NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

MOORE, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

George G. Sarris appeals from the entry of a harassment protection order against him and in favor of Dana C. McCown by the district court for Sarpy County. Because we find that the evidence is insufficient to support the issuance of the protection order, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the cause with directions to dismiss the petition for protection order. Pursuant to our authority under Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-111(B)(1) (rev. 2008), this case was submitted without oral argument.

BACKGROUND

On August 30, 2010, McCown filed a form petition and affidavit for a harassment protection order against Sarris pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.09 (Reissue 2008). The affidavit alleged that on August 28, Sarris showed up at McCown's house at 8:45 a.m., carrying a sign that said "coward?" and "obstruction?" in relation to legal action that McCown had taken against Sarris in her capacity as Sarris' U.S. Air Force squadron commander. McCown also alleged her "belief that Sarris' vehicle had previously been in McCown's subdivision and that she and her family took Sarris' actions as threatening because McCown has "personal knowledge of [Sarris'] past actions." McCown further alleged that between March and July 2009, Sarris made repeated verbal threats to several squadron leaders about getting "even" after McCown submitted a "security information file" against Sarris. Finally, McCown alleged that in November 2008, Sarris told another person at Sarris' part-time job that "he'll get even with management" because McCown took disciplinary action against him for violating Air Force directives.

An ex parte harassment protection order was entered on August 31, 2010. On September 2, Sarris filed a request for hearing, and a hearing was held on September 20. McCown appeared pro se, and Sarris appeared with counsel. At the beginning of the hearing, the district judge asked McCown to raise her right hand and asked her if she solemnly swore that the allegations of her petition are true, to which she responded yes. The judge then advised Sarris that the burden shifted to him. Sarris' counsel moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a cause of action. Discussion ensued between Sarris' counsel, McCown, and the judge. Thereafter, Sarris was sworn and testified. Sarris testified that he is a civilian employee at Offutt Air Force Base. Sarris indicated that he is currently involved in two proceedings relating to his employment. The first proceeding is a prohibited personnel practice action that he filed with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel in the summer of 2007 alleging that reprisal actions were taken against him for reporting unsafe conditions. The second proceeding is an investigation of fraud, waste, and mismanagement related to safety of flight issues at Offutt Air Force Base, for which Sarris was given a "whistle blower protection letter" from a member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance. Sarris testified that he personally gave McCown the whistleblower letter, which was dated October 30, 2008, a copy of which was received in evidence. At McCown's request, Sarris met with McCown again on November 5, the day after he gave her the letter, in McCown's office. At this meeting, McCown presented Sarris with a letter of reprimand. Sarris admitted that he appeared in front of McCown's house with a sign stating "coward?" in reference to an accusation that he was a coward because he expressed fear of retaliation for reporting unsafe conditions. Sarris testified that his purpose in appearing in front of McCown's house was to try to persuade her to reevaluate her position regarding the actions that she had taken against Sarris in retaliation for his reporting the unsafe conditions at Offutt Air Force Base. Sarris denied ever being at McCown's house prior to August 28 and denied ever contacting her by telephone or through electronic means. Sarris indicated that he does not intend to protest in front of McCown's house again or make any other contact with her except within the scope of his official duties.

Following Sarris' testimony, the court asked McCown whether she had any questions of Sarris. McCown did not ask any questions of Sarris, but she proceeded to "point out a few things." At no time during the hearing was McCown sworn to testify; rather, she only swore that the allegations of her petition are true. The petition and affidavit for issuance of a protection order was not offered as an exhibit at the hearing.

Following the hearing, a September 21, 2010, journal entry was noted on the court's docket stating that the protection order should continue in full force for a period of 1 year from the date of issuance. Sarris appealed, after which this court entered an order requiring the clerk of the district court to submit a supplemental transcript to include a signed and file-stamped order. A signed and file-stamped order was entered by the district court on December 15, and this appeal ripened.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Sarris asserts that the district court erred in entering the harassment protection order because the petition and affidavit were not offered into evidence and were not part of the bill of exceptions and thus there was no evidence of harassment presented at the hearing.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A protection order is analogous to an injunction. Mahmood v. Mahmud, 279 Neb. 390, 778 N.W.2d 426 (2010). Accordingly, the grant or denial of a protection order is reviewed de novo on the record. Id.

ANALYSIS

We address first the issue of the record from the protection order hearing. McCown was sworn by the court for only the limited purpose of stating whether the allegations of her petition were true. However, the petition and affidavit were not offered or received in evidence at the hearing. McCown made other comments during the hearing without being sworn to testify.

The Nebraska Supreme Court was presented with a similar factual situation in Mahmood v. Mahmud, supra. The Supreme Court found that the informal discussion that occurred between the lower court, the petitioner's counsel, and the pro se respondent at the contested factual hearing on the petition for a harassment protection order did not produce any evidence sufficient to support issuance of a protection order, since no sworn testimony or exhibits were considered. Id. The Supreme Court noted that because a contested factual hearing in protection order proceedings is a show cause hearing, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the truth of the facts supporting a protection order. Id. The Supreme Court held that while show cause harassment protection hearings do not require the full panoply of procedures common to civil trials, at a minimum, testimony must be under oath and documents must be admitted into evidence before being considered. Id. As such, the form petition and affidavit cannot be considered as evidence until offered and accepted at the trial. Id. See, also, Sherman v. Sherman, 18 Neb.App. 342, 781 N.W.2d 615 (2010) (allegations in petition and affidavit for domestic abuse protection order could not be considered as evidence in determining whether to issue harassment protection order, where petition and affidavit were not received as evidence at trial).

Because McCown did not present sworn testimony or offer exhibits, including the form petition and affidavit for harassment protection order, she failed to meet her burden of proving the grounds for issuance of a protection order.

We next turn to an examination of Sarris' sworn testimony and his proferred exhibit to determine whether this evidence supported issuance of the protection order. Sarris essentially admitted that he appeared in front of McCown's house on one occasion, bearing a sign stating "coward?" Sarris stated that this activity was in the nature of a "protest" in connection with McCown's alleged retaliation following Sarris' reporting of unsafe conditions at Offutt Air Force Base. There was no evidence of any verbal communication or physical contact between the parties during this activity and no evidence of any threats of any kind. Sarris testified to two other contacts with McCown relating to the "whistle blower protection letter." However, the evidence does not show any threatening actions or remarks by Sarris.

Section 28-311.09 allows a victim of harassment to file a petition and affidavit for a harassment order. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02(2) (Reissue 2008) states in relevant part:

Sarris' testimony does not establish a course of conduct as defined in the statute. And, as mentioned previously, there was no sworn testimony from McCown that she was seriously terrified, threatened, or intimidated by any alleged course of conduct by Sarris. We conclude that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the issuance of a harassment protection order.

CONCLUSION

After our de novo review, we find that the evidence was insufficient to support entry of the harassment protection order. We therefore reverse the district court's entry of the order and remand the cause with directions to vacate the harassment protection order.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.