THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).
IRWIN, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Darwin E. Anderson appeals from the order of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court that denied his request for an award for future medical expenses. Finding no error on the part of the compensation court, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Much of the evidence presented in this case was stipulated to by the parties or was otherwise undisputed. Anderson injured his right thumb in the course and scope of his employment with Lancaster County on April 24, 2008, and his medical and surgical expenses have since been fully paid. His surgeon, a Dr. Bigelow, placed him at maximum medical improvement in February 2009, assigning him a 20-percent permanent partial impairment rating of his right thumb. Anderson returned to work.
On March 23, 2011, Anderson filed a petition with the compensation court in which he alleged that there were matters in dispute including the compensability of past, present, and future medical expenses. Anderson testified at trial that he continues to experience symptoms with his thumb, which will lock up from time to time. He stated that his thumb aches and that his grip with his right hand is not as firm as it was before the accident.
Included in the stipulated evidence were the medical reports of Dr. Bigelow, including one from October 13, 2011, in which he examined Anderson's thumb and noted his complaints, stating that "[h]e does not have enough symptoms that he wants surgery for trigger finger or even a corticosteroid injection, but that is something that could be a possibility in the future." Bigelow received a brief questionnaire that asked him to answer, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, two questions in a "yes" or "no" format. One of the questions was as follows: "Is it your opinion that... Anderson will more likely than not require reasonable and necessary future medical care to treat his work-related right thumb injury, be it follow-up consultations with you, potential injections and/or potential surgery?" Bigelow checked the "yes" box, and he also wrote in a space provided for "Potential Future Medical Care" as follows: "[C]onsultation possible, injections, possible trigger thumb release."
The compensation court ordered Lancaster County to pay for the October 2011 office visit but found that the evidence presented was insufficient to support an award of future medical expenses. The court stated that Dr. Bigelow's evidence was couched in terms of potential or possible future treatment. Anderson's request for future medical expenses was denied. He appeals to this court.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Anderson contends that the compensation court erred in finding insufficient evidence to justify an award of future medical care. He also asserts that the court erred as a matter of law in imposing a heightened burden of proof on Anderson by requiring expert medical testimony supporting the reasonableness and necessity of specific future treatment modalities to award future medical care.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-185 (Cum. Supp. 2012), an appellate court may modify, reverse, or set aside a Workers' Compensation Court decision only when (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order, judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by the compensation court do not support the order or award. Manchester v. Drivers Mgmt., 278 Neb. 776, 775 N.W.2d 179 (2009).
On appellate review, the factual findings made by the trial judge of the Workers' Compensation Court have the effect of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong. Id.
ANALYSIS
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-120(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2012) provides that "[t]he employer is liable for all reasonable medical, surgical, and hospital services, including... appliances, supplies, prosthetic devices, and medicines as and when needed, which are required by the nature of the injury and which will relieve pain or promote and hasten the employee's restoration to health and employment...." In construing § 48-120(1)(a), the Nebraska Supreme Court has emphasized that before an order for future medical benefits may be entered, there should be a stipulation of the parties or evidence in the record to support a determination that future medical treatment will be reasonably necessary to relieve the injured worker from the effects of the work-related injury. See Foote v. O'Neill Packing, 262 Neb. 467, 632 N.W.2d 313 (2001).
The compensation court noted that there was no stipulation of the parties as to future medical expenses and assessed Anderson's evidence as insufficient. The court relied on the following passage from Adams v. Cargill Meat Solutions, 17 Neb.App. 708, 714, 774 N.W.2d 761, 765 (2009):
Simply stated, an award of future medical expenses requires explicit evidence that future medical treatment is reasonably necessary to relieve the injured worker from the effects of the work-related injury. Here, there is no evidence that [the worker] requires any future medical treatment or that future medical treatment would be in any way beneficial in relieving the effects of her back injury.
The court found that Anderson's evidence consisted of statements and reports from Dr. Bigelow that Anderson should return as needed, including a discussion about possible future surgery and possible injections and an opinion identifying potential future medical care in the form of consultation, possible injections, and a possible trigger thumb release. Applying this evidence to the above-quoted passage from Adams, the compensation court found that Anderson did not present explicit evidence to support an award of future medical benefits.
Anderson argues that the compensation court's analysis constitutes the imposition of a new, and more stringent, standard for the award of future medical benefits. We disagree. The court was applying long-held principles rejecting awards based on speculation and conjecture. Expert medical testimony based upon "could," "may," or "possibly" lacks the definiteness required to support an award from the Workers' Compensation Court. Edmonds v. IBP, inc., 239 Neb. 899, 479 N.W.2d 754 (1992). See, also, Fuglsang v. Blue Cross, 235 Neb. 552, 456 N.W.2d 281 (1990) (medical opinion that it is more likely than not that injury occurred at given time lacks definiteness and certainty necessary for it to be basis for compensation award), citing Husted v. Peter Kiewit & Sons Constr. Co., 210 Neb. 109, 313 N.W.2d 248 (1981) (physician's opinion, which amounted to no more than statement that it was more likely injury occurred on date of accident than when worker was at bedrest following accident, lacked definiteness and certainty necessary for it to be basis for compensation award). An expert's opinion must be examined in the context of the expert's entire testimony. Renne v. Moser, 241 Neb. 623, 490 N.W.2d 193 (1992).
Rather than announcing a new standard for the award of future benefits, the compensation court was merely applying long-settled case law involving the level of definiteness and certainty required to support a medical opinion. The record reflects that Anderson's expert opinions were couched only in terms of "possible," "potential," or "more likely than not," all of which have been held to be insufficiently definite. Anderson's assigned errors are without merit.
CONCLUSION
The compensation court did not err in denying Anderson's request for future medical expenses, and its judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
