NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).
INBODY, Chief Judge.
April Houchin appeals the decision of the district court for Lancaster County modifying the parties' dissolution decree granting sole custody of the parties' minor child to Wade Houchin, modifying the parties' visitation schedule, and ordering her to pay child support. Pursuant to this court's authority under Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-111(B)(1) (rev. 2008), this case was ordered submitted without oral argument.
April and Wade were divorced in October 2003. The parties had one minor child, Reid Houchin, who was 3 years old at the time of the parties' divorce. The dissolution decree granted the parties joint legal care, custody, and control of Reid with April given primary physical custody. However, the decree provided that the parties would share custody of Reid on an every-other-day basis, which essentially amounted to joint physical custody with each party having physical custody of Reid about 50 percent of the time. Additionally, the dissolution decree provided, by incorporation of the parties' agreement, that April would have primary decisionmaking regarding Reid's education, religious upbringing, and medical needs.
In January 2010, Wade filed a complaint to modify the parties' dissolution decree seeking custody of Reid, who was 9 years old at that time. In July, Wade filed a motion for temporary custody, which was granted by the district court in October. Pursuant to the temporary order, April was given weekend visitation beginning Fridays at 5 p.m. and ending Sundays at 5 p.m.
Trial was held on January 18 and 19, 2011. At the time of trial, Reid was 11 years old and attended fifth grade. Wade described Reid as an "amazing kid," who is polite, well-behaved, well-adjusted, loving, compassionate to others, and a leader in the classroom and in athletics, and said that Reid has excelled academically. Reid has been involved in football, basketball, baseball, track, a leadership camp, choir, and soccer. Reid is also involved in activities in the church that Wade attends. According to Wade, he signed Reid up for most of his athletic activities and Reid was ordinarily involved in only one sporting activity at a time; this was disputed by April, who testified that Reid was sometimes involved in up to three sports at a time. Reid testified in chambers, and his testimony is sealed. We have reviewed his testimony, but will not set forth specifics of his testimony.
Wade graduated from high school in 2000 and began working as an electrician. He completed a 4-year apprenticeship program, received his journeyman's license, and became an electrical foreman on commercial jobsites. In 2006, Wade gave up his job as an electrician and enrolled at Concordia University, where he studied, worked part time, and played football. He graduated in December 2010 with a degree in secondary education and social science with a psychology concentration. At the time of the trial, Wade was employed as a part-time substitute teacher for various schools in the Lincoln, Nebraska, area and was looking for full-time employment.
Wade testified that he has remarried and that he and his wife have two children together, who at the time of trial were 3 years old and 20 months old. He testified that he and his wife had lived at their current Lincoln address for 5½ years, and before that, he had resided in a duplex for 2 years. Wade described Reid's relationship with his new wife as very close, supportive, and communicative. He further stated that the younger children look up to Reid and that Reid "is kind of a hero to them."
Wade testified that it was his opinion that he has been Reid's primary caregiver since the divorce because Reid was in his care more, he facilitated Reid's activities, he paid tuition and daycare, and he paid for health care. However, on cross-examination, Wade admitted that he had never reimbursed April for any daycare expenses, he had not received any requests from April for daycare expense reimbursement, he had not provided health insurance for Reid since 2006, and he believed Reid was on Medicaid. He further admitted that while he was attending college from 2006 to 2010, his current wife would take care of Reid when he was at school and football practice, often not getting home until 7:30 p.m.
Wade expressed concerns regarding April, including verbal, physical, and emotional abuse; neglect; her leaving Reid home alone unsupervised at too young of an age; and a lack of support for Reid's extracurricular activities such as being consistently late and failing to attend activities. However, Wade admitted that Reid had not missed any sporting event because of April and that he had not witnessed any physical or verbal abuse by April toward Reid since the parties' divorce. Wade expressed concern with the stability of April's home, Reid's emotional well-being and stability, and spiritual life. Wade also claimed that April would speak negatively about him and swear in front of Wade. Wade testified that since their divorce, April has moved on multiple occasions, having lived in an apartment; a rental house in southwest Lincoln; a rental house in Denton, Nebraska; again moving to Lincoln; then moving to Fremont, Nebraska. Despite this, Wade testified that April is a good mother.
Wade testified that he believed that placing primary custody of Reid with him was in Reid's best interests because he had a more stable and secure environment and because of the benefits of Reid's residing in Lincoln. Wade testified that his reason for wanting to modify the decree was April's move to Fremont.
Wade testified that Reid has seen Dr. George Williams, a child psychologist, about 10 times and that he was planning on having Reid continue to see Dr. Williams. Wade's attorney recommended Dr. Williams, and Reid only began seeing Dr. Williams after Wade filed the application to modify. Dr. Williams testified that he met with Reid from January to July 2010 and that early on, Reid was anxious and depressed. According to Dr. Williams, Reid was anxious that a move to Fremont would negatively impact his relationship with his father. Reid was also concerned that although the situation with his parents had improved, his parents would revert to their previous conflicts once the legal proceedings were concluded. At the time of trial, Dr. Williams was no longer involved with the family. Dr. Williams was unsure why Reid stopped attending therapy, but at that point in time, he was in a better mental status.
At the time of trial, April was living in Fremont with her new husband and her children and was working full time in Lincoln at a dental office. April testified that the travel time between Fremont and Lincoln was between 45 minutes to 1 hour and that, although she has job opportunities in Fremont that pay more, she chooses to work in Lincoln because she wants to be in the same town where her son goes to school. April testified that her husband is a firefighter for the city of Fremont and that his employment requires him to live within 12 miles of the Fremont city limits. As a result of this requirement, they were required to move to Fremont in August 2010. April has provided health insurance for Reid through her husband's employment since October 2010. Additionally, she testified that she has provided dental and vision insurance for Reid for the 3 years prior to trial. April testified that she did incur expenses for daycare a few years before trial, but that if she was going to be working late, she would ask Wade to watch Reid so that neither one of them would incur daycare expenses. April denied physically or verbally abusing Reid.
April testified that Fremont has good schools, that Reid has friends in Fremont, and that he plays basketball with a YMCA team. She further testified that she believed that Reid would not suffer in any way if he moved to Fremont and that it was in Reid's best interests that she retain custody of him.
The district court determined that physical custody of Reid should remain with Wade during the school year because the minor child is connected to Lincoln through school, athletics, and church activities. April was granted custody of Reid during the summers and school breaks. April was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $238 per month. April has timely appealed to this court.
April contends that the trial court erred (1) in granting Wade primary physical custody of Reid and granting Wade final decisionmaking authority, (2) in modifying the parties' visitation schedule, and (3) in ordering her to pay child support.
Modification of a dissolution decree is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trial court, whose order is reviewed de novo on the record, and which will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Metcalf v. Metcalf, 278 Neb. 258, 769 N.W.2d 386 (2009); Rouse v. Rouse, 18 Neb.App. 128, 775 N.W.2d 457 (2009).
April contends that the district court erred in granting Wade primary physical custody of Reid.
We first note that although April argues that this is a "removal" case, the law regarding removal of a minor child from the jurisdiction references a request by the custodial parent to remove the minor child from Nebraska to another State. See Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 257 Neb. 242, 597 N.W.2d 592 (1999). The Farnsworth analysis has not been applied to cases involving a move within Nebraska. See McLean v. McLean, No. A-08-879, 2009 WL 1270492 (Neb. App. May 5, 2009) (selected for posting to court Web site).
In cases such as the instant case, where a noncustodial parent has filed a petition for modification of custody in response to the custodial parent's change of residence within Nebraska, we apply the law regarding modifications: Ordinarily, custody of a minor child will not be modified unless there has been a material change in circumstances showing that the custodial parent is unfit or that the best interests of the child require such action. Vogel v. Vogel, 262 Neb. 1030, 627 N.W.2d 611 (2002). A material change in circumstances means the occurrence of something which, had it been known at the time of the initial decree, would have persuaded the court to decree differently. Donscheski v. Donscheski, 17 Neb.App. 807, 771 N.W.2d 213 (2009). The party seeking modification of child custody bears the burden of showing a change in circumstances. Heistand v. Heistand, 267 Neb. 300, 673 N.W.2d 541 (2004).
We first consider whether there has been a material change in circumstances in the instant case. If, at the time of the entry of the dissolution decree, April lived in Fremont and Wade lived in Lincoln, the district court would not have ordered an every other day custody arrangement and would have had to make a determination as to the parent with whom Reid would reside. Therefore, a material change of circumstances has occurred.
Having reviewed the record de novo, as we are required to do, we note that although both parents are fit parents, Reid has substantial ties to Lincoln including his school, friends, church, and sports. Upon our de novo review of the record, we cannot say that the district court's determination that maintaining Reid's stability by remaining in Lincoln was an abuse of discretion.
Our resolution of April's claims that the district court erred in modifying the parties' visitation schedule and in ordering her to pay child support obviously rests upon our decision that the court did not err in awarding primary physical custody of Reid to Wade. Having found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding primary physical custody of Reid to Wade, and noting that April does not appeal the amount of the child support award, we affirm the court's order requiring April to pay child support in the amount of $238 per month. We further find that the district court did not abuse the parties' visitation schedule, as a modification of the visitation schedule was required once the district court determined that placing primary custody of Reid with Wade was in his best interests.
Having considered, and rejected, April's assignments of error, we affirm the decision of the district court.
AFFIRMED.