share was $3,850, that Davenport made demand upon Dodge II for payment of $3,850, but that Dodge II had not paid Davenport.
The district court sustained Davenport's motion. The court found that the four-party agreement incorporated into the Space Lease specifically provided that if Dodge I's interest in the Ground Lease expired, then Davenport became the landlord under the Space Lease and Dodge II would be obligated to pay rent to Davenport. The court found that after the Ground Lease expired, Davenport became the landlord under the Space Lease until the June 2009 order of restitution. Because the district court found that the Ground Lease expired on May 31, 2008, it determined that Dodge II was obligated under the Space Lease to pay Davenport from May 31, 2008, through June 22, 2009. The court ordered that Davenport was entitled to summary judgment against Dodge II for past due rent of $464,820.79 and for its share of expenses in the amount of $3,850, for a total judgment of $468,670.79, plus taxable costs.
Dodge II timely appeals. Pursuant to authority granted to this court under Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-111(B)(1) (rev. 2008), this case was ordered submitted without oral argument.
On appeal, Dodge II assigns 10 errors and includes approximately four pages of argument. In order to be considered by an appellate court, an alleged error must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error. In re Interest of Hope L. et al., 278 Neb. 869, 775 N.W.2d 384 (2009). The only errors that are both assigned and argued are that the district court erred in granting Davenport's motion for summary judgment after finding that Dodge II was liable to Davenport for past due rent and for expenses in the amount of $3,850.
In appellate review of a summary judgment, the court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. Podraza v. New Century Physicians of Neb., 280 Neb. 678, ___ N.W.2d ___ (2010).
At issue in this appeal is whether the district court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Davenport and against Dodge II for past rent and expenses. A prima facie case for summary judgment is shown by producing enough evidence to demonstrate that the movant is entitled to a judgment in its favor if the evidence were uncontroverted at trial. Corona de Camargo v. Schon, 278 Neb. 1045, 776 N.W.2d 1 (2009). After the movant for summary judgment makes a prima facie case by producing enough evidence to demonstrate that the movant is entitled to judgment if the evidence was uncontroverted at trial, the burden to produce evidence showing the existence of a material issue of fact that prevents judgment as a matter of law shifts to the party opposing the motion. Id.
Dodge II argues that Davenport's complaint in the first case was not sufficient to place Dodge II on notice of an obligation to pay Davenport rent between June 1, 2008 (the date the Ground Lease ended), and March 12, 2009 (the date of the district court's order in the first case). We disagree. Under the four-party agreement, which was incorporated into the Space Lease, when Dodge I's interest in the Ground Lease expired, then Davenport became the landlord under the Space Lease and Dodge II was obligated to pay rent to Davenport. As a party to the four-party agreement, Dodge II was on notice as to its terms.
There is no dispute as to the monthly amounts of rent due by Dodge II or that Dodge II did not pay rent to Davenport. Accordingly, the district court correctly entered summary judgment against Dodge II for past due rent in the amount of $464,820.79.
As to the issue of expenses, Davenport's complaint alleged that "[u]nder the terms of the Space Lease, rent and other charges continue to accrue and [Davenport] may incur additional damages under the terms of the Space Lease after the filing of this [c]omplaint." Dodge II denied the allegation in its answer. Under the Ground Lease, the expense of appraisers to determine the monthly additional rent to be paid for each 10-year period "shall be borne equally between Landlord and Tenant." The Space Lease provides:
Seline stated in an affidavit that Davenport's share of the cost of determining the amount of the rent adjustment that went into effect in July 2008 was $3,850, that Dodge II was required to pay Davenport's share under the terms of the Space Lease, that Davenport made demand upon Dodge II for payment of $3,850, but that Dodge II has not paid Davenport the $3,850 incurred by Davenport. Thus, Davenport presented a prima facie case that it was owed $3,850 by Dodge II under the terms of the Space Lease. The burden then shifted to Dodge II to produce evidence showing the existence of a material issue of fact. Dodge II offered nothing into evidence to rebut the prima facie case on this issue. Accordingly, the district court properly entered summary judgment.
Because there is no dispute that Dodge II did not pay rent to Davenport and Dodge II did not rebut Davenport's prima facie case as to rent and expenses claimed by Davenport, we affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Davenport.
AFFIRMED.
