RIEDMANN, Judge.
This matter is before the court on Joshua M.'s motion for attorney fees. Motions for attorney fees filed pursuant to Neb. Ct. R.App. P. § 2-109(F) (rev.2012) are typically disposed of with a minute entry. A minute entry is not appropriate here, because Joshua's motion involves an issue not previously reported in our case law. The new issue presented that we must answer is whether a motion for attorney fees is timely when it is not filed within 10 days after the release of an opinion, but is filed within 10 days of the Nebraska Supreme Court's denial of a petition for further review.
Without reaching the merits of whether attorney fees are proper in a case of this nature, we deny Joshua's motion as untimely.
This case began as a paternity action that the State initiated, and it ended with Joshua's requesting, and being awarded, custody of the minor child. The child's mother, Amy B., appealed the trial court's order awarding Joshua custody. We affirmed the trial court's order on December 11, 2012. See State on behalf of Keegan M. v. Joshua M., 20 Neb.App. 411, 824 N.W.2d 383 (2012). Amy filed a petition for further review on January 9, 2013, which the Supreme Court denied on March 13. Joshua filed a motion for attorney fees and costs 8 days later.
Section 2-109(F) governs the filing of a motion for attorney fees following an appeal. This section provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Pursuant to § 2-109(F), a motion for attorney fees must be filed within 10 days of either (1) the release of the court's opinion or (2) the entry of the order of the court disposing of the appeal. Joshua did not file his motion within 10 days of the date of the release of the opinion. Therefore, his motion is untimely unless he filed it within 10 days of "the entry of the order of the court disposing of the appeal."
The phrase "the entry of the order of the court disposing of the appeal" is not specifically defined in the court rules; however, § 2-109(F) provides guidance as to its meaning. This section states that the phrase includes "an order disposing of a motion for rehearing." It does not state that the phrase includes an order disposing of a petition for further review. Motions for rehearing are governed by Neb. Ct. R.App. P. § 2-113 (rev.2012), and neither party filed a motion for rehearing.
In addition to addressing motions for rehearing, § 2-109(F) also states that a motion for attorney fees which is timely filed in the Nebraska Court of Appeals
We further note that the phrase "the entry of the order of the court disposing of the appeal" appears with one variation in Neb. Ct. R.App. P. § 2-102(F)(1) (rev. 2012) governing petitions for further review. This section requires the following:
As evidenced by the above, the phrase "an order of the Court of Appeals finally disposing of an appeal" is defined again as including an order on a motion for rehearing and is expanded to include an order on a motion for attorney fees filed with the Court of Appeals.
Neb. Ct. R.App. P. §§ 2-107 (rev. 2012) and 2-108 (rev.2008) also address disposition of appeals, but are inapplicable to the present case. We identify them solely for purposes of completeness. Neither of them, nor any other court rule, defines the phrase "an order of the court finally disposing of an appeal" to include an order on a petition for further review. To the contrary, a careful reading of the rules leads to the conclusion that an order denying a petition for further review is not "an order of the court disposing of the appeal" as contemplated in § 2-109(F). We reach this determination because (1) § 2-109(F) specifically defines an order on a motion for rehearing as "an order of the court disposing of the appeal," but does not include an order on a petition for further review in that definition, and (2) § 2-109(F) provides that the filing of a motion for attorney fees tolls the time for filing a petition for further review, but fails to provide for the converse. Therefore, we determine that the filing of a petition for further review does not toll the 10-day period in which to file a motion for attorney fees.
In the present case, if we were to determine that Joshua's motion for attorney fees was timely, we would create an absurd result, because Amy did not file her petition for further review until 29 days after we released our opinion. Therefore, although Joshua "missed" the 10-day deadline following issuance of our opinion, he would be fortuitously timely because Amy filed a petition for further review. The following chronology depicts this absurdity:
As evidenced by the above, Amy's filing of the petition of further review would breathe new life into an otherwise expired time period in which to file a motion for attorney fees. While a party who is successful
Joshua failed to timely file his motion for attorney fees when he failed to file it within 10 days from the date on which we released the opinion in State on behalf of Keegan M. v. Joshua M., supra. We therefore deny his motion.
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES DENIED.