IRWIN, Judge.
Marshall Eggert appeals his conviction of first-offense driving under the influence (DUI). On appeal, Eggert asserts that the county court erred in overruling a motion to suppress and that the district court erred in affirming that decision. We find no merit to the appeal. Pursuant to this court's authority under Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-111(B)(1) (rev. 2008), this case was ordered submitted without oral argument.
On June 9, 2008, Eggert was charged by complaint with first-offense DUI. On October 3, Eggert filed a motion to suppress evidence. In part, Eggert alleged that his arrest and the requirement he submit to a chemical breath test were unsupported by sufficient probable cause or reasonable suspicion of DUI.
A Deputy Frederick, the arresting officer, was the sole witness to testify during the suppression hearing. He testified about his training and certification to conduct standard field sobriety tests and DUI investigations. He testified that on April 5, 2008, he was patrolling Interstate 80, when he observed Eggert fail to signal a lane change. He initiated a traffic stop of Eggert's vehicle. Upon making contact, he noticed an odor of alcoholic beverage and asked Eggert to exit the vehicle. Eggert also had bloodshot, watery eyes. He asked Eggert if Eggert had been drinking, and Eggert acknowledged consuming "a few beers."
Frederick administered field sobriety tests, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, the walk-and-turn test, and the one-legged stand test. He testified that he asked Eggert if he had any physical disabilities or impairments that might affect his performance on the field sobriety tests, and Eggert indicated, "When you get real close to my eyes, they get messed up, they get blurry." When Frederick administered the HGN test, Eggert was able to follow the stimulus with his eyes during each phase of the test and never complained that Frederick was placing the stimulus too close to Eggert's eyes. Frederick testified that he observed nystagmus in both of Eggert's eyes, in all three phases of the test, so that Eggert displayed all six clues of impairment on the HGN test. During both the walk-and-turn test and the one-legged stand test, Eggert displayed one sign of impairment.
Based on all of his observations, Frederick testified that it was his opinion that Eggert was under the influence of alcohol. Frederick testified that he did not base his opinion on considering the field sobriety tests as being passed or failed, but, rather, by incorporating all of his observations and all signs of impairment together.
The county court found that the HGN test alone would not be sufficient to establish probable cause for requiring a chemical breath test, but that when combined with Eggert's admission of drinking and the other signs of impairment, there was probable cause. The court overruled the motion to suppress.
After the county court overruled Eggert's motion to suppress, a stipulated bench trial was conducted. Eggert renewed his motion to suppress. The stipulated evidence included the testimony and evidence from the suppression hearing, as well as additional investigative reports. The evidence indicated that Eggert submitted to a chemical breath test and had a blood alcohol content of .116. The court found Eggert guilty of first-offense DUI, sentenced him to a period of 9 months' probation, and ordered his operator's license impounded for 60 days.
Eggert appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the county court's order. This timely appeal followed.
Eggert's sole assignment of error is that the lower courts erred in overruling his motion to suppress challenging the probable cause for requiring him to submit to a chemical breath test.
In determining the correctness of the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court will uphold the trial court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly wrong. State v. Johnson, 256 Neb. 133, 589 N.W.2d 108 (1999). In deciding whether the trial court's factual findings on a motion to suppress are clearly erroneous, the reviewing court recognizes the trial court as the trier of fact and takes into consideration that the trial court has observed the witnesses testifying. Id. However, to the extent questions of law are involved, an appellate court is obligated to reach conclusions independent of the decision reached by the courts below. Id. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court reviews the ultimate determination of probable cause de novo. State v. Baue, 258 Neb. 968, 607 N.W.2d 191 (2000).
In this case, Eggert argues that the evidence of the HGN test should not have been considered because Eggert informed Frederick that he suffers from blurred vision when objects get too close to his eyes and that the HGN test results were not sufficiently corroborated by the other field sobriety tests. We find no merit to either assertion.
Although Frederick testified that Eggert did comment about items becoming blurry if something got too close to his eyes, there was absolutely no evidence adduced to indicate that such happened in this case or that such was the cause of Eggert's failing the HGN test. Rather, Frederick testified that Eggert was able to follow the stimulus during all three phases of the HGN test and that Eggert never indicated that the stimulus was too close or was causing him any problems because of being too close. In addition, although the testimony indicates that Eggert did not perform poorly enough to "fail" the walk-and-turn test and the one-legged stand test, he did demonstrate at least one sign of impairment on each test. There is no requirement that the HGN test be corroborated by other field sobriety tests for the results and observations of the officer during the field sobriety tests to be admissible. Similarly, we conclude that Eggert's arguments about the walk-and-turn test and the one-legged stand test properly go to the weight to be afforded to Frederick's observations during the test, rather than the admissibility of those observations.
Taken as a whole, we conclude that there was no error in finding probable cause. The evidence in this case indicates that Frederick initially stopped Eggert for a traffic violation, noticed the odor of alcohol upon contacting Eggert, observed bloodshot and watery eyes, was told by Eggert that Eggert had consumed "a few beers" prior to driving, observed Eggert to show six signs of impairment during the HGN test, one sign of impairment during the walk-and-turn test, and one sign of impairment during the one-legged stand test. Frederick testified that, based on all of this as a whole, he opined that Eggert was driving under the influence of alcohol. We find no merit to Eggert's challenges to the probable cause to support that opinion.
Eggert also argues that the district court applied the wrong standard of review when applying the clearly erroneous standard of review rather than a de novo standard. Even assuming the district court did so err, we apply a de novo review to the ultimate conclusion on probable cause, and upon our de novo review, we find no reversible error by the county court. As such, any error by the district court in applying the standard of review is harmless.
We find no merit to Eggert's appeal. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.