MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
IRWIN, Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nelson L. Evans appeals from orders of the district court for Douglas County, Nebraska, granting summary judgment in favor of Millard Drywall Services, Inc. (Millard Drywall), and Robert Lally. The underlying action brought by Evans sought damages for an alleged assault committed by Lally while Evans was performing work for Millard Drywall in December 2005. We find that Evans' failure to designate any expert witnesses precluded him from being able to sustain his causes of action against either Millard Drywall or Lally, and therefore, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of each. Pursuant to this court's authority under Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-111(B)(1) (rev. 2008), this case was ordered submitted without oral argument.
II. BACKGROUND
In December 2005, Evans was employed by a temporary labor service and had been assigned to work at Millard Drywall. On or about December 9, while at work at Millard Drywall, Evans was allegedly assaulted by a Millard Drywall employee, Lally. According to Evans, he was standing on a wooden cube and cleaning a piece of machinery when Lally approached him "from behind and shoved a broom handle into [Evans'] rectum through [Evans'] clothing." Evans alleges that he suffered "a rectal muscle contusion, inner and outer," and that he also suffered "severe emotional and mental anguish."
On March 26, 2008, Evans filed a petition in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court against Millard Drywall. In that petition, Evans alleged that "[a]t the time of [his] December 9, 2005, accident, he was employed as a commercial operator," and that the injuries he sustained in the alleged assault by Lally arose "out of and in the course of [his] employment by [Millard Drywall]." The record presented to us does not reveal the eventual outcome of the workers' compensation action.
On March 4, 2009, Evans brought the present action in the district court. In the present action, Evans named both Millard Drywall and Lally as defendants. Evans alleged that Millard Drywall had been negligent in failing to properly supervise, failing to conduct a proper background check, and failing to ensure a safe working environment. Evans also alleged that the assault was an intentional act committed by Lally. Evans alleged that the proximate cause of his resulting injuries and damages for the rectal muscle contusion and emotional and mental anguish was the alleged assault by Lally.
On July 1, 2009, Millard Drywall moved for summary judgment. Although the motion for summary judgment does not indicate the specific basis for Millard Drywall's request for summary judgment, it is apparent that Millard Drywall alleged that the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act was the sole remedy for Evans to seek compensation for an injury allegedly sustained in the course of Evans' employment with Millard Drywall. The district court concluded that Evans had been an employee of Millard Drywall at the time of the alleged assault and that, accordingly, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act was his sole remedy. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Millard Drywall.
On February 18, 2010, Lally moved for an order in limine to prevent Evans from proffering the testimony of any expert who had treated Evans for injuries stemming from the incident allegedly occurring in December 2005. In support, Lally noted that interrogatories had been issued to Evans, a scheduling order issued by the court had directed Evans to designate expert witnesses, that a prior motion to compel had been issued compelling Evans to designate expert witnesses, and that Evans had failed to designate any experts or to provide any expert reports. In ruling on the motion, the district court specifically noted that Evans' counsel "informed the Court that he had no objection to granting the Motion in Limine as he did not have any experts." As such, the court granted the motion in limine.
On March 18, 2010, Lally moved for summary judgment. Although the motion for summary judgment does not indicate the specific basis for Lally's request for summary judgment, it is apparent that Lally alleged that Evans was unable to prove proximate cause and the extent of his alleged injuries and damages because he had declined to designate any expert witnesses. The district court concluded that Evans' alleged injuries were subjective in nature and that they were required to be supported with expert testimony, which Evans had specifically indicated he did not intend to produce. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Lally. This appeal followed.
III. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
On appeal, Evans asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Millard Drywall and in favor of Lally.
IV. ANALYSIS
The issue raised on appeal is whether the district court was correct in finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that both Millard Drywall and Lally were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We find no merit to Evans' assertions that summary judgment was inappropriate. We find that Evans' failure to designate any expert witnesses and Evans' representation to the district court that he had no expert evidence to present on the issues of proximate cause or the extent and nature of his alleged injuries demonstrates that summary judgment was appropriate with respect to both defendants in the court below.
With respect to Millard Drywall, much time is devoted in the parties' briefs to the issue of whether Evans was an employee of Millard Drywall at the time of the alleged assault, such that the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act was the exclusive remedy for Evans. Millard Drywall further argues that Evans' assertions in the petition he filed in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court should be considered judicial admissions. We conclude that we need not reach either issue, because Evans' inability to demonstrate proximate cause or the extent and nature of his alleged injuries with the support of expert testimony is fatal to his claims against both Millard Drywall and Lally. See Healy v. Langdon, 245 Neb. 1, 511 N.W.2d 498 (1994) (proper result in summary judgment can be upheld on different grounds than granted by lower court); Richards v. Meeske, 12 Neb.App. 406, 675 N.W.2d 707 (2004) (summary judgment upheld for reasons different than lower court's).
The Nebraska Supreme Court has previously addressed the issue of when expert testimony is required to establish proximate cause and the extent and nature of injury to support a claim for damages and has drawn a distinction between objective and subjective medical conditions. See Storjohn v. Fay, 246 Neb. 454, 519 N.W.2d 521 (1994). In personal injury cases where injuries are objective and the conclusion to be drawn from proven basic facts does not require special technical knowledge or science, use of expert testimony is not legally necessary to establish the cause and extent of such injuries. Id. However, unless the character of the injury is objective, there must be expert testimony to establish causation and the extent and nature of the injuries. Id. Where the claimed injuries are of such a character as to require skilled and professional persons to determine the cause and extent thereof, the question is one of science, and such a question must necessarily be determined from the testimony of skilled professional persons and cannot be determined from the testimony of unskilled witnesses having no scientific knowledge of such injuries. Id. When symptoms from which personal injury may be inferred are subjective only, medical testimony is required. Id.
In Eno v. Watkins, 229 Neb. 855, 429 N.W.2d 371 (1988), a legal malpractice action was brought against the attorneys who represented the plaintiff in a prior personal injury action. To sustain the malpractice claim, the plaintiff was required to prove that she would have been successful in obtaining a judgment in the personal injury action and that she was prevented from doing so by her attorneys' negligence. As such, she was required to prove proximate cause and the extent and nature of the injuries for which she sought compensation in the personal injury action. The alleged injuries were caused by an automobile accident, which injuries allegedly included "multiple contusions, a strain to her cervical spine, and traumatic arthritis in her cervical spine" as well as mental suffering. Id. at 856, 429 N.W.2d at 372. The Nebraska Supreme Court classified these as subjective injuries and held that the plaintiff's personal testimony about headaches and backaches, without any medical testimony, was insufficient to sustain her claim. Eno v. Watkins, supra. The court held that "[t]he absence of any medical testimony to establish the extent and nature of the plaintiff's alleged injuries and that they were proximately caused by the accident" prevented Eno from recovering. Id. at 859, 429 N.W.2d at 373.
Similarly, in Doe v. Zedek, 255 Neb. 963, 970, 587 N.W.2d 885, 891 (1999), the plaintiff sought compensation for alleged "mental suffering and a sense of helplessness as a proximate result of [the defendant's] negligence." The Nebraska Supreme Court held that mental suffering and a sense of helplessness are injuries which are not plainly apparent and are demonstrated primarily by complaints of the victim. Id. The court held that such injuries are, therefore, classified as subjective in nature and effect and require expert testimony to support a claim for relief. Id.
In the present case, Evans alleged that he suffered "a rectal muscle contusion, inner and outer," and that he had suffered "severe emotional and mental anguish" as a proximate result of the alleged negligence of Millard Drywall and the alleged intentional assault by Lally. The alleged rectal muscle contusion is an injury comparable to the alleged injuries in Eno v. Watkins, supra, and is subjective in nature; causation and the nature and extent of such an injury is not plainly apparent to a nonexpert and cannot be sustained by just the testimony of Evans. The alleged emotional and mental anguish is also a subjective injury which, as noted by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Doe v. Zedek, supra, also requires expert testimony to sustain. In this case, Evans not only failed to designate any experts or proffer any expert testimony to demonstrate that he could meet his burden of proving proximate causation and the extent and nature of his injuries, but he consented to the entry of an order in limine precluding him from attempting to present any such expert testimony and affirmatively represented to the district court that he had no experts.
The record in this case reveals no genuine issue of material fact with respect to proximate cause or the nature and extent of Evans' alleged injuries because the injuries required expert testimony and Evans affirmatively represented that he would not present expert testimony. As a result, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of both Millard Drywall and Lally was correct, and we affirm.
V. CONCLUSION
We find no merit to Evans' assertions on appeal. Summary judgment was proper in favor of both Millard Drywall and Lally because Evans did not have any expert testimony to demonstrate proximate causation or the nature and extent of his subjective injuries.
AFFIRMED.
