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STATE v. NADEEM, 808 N.W.2d 95 (2012)

Court: Court of Appeals of Nebraska Number: inneco20120117245 Visitors: 21
Filed: Jan. 17, 2012
Latest Update: Jan. 17, 2012
Summary: PIRTLE, Judge. INTRODUCTION Mohammed Nadeem appeals his convictions and sentences in the district court for Lancaster County for attempted first degree sexual assault and attempted third degree sexual assault of a child. Based on our conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in impaneling an anonymous jury, we reverse, and remand for a new trial. BACKGROUND On August 6, 2009, H.K., the victim in this case, was with a friend at a public library in Lincoln, Nebraska. H.K. was 14
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PIRTLE, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Mohammed Nadeem appeals his convictions and sentences in the district court for Lancaster County for attempted first degree sexual assault and attempted third degree sexual assault of a child. Based on our conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in impaneling an anonymous jury, we reverse, and remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

On August 6, 2009, H.K., the victim in this case, was with a friend at a public library in Lincoln, Nebraska. H.K. was 14 years old at the time. While H.K. was sitting at a table in a reading room of the library using her laptop computer, she noticed Nadeem standing within a couple feet of her looking at a newspaper and glancing over at her. Shortly thereafter, Nadeem began talking to H.K. and asking her questions, including how old she was. Nadeem asked H.K. for her telephone number, and when she would not give it to him, he gave H.K. his telephone number and told her he hoped to hear from her.

When H.K.'s mother later picked up H.K. and her friend from the library, H.K. told her mother about her encounter with Nadeem. H.K. and her mother reported the incident to the library and then called the police. The next day, the police asked H.K. to make a controlled call to Nadeem from the police station, which she agreed to do. H.K. spoke with Nadeem and asked him why he wanted her to call. Nadeem indicated that he wanted to talk to her more and to see her. The conversation continued, and they began discussing what they would do together, which led to Nadeem's indicating that he wanted to touch her and that he had a "grand collection of ideas" in regard to what type of touching. H.K. told Nadeem she was a virgin, and at that point, Nadeem asked H.K. if she wanted to lose her virginity and when she wanted to lose it. He suggested "sexual stimulation" such as "licking," "kissing," and "fingering" when H.K. told him that she did not know how to lose her virginity. When H.K. stated that she did not know what "fingering" meant, Nadeem volunteered to do it to her. Nadeem later explained that putting his penis into H.K.'s vagina would also be "stimulation." By the end of the conversation, Nadeem and H.K. agreed to meet at the library about 30 minutes later. Nadeem was arrested when he arrived at the library. Nadeem was 22 years old at the time.

Nadeem was charged by information with attempted first degree sexual assault and attempted third degree sexual assault of a child. A jury found him guilty on both counts. The trial court sentenced him to 3 to 6 years' imprisonment on the attempted first degree sexual assault conviction and not less than nor more than 1 year's imprisonment on the attempted third degree sexual assault of a child conviction.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Nadeem assigns that the trial court erred in (1) impaneling an anonymous jury, (2) finding that there was sufficient evidence to support convictions for attempted first degree sexual assault and attempted third degree sexual assault of a child, (3) admitting testimony by library staff of prior "unusual behavior" exhibited by Nadeem in the library, (4) failing to give an entrapment instruction on the attempted first degree sexual assault charge, and (5) imposing excessive sentences. Nadeem also alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hudson, 279 Neb. 6, 775 N.W.2d 429 (2009). Regardless of whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, an appellate court, in reviewing a criminal conviction, does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. Id. Any conflicts in the evidence or questions concerning the credibility of witnesses are for the finder of fact to resolve. Id. A conviction will be affirmed, in the absence of prejudicial error, if the properly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the conviction. Id.

ANALYSIS

Nadeem first argues that the trial court erred in impaneling an anonymous jury. Before voir dire began, each prospective juror had been assigned a number and each juror was referred to by his or her assigned number, rather than his or her name, throughout voir dire. Based on the record, the numbers were apparently assigned prior to the jurors' being brought in to the courtroom.

The term "anonymous jury" encompasses the withholding of a broad spectrum of information. State v. Sandoval, 280 Neb. 309, 788 N.W.2d 172 (2010). Generally, an "anonymous jury" describes a situation where juror identification information is withheld from the public and the parties themselves. Id. The least secretive form of an anonymous jury is where only the jurors' names are withheld from the parties. Id. At other times, names and other identification information are withheld, but limited biographical information is made available. Id.

Generally, impaneling an anonymous jury is a drastic measure that should only be undertaken in limited circumstances, and there is a danger that the practice could prejudice jurors against the defendants. State v. Sandoval, supra.

Juror anonymity is most disadvantageous to the defendant during jury selection and with regard to the defendant's presumption of innocence. State v. Sandoval, supra. During jury selection, a lack of information could prevent the defense from making intelligent decisions regarding peremptory strikes. Id. Additionally, there is a risk that potential jurors will interpret the anonymity as an indication that the court believes the defendant is dangerous. Id.

A district court's decision regarding impaneling an anonymous jury is reviewed under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Sandoval, supra.

The propriety of withholding personal information or names of potential jurors from the defendant was addressed for the first time by the Nebraska Supreme Court in State v. Sandoval, supra. In Sandoval, the trial court announced in a preliminary hearing that it intended to identify jurors by number rather than by name. The court ordered counsel for Jose Sandoval, the defendant, not to disclose the names of the potential jurors to anyone, including Sandoval. As each juror entered the courtroom for voir dire, the court informed the juror that the court and attorneys would be referring to the juror by his or her juror number. No other acknowledgment or explanation of the action was given.

The Sandoval court established a two-part test to reduce the dangers associated with anonymous or numbers juries. It held that a court should not impanel such a jury unless it (1) concludes that there is a strong reason to believe the jury needs protection and (2) takes reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial effects on the defendant and to ensure that his or her fundamental rights are protected. See State v. Sandoval, supra. Within the scope of this two-part test, the decision is left to the discretion of the lower court and is subject to a review for abuse of discretion. Id.

The Sandoval court adopted several factors used by other courts in determining the first prong of the test, whether the jurors need protection, including (1) the defendant's involvement in organized crime; (2) the defendant's participation in a group with the capacity to harm jurors; (3) the defendant's past attempts to interfere with the judicial process or witnesses; (4) the potential that, if convicted, the defendant will suffer a lengthy incarceration and substantial monetary penalties; and (5) extensive publicity that could enhance the possibility that jurors' names would become public and expose them to intimidation and harassment.

In State v. Sandoval, 280 Neb. 309, 328, 788 N.W.2d 172, 196 (2010), the court held that "[h]enceforth," if a court decides to impanel an anonymous or numbers jury, it must follow the two-part test set forth above and articulate its specific findings of fact in support of such decision.

The Sandoval court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in impaneling an anonymous jury under the circumstances of the case. In regard to the first part of the test, the court concluded that there was a combination of factors to support a conclusion that the jury needed protection. Specifically, the court noted that Sandoval was a member of a gang and had commanded a riot while in prison and preyed on other inmates. The court also noted that the murders with which he was charged generated significant media attention in Nebraska and that, if convicted, Sandoval faced life imprisonment or the death penalty.

In regard to the second part of the test, precautions to prevent prejudice, the Sandoval court concluded that the trial court took reasonable precautions to protect Sandoval from prejudice during voir dire in that the names of the potential jurors were withheld from him, but not from his attorney, and the court permitted extensive individual voir dire of every juror. The court also found that there was no evidence that Sandoval's presumption of innocence was compromised by the use of a numbers jury. It noted that although the trial court did not provide the jurors with an explanation for their anonymity, the trial court did not draw attention to the fact that juror numbers were used instead of names, and there was no indication that the jurors understood the practice to be unusual.

In the instant case, there is nothing in the record to indicate why the trial court thought an anonymous jury was necessary or to support the trial court's decision. Further, there is nothing in the record to show what the jury was told about the use of numbers rather than names and no indication as to whether the jurors' names were withheld from Nadeem's attorney or whether his attorney had an opportunity to object. There is no discussion at all in the record related to the impaneling of an anonymous jury.

As previously stated, State v. Sandoval, supra, is the only case in Nebraska that has addressed the use of an anonymous jury. We acknowledge that the Sandoval case was decided after the trial in the instant case and that the trial court did not have the two-part test to follow in determining whether an anonymous jury was necessary. However, given that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the jury needed protection or any indication as to why the court impaneled an anonymous jury, we are compelled to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in impaneling an anonymous jury, resulting in reversible error.

Having found reversible error, we must determine whether the totality of the evidence admitted by the district court was sufficient to sustain Nadeem's convictions. See State v. Rogers, 277 Neb. 37, 760 N.W.2d 35 (2009). If it was not, then concepts of double jeopardy would not allow a remand for a new trial. See id. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not forbid a retrial so long as the sum of all the evidence admitted by a trial court, whether erroneously or not, would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. Id. We find that the sum of all the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdicts. We therefore reverse the convictions and remand the cause for a new trial.

Given our determination that the trial court abused its discretion in impaneling an anonymous jury, we need not address Nadeem's remaining assignments of error. See State v. Passerini, 18 Neb.App. 552, 789 N.W.2d 60 (2010) (appellate court is not obligated to engage in analysis which is not needed to adjudicate controversy before it).

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in impaneling an anonymous jury. Because the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to sustain Nadeem's convictions, we reverse the convictions and remand the cause for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Source:  Leagle

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