THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

IRWIN, Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This appeal was brought by Jefferson County School District No. 48-0300, also known as Tri County Public Schools (TPS). TPS seeks review of a writ of mandamus issued by the district court for Gage County ordering the Gage County officials to revise records and maps to reflect certain annexations by the city of Beatrice, Nebraska, and directing TPS to pay back property taxes assessed during tax years 2010 and 2011. The writ of mandamus was issued subsequent to, and consistent with, a summary judgment order entered by the district court on February 16, 2012. Because we find that the summary judgment order was the final, appealable order and that TPS failed to timely appeal from it, we dismiss the appeal.

II. BACKGROUND

This case was filed by Beatrice Public Schools (BPS) in December 2009, by the State of Nebraska, seeking a writ of mandamus directing various Gage County officials to revise their records to reflect changes in boundary lines resulting from a number of annexations of property in Gage County by the city of Beatrice since 1971. Dale F. Kruse, a resident of the city of Beatrice, was permitted to intervene, and TPS was later added as a necessary party.

Prior to the instant action, TPS had filed an action in Gage County in 2007 seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the county assessor to revise her records to reflect that certain of the annexed property was part of the TPS school district. BPS was aware of that action, but did not intervene in it. TPS prevailed in that action, and no appeal was taken from the final order. In the instant action, TPS asserted that collateral estoppel or res judicata should operate to prevent BPS' mandamus request.

On February 16, 2012, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of BPS. In the summary judgment order, the district court held:

(Emphasis in original.) The court ordered TPS to pay back all property taxes levied and assessed for tax years 2010 and 2011 and distributed to them by the Gage County treasurer, and ordered those funds be disbursed to BPS.

On February 27, 2012, the court entered a "Peremptory Writ of Mandamus" ordering the Gage County officials to revise their records and maps to reflect the annexations by the city of Beatrice and ordered TPS to pay back property taxes assessed for tax years 2010 and 2011. The mandamus order also stated that the requirements imposed on the Gage County officials pursuant to TPS' 2007 action were no longer to be enforced.

TPS filed a notice of appeal on March 28, 2012. The notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the February 27 mandamus order, but was not filed within 30 days of the summary judgment order.

III. ANALYSIS

TPS challenges the district court's sustaining of BPS' motion for summary judgment, overruling of TPS' motion for summary judgment, and granting of mandamus. We do not reach the merits of these assertions, however, because we conclude that TPS failed to timely perfect its appeal.

The situation in the present case is somewhat analogous to the situation presented in City of Ashland v. Ashland Salvage, 271 Neb. 362, 711 N.W.2d 861 (2006). In that case, the city of Ashland brought a declaratory judgment action against Ashland Salvage, "seeking a declaration as to the existence and lawful boundaries of certain public rights-of-way claimed by the city and further seeking an injunction against [Ashland Salvage's] improper use of the public rights-of-way." 271 Neb. at 363, 711 N.W.2d at 864. Following trial, in a file-stamped journal entry dated November 22, 2004, the district court ruled in favor of the city in the declaratory judgment action, "declaring the boundaries of [Ashland Salvage's] property and the existence of the city's public rights-of-way. Specifically, in its journal entry, the district court stated that `a public right-of-way exists and its legal boundaries are as set forth in Exhibit 14.'" Id. at 365, 711 N.W.2d at 866. Further, in the journal entry, the district court "`enjoined [Ashland Salvage] from any use of [the disputed] property inconsistent with its use as a public right-of-way.'" Id. The journal entry also "directed the city to prepare an `injunction,' and an `Order of Permanent Injunction' was subsequently filed on December 6." Id. at 365-66, 711 N.W.2d at 866.

On November 30, 2004, Ashland Salvage filed its notice of appeal from the adverse ruling, and the Nebraska Supreme Court considered whether appellate jurisdiction existed in the case or whether the notice of appeal had been filed prematurely. The Supreme Court concluded:

Id. at 367-68, 711 N.W.2d at 867 (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court therefore determined that because the November 22 journal entry disposed of the claims, the appeal taken from the November 22 journal entry was timely. Id.

Similarly, in the present case, the district court's February 16, 2012, order resolved all of the issues and claims that had been raised, notwithstanding its directive for counsel to prepare a formal writ of mandamus for the court's later execution. The February 16 order in the present case resolved the issues in the same way as the November 22, 2004, journal entry in City of Ashland, supra, and just as the Supreme Court concluded that the court's directive in that case for the subsequent preparation of an actual injunction to be executed did not prevent the November 22 journal entry from being final and appealable, so too did the court's directive in the present case for the subsequent preparation of a writ of mandamus for the court's execution not prevent the February 16, 2012, order from being final and appealable.

The only difference between the language of the actual writ of mandamus and the February 16, 2012, summary judgment order was the inclusion in the writ of language indicating that the requirements imposed on the Gage County officials pursuant to TPS' 2007 action were no longer to be enforced. That language, however, was entirely superfluous and had no effect on the February 16 order in any way. Prior to the present action being instituted by BPS, certain boundary lines were in effect and taxes were imposed and disbursed accordingly. Some of those boundary lines and tax revenue rights were established by TPS' 2007 action. In the February 16 order in the present case, the court changed those boundary lines, changing the imposition of taxes and disbursing of tax revenues accordingly. The language in the writ of mandamus specifying that the boundaries and effects of the 2007 order were no longer in effect was merely stating a specific effect of the present order, not providing any new substantive finding or resolution of any outstanding claims.

We note TPS asserted in its reply brief that the February 16, 2012, summary judgment order did not include a ruling on BPS' request that Gage County "hereafter levy, collect, and disburse property taxes on the disputed property," and that such was not ruled on until the writ of mandamus was executed. This also does not amount to any substantive change in the writ of mandamus from the February 16 order, however, as this was merely part of the request to have the tax boundaries changed. If the request to change the tax boundaries was granted (as it was in the summary judgment order), then of course Gage County is also going to levy and collect taxes differently than it had in the past. This is not a case involving multiple causes of action, such as Malolepszy v. State, 270 Neb. 100, 699 N.W.2d 387 (2005). Rather, there was one cause of action here that included multiple consequences, and the summary judgment order specifically granted the relief requested in the form of declaring the new boundaries, and the consequences concerning the levying of taxes, like no longer following the prior order concerning boundaries, simply followed from that resolution of the cause of action.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the February 16, 2012, summary judgment order resolved all of the claims presented and disposed of the whole case, notwithstanding the direction for preparation of a writ of mandamus to be later executed, it was a final, appealable order disposing of the claims of the parties. TPS failed to perfect an appeal from the order within 30 days. As such, the present appeal is untimely and must be dismissed.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

MOORE, Judge, participating on briefs.