THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
IRWIN, Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cynthia F. Bruckner appeals the decision of the district court for Lancaster County, Nebraska, denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a canine sniff search of the rental vehicle she was driving. Bruckner assigns error concerning her detention, the search, statements made during the detention, and the sufficiency of the evidence to support conviction. We find no merit to Bruckner's assertions, and we affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
The events giving rise to this case, and the issues raised on appeal, are substantially intermingled with those in a companion case filed today in case No. A-11-321 involving Bruckner's son, Scot A. Christensen. Bruckner was driving the rental vehicle in which Christensen was a passenger when the events giving rise to this case occurred.
The relevant factual background concerning the initial traffic stop, the subsequent detention, the search of the rental vehicle, and the discovery of more than 60 pounds of high-grade marijuana is set forth in our opinion involving Christensen. Like Christensen, Bruckner filed pretrial motions to suppress evidence and statements, and the order overruling those motions is discussed in more detail in our opinion involving Christensen.
Bruckner was charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. The two cases were consolidated for purposes of the motions to suppress evidence and statements. After the district court denied Bruckner's motions to suppress, the case was scheduled for trial to a jury. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the court sentenced Bruckner to a period of 3 to 8 years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Bruckner has assigned four errors on appeal. First, Bruckner challenges her detention beyond the time necessary to issue a warning for the traffic violation observed by a Trooper Townsend. Second, Bruckner challenges the search of the rental vehicle as being unlawful and not supported by probable cause. Third, Bruckner challenges the court's overruling of her motion to suppress statements made during the detention while Bruckner and Christensen were alone in Trooper Townsend's patrol vehicle. Finally, Bruckner asserts that there was not sufficient admissible evidence to support conviction.
IV. ANALYSIS
1. DETENTION
Like Christensen, Bruckner asserts that her detention was unlawful. She asserts that the questioning by Trooper Townsend exceeded the permissible scope of questioning for the traffic stop. Bruckner's assertions are substantially similar to the assertions made by Christensen and resolved by our analysis in Christensen's case. For the reasons stated in that opinion, we find no merit to Bruckner's assertions concerning her detention.
2. SEARCH
Like Christensen, Bruckner asserts that the search of the rental vehicle was unlawful. Like Christensen, Bruckner challenges the reliability of the drug detection dog named "Rex" and challenges the finding of probable cause for the search.
Bruckner has provided extensive argument in her brief concerning the lack of guidance for trial courts concerning the appropriate standard for assessing the reliability of a drug detection dog in Nebraska and arguing for a particular standard to be adopted, and she couches much of her argument in the lower court's lack of an appropriate analytical framework for making the determination. As we noted in Christensen's case, the Nebraska Supreme Court has resolved this perceived deficiency in issuing its opinion in State v. Howard, 282 Neb. 352, 803 N.W.2d 450 (2011), issued after Bruckner submitted her brief on appeal. For the reasons set forth in Christensen's case, we conclude that the district court's determination of the drug detection dog's reliability is not clearly erroneous under the framework set forth in State v. Howard, supra. We find no merit to this assignment of error.
3. STATEMENTS
Like Christensen, Bruckner challenges the district court's overruling of her motion to suppress the statements made while she and Christensen were alone in Trooper Townsend's patrol vehicle during the canine sniff of the rental vehicle. Bruckner makes substantially the same arguments as Christensen concerning custody and functional interrogation. For the reasons set forth in Christensen's case, we find no merit to Bruckner's assertions concerning the voluntariness of her statements.
4. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Finally, Bruckner asserts that there was not sufficient admissible evidence to support her conviction. Bruckner asserts that the State adduced insufficient evidence to establish that she had any knowledge of the presence of the 63 pounds of marijuana in the vehicle. We disagree.
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the same: An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact. State v. Nero, 281 Neb. 680, 798 N.W.2d 597 (2011). The relevant question for the appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
In the present case, Bruckner and Christensen gave widely differing stories concerning their travel to New York, the alleged length of the trip did not match the length of the rental agreement, and Bruckner and Christensen made incriminating statements while observing the canine sniff. During the canine sniff, and before the search of the locked containers, Bruckner commented to Christensen, "They're taking us in." Christensen commented to Bruckner that they would have to hope for the case to get "thrown out," and Bruckner responded, "Yeah, but... this stuff is gone."
We conclude that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to allow a trier of fact to conclude that Bruckner was guilty. We find no merit to this assignment of error.
V. CONCLUSION
We find no merit to Bruckner's assertions of error. We find no error concerning the district court's denial of Bruckner's motions to suppress concerning her detention, the search, or the statements made during the detention, and we find the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.
