MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL

MOORE, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Phillip J. White appeals his conviction for driving under revocation or impoundment, second offense. For the following reasons, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On December 1, 2008, White was charged in Hamilton County Court with operating a motor vehicle during a period of suspension, second or subsequent offense, a Class II misdemeanor. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-4,108(1) (Reissue 2004). White then filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained by law enforcement after the initial stop of the vehicle alleging that there was not reasonable suspicion to stop him in the first place.

At the motion to suppress hearing (and later trial to the bench), Chad Mertz, a corporal with the Aurora Police Department, testified that on November 12, 2008, at approximately 5:16 p.m., he was on duty in Aurora, Hamilton County, Nebraska, when he saw a vehicle traveling eastbound with a left headlight out. Mertz testified that, at that time, it was getting dark out and he had his cruiser's headlights in operation. Mertz initiated a traffic stop and made contact with White, who indicated that he did not have a driver's license because it had been suspended. Mertz contacted dispatch, which indicated to him that White's license had been revoked. Mertz then arrested White for driving under suspension. On cross-examination, Mertz testified that upon further investigation, the lights on White's vehicle that were on at the time of the stop were the auxiliary lights or "daytime lights" and were not the headlights, but that when he asked White to turn on the headlights, the left headlight was still not operational.

The police cruiser recording of the stop was offered and received without objection at the hearing. The video recording of the stop indicates Mertz was headed westbound when he turned his cruiser around to initiate the stop with White. The recording shows that the weather was mostly clear with some low-lying clouds along the horizon and that the sun was below the horizon line. The sky to the west was a light hazy orange color and a dark blue where the clouds met the horizon. As Mertz headed eastbound to catch up with White's vehicle, the sky was clear and was a darker blue color. At the time of the initial stop, the street lamps were not yet on, but came on during the approximately 22-minute stop.

The trial court overruled White's motion to suppress, and a trial to the bench was held. At trial, in addition to the testimony of Mertz and the video recording of the traffic stop, the State offered exhibit 2, a certified abstract of White's driving record from the Department of Motor Vehicles, and exhibit 3, a certified copy of a Lancaster County Court file in which White was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended. Exhibit 3 indicates that on July 15, 1995, White was cited for operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended, that he pled guilty to the charge, and that he was sentenced to a period of probation. The trial court admitted exhibit 2, over objection, and reserved a ruling on the admission for exhibit 3, which had also been objected to by White.

The trial court found White guilty of driving under revocation or impoundment. The trial court further overruled White's objection to exhibit 3, finding that the objection was an impermissible collateral attack and determined that the present conviction was a second offense. White was sentenced to 15 days in jail, sentenced to 2 years' revocation of his driver's license, and ordered to pay court costs.

On appeal to the district court, White argued that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress, in finding him guilty, and in finding that the offense was a second offense. The district court affirmed the trial court's judgment in all respects, although its reasoning on the motion to suppress differed slightly from that of the county court. White has timely appealed to this court.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

White assigns that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress and that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for second-offense operating a motor vehicle during a period of revocation or impoundment pursuant to § 60-4,108(1).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress based on the Fourth Amendment, apart from determinations of reasonable suspicion to conduct investigatory stops and probable cause to perform warrantless searches, is to be upheld on appeal unless its findings of fact are clearly erroneous. The ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop and probable cause to perform a warrantless search are reviewed de novo. State v. Royer, 276 Neb. 173, 753 N.W.2d 333 (2008).

When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hilding, 278 Neb. 115, 769 N.W.2d 326 (2009); State v. Branch, 277 Neb. 738, 764 N.W.2d 867 (2009). Regardless of whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, an appellate court, in reviewing a criminal conviction, does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. Id.

When dispositive issues on appeal present questions of law, an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision of the court below. State v. Flores, 17 Neb.App. 532, 767 N.W.2d 512 (2009).

ANALYSIS

Motion to Suppress.

White contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress, arguing that there was no evidence to support the trial court's finding that Mertz had probable cause to initially stop White for a traffic violation. White argues that, contrary to Mertz' testimony, it was not yet dark outside and that therefore, he was not required to be driving with his vehicle's headlights on pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,219 (Reissue 2004). This statute requires that "[e]very motor vehicle upon a highway within this state during the period from sunset to sunrise and at any other time when there is not sufficient light to render clearly discernible persons or vehicles upon the highway at a distance of five hundred feet ahead shall be equipped with lighted headlights . . . ."

A traffic violation, no matter how minor, creates probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle. State v. Lee, 265 Neb. 663, 658 N.W.2d 669 (2003). Once a vehicle is lawfully stopped, a law enforcement officer may conduct an investigation reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the traffic stop. Id. This investigation may include asking the driver for an operator's license and registration, requesting that the driver sit in the patrol car, and asking the driver about the purpose and destination of his or her travel. Id. Also, the officer may run a computer check to determine whether the vehicle involved in the stop has been stolen and whether there are outstanding warrants for any of its occupants. Id.

Upon our de novo review, we find that the trial court did not err in concluding that Mertz had the authority to stop White's vehicle to investigate a possible violation of § 60-6,219. The record shows that Mertz observed what he thought was the left headlight of White's vehicle to be out. Mertz stopped White's vehicle at 5:16 p.m., at which time Mertz indicated that it was getting dark out and he had his cruiser's headlights in operation. The video recording from the cruiser confirms that it was beginning to get dark and that the sun was no longer visible. Mertz had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop, which investigation properly included running a computer check to confirm White's statement that his driver's license had been suspended. White's assignment of error is without merit.

Sufficiency of Evidence.

White argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for operating a motor vehicle during a period of revocation, or impoundment, pursuant to § 60-4,108(1); specifically that the prior conviction offered was insufficient to prove the present offense was a second or subsequent offense in accordance with the statute.

In order to prove a prior conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement, "`the State has the burden to prove the fact of prior convictions by a preponderance of the evidence and the trial court determines the fact of prior convictions based upon the preponderance of the evidence standard.'" State v. Macek, 278 Neb. 967, 971, 774 N.W.2d 749, 752 (2009), quoting State v. Hall, 270 Neb. 669, 708 N.W.2d 209 (2005).

Section § 60-4,108(1) provides that it is

Pursuant to § 60-4,108(1)(b), any person so offending shall

Exhibit 2, the Department of Motor Vehicles driving abstract, indicates that on July 15, 1995, White was cited for "DRIVING DURING SUSPENSION" and convicted on April 24, 1996, in Lancaster County Court. The "statute/ord" cited is "60-484." Exhibit 3, the certified copy of the court file for that case, includes a uniform citation and complaint which indicates that count I of the charge convicted was "[o]perate a motor vehicle while his/her Nebraska's operator's license was suspended and before it was reinstated. L.M.C. [specific numerical citation indiscernible]."

At trial, White argued that the enhancement for any subsequent offense was only applicable under § 60-4,108(1), which sets forth the penalties for operating a motor vehicle under revocation or impoundment, while § 60-4,108(2) applies to violations for driving under suspension and does not include an enhancement for any second or subsequent offense. In his brief on appeal, White argues that the prior conviction offered by the State is a "suspension" under a purported city ordinance, which ordinance was not offered in evidence, and therefore the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the prior "suspension" and the alleged "revocation or impoundment" are the same "such" offense under § 60-4,108(1)(b).

The State argues that White's argument amounts to an impermissible collateral attack on the previous conviction, as found by both the county and district courts. When a judgment is attacked in a manner other than by a proceeding in the original action to have it vacated, reversed, or modified, or by a proceeding in equity to prevent its enforcement, the attack is a collateral attack. State v. Smith, 269 Neb. 773, 696 N.W.2d 871 (2005). See, also, State v. Head, 276 Neb. 354, 754 N.W.2d 612 (2008); State v. Keen, 272 Neb. 123, 718 N.W.2d 494 (2006) (argument that prior conviction under municipal code later declared unenforceable could not be used for enhancement amounted to impermissible collateral attack).

In this case, White is not attacking the validity of the previous offense; rather, he is arguing that the previous offense was not the same "such" offense which can be used for enhancement under the particular section of the statute from which he was convicted.

Regardless of whether White's argument amounts to an impermissible collateral attack, which we do not decide, White's argument that the previous offense cannot be used for enhancement must fail. Section 60-4,108(1) provides that not only is it unlawful to operate a motor vehicle during any period that a person's license has been revoked or impounded, but also during any period that "he or she is subject to a court order not to operate any motor vehicle for any purpose." The record from the previous conviction includes an order of probation, in which it was ordered that White "[s]hall not drive a motor vehicle without a valid Nebraska driver's license, proof of insurance and only operate those vehicles properly registered." Thus, the previous conviction qualifies as a previous "such offense" under § 60-4,108(1)(b). The trial court did not err in enhancing White's conviction to a second offense. This assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

The trial court did not err in overruling White's motion to suppress evidence received following a lawful traffic stop. The evidence was sufficient to support White's conviction for second-offense operating a motor vehicle during a period of revocation or impoundment.

AFFIRMED.