LAURIE SMITH CAMP, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the Joint Stipulation of Consent Decree (Filing No. 79) entered into by Plaintiff Shirley L. Phelps-Roper and Defendants City of Bellevue, John W. Stacey, Gary Mixan, Kay Dammast, and Gary Troutman (collectively the "Bellevue Defendants"); Objections to the Proposed Consent Decree (Filing Nos. 84, 85, 86, 87, 88); Motions to Dismiss and Abstain or to Stay Proceedings and for a Protective Order (Filing Nos. 42, 47, 51, 52, 56, 72); and the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Steven M. Curry and Anthony McPhillips (Filing No. 68). For the reasons discussed below, the Court declines to enter the consent decree and the objections will be sustained. The
Plaintiff Shirley L. Phelps-Roper ("Phelps-Roper") is a member of the Westboro Baptist Church ("WBC") and regularly protests at funerals, including the funerals of United States soldiers. (Filing No. 17, Amended Complaint, ¶ 1.) The Defendants in this action are city, county, and state government officials and officers, mainly in eastern Nebraska. (Id. ¶¶ 2-22.) Phelps-Roper and members of her family picketed a soldier's funeral in Bellevue, Nebraska, on June 5, 2007. (Id. ¶ 49.) During the protest, Bellevue police officers arrested Phelps-Roper for contributing to the delinquency of a minor after she allowed her son to step on an American flag. (Id. ¶ 63.) On July 5, 2007, criminal complaints were filed in Sarpy County Court (the "county court") charging Phelps-Roper with one count each of mutilating a flag, disturbing the peace, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and negligent child abuse. (Id. ¶ 67.)
On February 3, 2009, Phelps-Roper filed a motion to quash with the county court, seeking relief from prosecution. (Id. ¶ 68.) Phelps-Roper argued that Nebraska's flag mutilation statute, Neb. Rev.Stat. § 28-928 (Reissue 2008), was unconstitutional. (Id.) The county court declined to rule on Phelps-Roper's constitutional challenges because of its limited jurisdiction. (Id.) Phelps-Roper appealed the county court's decision and moved to bypass review by the state district court and court of appeals and to appeal directly to the Nebraska Supreme Court. (Id.) The Nebraska Supreme Court granted the bypass but dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. (Id.) Phelps-Roper's appeal is currently pending before the Nebraska Supreme Court on a motion for rehearing and the matter has not yet returned to the county court. (Id.)
Phelps-Roper filed this case on December 30, 2009 (Filing No. 1). She amended her complaint on January 20, 2010, to add Defendant Gary Troutman and new allegations. (Filing No. 17, Amended Complaint.) In the Amended Complaint, Phelps-Roper asserts five general causes of action: (1) Counts I and II challenge the constitutionality of the Nebraska Funeral Picketing Law ("NFPL"),
With the original Complaint, Phelps-Roper filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction with respect to the criminal proceedings and the enforcement of the statutes and ordinances she challenges. (Filing No. 5.) A hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction was set for February 25, 2010. (Filing No. 41.) On February 23, 2010, the Court granted Defendants Heineman, Bruning, Hutton,
The Proposed Consent Decree purports to settle the claims between Phelps-Roper and the Bellevue Defendants. Regarding the NFPL, the Proposed Consent Decree states:
(Filing No. 79-1, Proposed Consent Decree, ¶ 2.)
Regarding the Nebraska Flag Mutilation Statute, the proposed consent decree states:
(Id. ¶ 3.)
The Proposed Consent Decree also notes that Phelps-Roper was being prosecuted under the flag mutilation statute, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and negligent child abuse. Regarding these charges in criminal actions pending against her, the Proposed Consent Decree states:
(Id. ¶¶ 5-7.)
The Proposed Consent Decree also forbids the City of Bellevue or its employees, agents, or assigns from arresting Phelps-Roper for disturbing the peace, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, or negligent child abuse for conduct associated with her picketing activities. (Id. ¶ 9.) The Proposed Consent Decree concludes by obligating the parties to attempt to reach an amicable agreement before involving the Court in an action to enforce the obligations. (Id. ¶ 10.) Last, the parties agree to dismiss Phelps-Roper's claims against the Bellevue Defendants at the Bellevue Defendants' cost, and ask the Court to retain jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the Proposed Consent Decree. (Id. ¶ 11-12.)
Entry of a consent decree is a judicial act and is left to the district court judge's informed discretion. Missouri v. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 104 F.3d 159, 162 (8th Cir.1997). The district court reviews a proposed consent decree for fairness, reasonableness and adequacy. United States v. Hercules, Inc., 961 F.2d 796, 800 (8th Cir.1992). A district court must also determine whether the proposed decree is consistent with the goals of the underlying legislation. United States v. Union Elec. Co., 132 F.3d 422, 430 (8th Cir.1997).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,. . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. Specifically, the complaint must contain "enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" to substantiate the necessary elements of the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
When ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must rule "on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true," and "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and `that recovery is very remote and unlikely.'" Id. (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)). The complaint, however, must still "include sufficient
"Two working principles underlie . . . Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 1950 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
The Court will not adopt the Proposed Consent Decree because its terms are inconsistent with statutory rights and duties. Though the law favors settlement, a district court "is not a mere `recorder of contracts from whom parties can purchase injunctions.'" Hesselbein v. Clinton, 999 F.2d 320, 324 (8th Cir.1993) (quoting Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 530, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986)). Rather, a consent decree is a judicial act, and "the adopting court is free to reject agreed-upon terms as not in furtherance of statutory objectives." Id. (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115, 52 S.Ct. 460, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932)). A district court "may not enter a consent decree that imposes obligations on a party that did not consent to the decree." Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 530, 106 S.Ct. 3063. Further, parties may not consent to do something together that they lack the power to do individually. Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 560 (7th Cir.1986) ("Some rules of law are designed to limit the authority of public officeholders."). Absent a finding that a court action is necessary to remedy a federal constitutional violation, "parties can only agree to that which they have the power to do outside of litigation." Perkins, 47 F.3d at 216.
In the present case, Phelps-Roper and the Bellevue Defendants lack the power to consent to the terms of the decree. First, the Bellevue Defendants may not abrogate duties in the manner provided in the Proposed Consent Decree. In Nebraska, police chiefs and officers have a "duty to arrest all offenders against the laws of the state or the city." Neb.Rev. Stat. § 16-323 (Reissue (2007)). The proposed consent decree states, inter alia, that Bellevue Defendants will not arrest or issue citations against Phelps-Roper for violations of the NFPL
The Proposed Consent Decree also affects the rights and duties of parties who did not consent to its terms. The Proposed Consent Decree states that the criminal citations and preconditions placed on Phelps-Roper were unconstitutional. At this early stage of the litigation, it is not apparent that a court order is necessary to rectify a violation of the federal constitution. See Perkins, 47 F.3d at 216. A decree that the underlying arrest was unconstitutional would be a complete defense, backed by judicial force, to Phelps-Roper's criminal action pending in the county court. Thus, the terms would affect the rights and duties of the county attorney who prosecutes the crime, and the State of Nebraska which delegates enforcement of its laws to county and municipal authorities. Absent the affected parties' consent or a supported finding that the statutes and enforcement methods used by the Bellevue Defendants were unconstitutional, court approval is improper.
Last, the Proposed Consent Decree's language forbidding testimony unduly interferes with state court processes and would be overly burdensome to enforce. The enforcement mechanism of a consent decree makes it a judicial act. Hesselbein, 999 F.2d at 325. Further, a consent decree must use the least restrictive means and be narrowly drawn to address a particular problem. Hines v. Anderson, 547 F.3d 915, 922 (8th Cir.2008). The Proposed Consent Decree bars the Bellevue Defendants or their agents or assigns from assisting in the prosecution of Phelps-Roper's criminal actions pending in the county court unless subpoenaed. If subpoenaed, the Bellevue Defendants, their agents, employees, or assigns may not give any evidence or testimony inconsistent with the Proposed Consent Decree.
This provision presents at least two problems. First, the stated guideline that testimony and evidence "be consistent with the Proposed Consent Decree" is overly broad. Blanket injunctions are disfavored. Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849, 852 n.1 (8th Cir.2004). A consent decree that requires future testimony to be consistent with the decree's terms lacks the same specificity. Nearly every statement a witness makes would need to be reviewed to ensure consistency with the broad spectrum of the Proposed Consent Decree. This process makes enforcement overly burdensome and intrusive. Second, this term places judicial restriction on the content of a witness's testimony. While the Bellevue Defendants are free to adopt an "official position" regarding their future conduct, the Court will not enter a decree that expressly limits a witness's testimony in this manner. Because the Proposed Consent Decree is not narrowly drawn and is too broad to enforce, it will not be approved.
In sum, the Court encourages parties to settle their disputes amicably, and respects such efforts. The Proposed Consent Decree, however, affects the rights and duties of Defendants who did not consent to its terms. Further, some of the terms are so broad as to be difficult if not impossible to enforce. The Court concludes, therefore, that the Objections to the Joint Submission
In Counts VI and VII of the Amended Complaint, Phelps-Roper seeks a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief barring enforcement of sections 28-111, 28-112, and 28-125 through 28-133 of the Bellevue Municipal Code. Each of these sections has been repealed by Bellevue City Ordinance 3561, effective February 8, 2010. Because there is no evidence that the City of Bellevue intends to reenact the repealed ordinances, Phelps-Roper's claims are moot and will be dismissed. See Epp v. Kerrey, 964 F.2d 754, 755-56 (8th Cir.1992).
The Court will dismiss Phelps-Roper's claims that she may address in her pending criminal case, but will retain jurisdiction over her challenges to the NFPL. Generally, federal district courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise jurisdiction over proper cases. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). However, courts may abstain from deciding certain issues to preserve "traditional principles of equity, comity, and federalism." Alleghany v. McCartney, 896 F.2d 1138, 1142 (8th Cir.1990). Federal court abstention is divided into several limited doctrines aimed at preserving these principles. See generally Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941) (abstention appropriate where a challenged state statute is susceptible of a construction by the state court that would modify or avoid a federal constitutional question ("Pullman abstention")); Colorado River Water Conservation, 424 U.S. at 817-820, 96 S.Ct. 1236 (1976) (abstention appropriate to avoid duplicative litigation ("Colorado River abstention")); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943) (abstention appropriate to avoid needless conflict in administration of state affairs ("Burford abstention")); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) (abstention appropriate to avoid intrusion on state enforcement of state laws in state courts ("Younger abstention")).
The Defendants in this case argue the Court should dismiss and abstain because of the pending criminal charges against Phelps-Roper. The Court concludes it should abstain, and dismiss Counts III through V and Count VIII, under the Younger doctrine, because these issues may be addressed through the defense of her criminal charges. However, the Court will not dismiss Phelps-Roper's challenge to the NFPL, because none of the Defendants has demonstrated that abstention is proper at this time.
Counts III through V must be dismissed because criminal actions are pending that relate directly to these allegations. In Younger, the Supreme Court held that federal courts must dismiss suits for injunctive or declaratory relief directly related to pending criminal proceedings, except in the most exceptional circumstances. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43, 91 S.Ct. 746. In Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982), the Supreme Court set out a three-part test for deciding whether a district court should abstain in favor of a state proceeding. Before abstaining, the district court must determine that: (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests;
Here, criminal proceedings that raise important state interests are pending against Phelps-Roper in a Nebraska state court. State interests are matters that traditionally look to state law for resolution or implicate separate state policies. Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir.1997). Charges for disturbing the peace, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and negligent child abuse are all matters typically resolved under state law. Further, the proceedings raise important state interests because Phelps-Roper challenges the constitutionality of state statutes. See Postscript v. Peach, 878 F.2d 1114, 1116 (8th Cir.1989) ("vital state interests" implicated where plaintiff raised the issue of constitutionality of state statutes). Accordingly, the first two parts of the Middlesex analysis are met.
The state criminal proceedings also afford Phelps-Roper an opportunity to present her constitutional claims. Nebraska law allows criminal defendants to challenge the constitutionality of statutes under which they are charged, through a motion to quash or a demurrer. See State v. Liston, 271 Neb. 468, 471, 712 N.W.2d 264 (2006). Phelps-Roper herself challenged the flag desecration statute through a motion to quash before the county court.
The Court must also abstain on Phelps-Roper's substantive due process claim because it is based on her arrest and prosecution. Abstention on issues affecting the outcome of a constitutional challenge is appropriate where nonabstention would foreclose a state court's opportunity to address the direct statutory challenge. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 445, 97 S.Ct. 1911, 52 L.Ed.2d 486 (1977). In other words, district courts must abstain from constitutional challenges that are inseverable from claims that must be dismissed under Younger abstention. Act Now to Stop War and End Racism Coalition v. District of Columbia, 589 F.3d 433, 436 (D.C.Cir.2009). In Count VIII, Phelps-Roper claims that Defendants violated her right to raise her children in accordance with her religious beliefs. (Amended Compl. ¶ 142.) These violations allegedly occurred when she was arrested, cited, and prosecuted for her children's involvement in the protest. She also alleges that her rights were violated by Defendant Polikov's public statement of intent to prosecute her for her children's involvement. These claims may be raised as defenses to her criminal charges. A ruling on the merits of this claim in Phelps-Roper's favor would be grounds for dismissal
Phelps-Roper has not shown her prosecution was initiated in bad faith. The bad faith exception to the Younger doctrine is narrow. If Younger abstention requirements are met, the district court should abstain unless the plaintiff shows "bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate." Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435, 102 S.Ct. 2515. For purposes of Younger, "bad faith" means a showing that the statute was enforced with no expectation of convictions, but only to discourage a plaintiff's exercise of protected rights. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124, 95 S.Ct. 1524, 44 L.Ed.2d 15 (1975); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 621, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968). To make this showing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she suffered or may suffer "irreparable injury" that is "great and immediate." Postscript Enterprises, Inc. v. Peach, 878 F.2d 1114, 1116 (8th Cir.1989) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 91 S.Ct. 746.). Public statements directed at a plaintiff, without more, are insufficient to establish bad faith. Id. For example, in Postscript, the Eighth Circuit found that a plaintiff adult-bookstore owner claiming first amendment violations had not established bad faith prosecution even though the prosecuting attorney publicly declared he would "run [the plaintiff] out of business." Id.
In this case, Phelps-Roper has failed to establish malicious prosecution. Phelps-Roper argues that public statements made by Defendant Polikov show his decision to prosecute was in bad faith. However, Polikov's alleged statements, repeated in the Amended Complaint and in Phelps-Roper's brief, appear to reflect his theory underlying the prosecution—that Phelps-Roper's actions were designed to induce a response or reaction from others, rather than to reflect her own expressive conduct. (See Amended Complaint, Filing No. 17 ¶¶ 70-73; Filing No. 65 at 12). These statements are simply reasons why Polikov believed the prosecutions would be successful and do not indicate that he exercised his prosecutorial discretion solely to harass Phelps-Roper.
The Court will not abstain from hearing Phelps-Roper's remaining causes of action,
No charges against Phelps-Roper were brought for NFPL violations in the county court, nor does any evidence before this Court indicate state proceedings against Phelps-Roper under the NFPL are pending. Nothing in the record at this time indicates that Phelps-Roper's NFPL challenges are inseverable from her challenges to the statutes that are the basis of her criminal charges. See Act Now, 589 F.3d at 436. Therefore, abstention under the Younger doctrine does not apply to these claims.
For the same reasons the Younger doctrine is inapplicable, abstention or a stay of these proceedings are not appropriate under the Colorado River doctrine. Under Colorado River, a district court "may divest itself of jurisdiction by abstaining only when parallel state and federal actions exist and exceptional circumstances warrant abstention." FruCon Const. Corp. v. Controlled Air, Inc., 574 F.3d 527, 534 (8th Cir.2009) (citing Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-18, 96 S.Ct. 1236.) Because Phelps-Roper has not been charged under the NFPL, and no parallel state actions are pending, Colorado River abstention is inapplicable.
Defendants also broadly suggest that each of the other abstention doctrines applies to this case. However, the Burford abstention doctrine does not apply to Phelps-Roper's NFPL claims because the NFPL is not a "complex regulatory scheme supervised by state courts." Melahn v. Pennock Ins., Inc., 965 F.2d 1497, 1506 (8th Cir.1992). Further, Phelps-Roper's NFPL claims do not demand specialized knowledge for an application of complicated state laws. Casey v. FDIC, 583 F.3d 586, 592 (8th Cir.2009). Therefore, adjudication of Phelps-Roper's NFPL challenges do not needlessly interfere with state affairs.
Defendants also have failed to demonstrate that the Court should abstain under the Pullman doctrine. Federal courts may abstain under Pullman where a "challenged statute is susceptible of `a construction by the state courts that would avoid or modify the [federal] constitutional question.'" Beavers v. Arkansas State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 151 F.3d 838, 841 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510-11, 92 S.Ct. 1749, 32 L.Ed.2d 257 (1972)). The Court must examine several factors to determine whether abstention is appropriate.
Defendants Hutton and the Nebraska Supreme Court (the "judicial defendants") will be dismissed from this action. The Supreme Court has held that "judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in [the] judicial capacity." Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984). Under the circumstances of this case, however, the judicial defendants are not proper parties. "[A] court should not enjoin judges from applying statutes when complete relief can be afforded by enjoining all other parties with the authority to seek relief under the statute." In re Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir.1982). It is presumed that judges will abide by a declaration of a statute's unconstitutionality, made by a court of competent jurisdiction, without further compulsion. See Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 366 (9th Cir.2004). Each of the other Defendants can seek to enforce the NFPL. There is no basis for causing the judicial defendants to remain subject to Phelps-Roper's remaining claims, because complete relief is available through her suit against the other parties. Therefore, the judicial defendants will be dismissed.
Defendants Steven M. Curry and Anthony McPhillips ("Merrick County Defendants") move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Merrick County Defendants filed their Answer to the Complaint on January 7, 2010 (Filing No. 8), and, technically, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) cannot be filed after an answer has been submitted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Rule 12(h)(2), however, permits a defense of "failure to state a claim" to be raised as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Thus, the Court will treat the Merrick County Defendants' motion as a Rule 12(c) motion. See Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir.1990). This distinction is purely formal, and the Court reviews this Rule 12(c) motion under the same standard that governs Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Id.
The Merrick County Defendants argue that Phelps-Roper's claims against them should be dismissed because the Amended Complaint fails to allege any acts by the Merrick County Defendants other than to list them in the caption and describe their positions with Merrick County, Nebraska. This assertion is incorrect. Paragraph 43 of the Amended Complaint describes Phelps-Roper's allegations against Defendant McPhillips. Further, both Merrick County Defendants' statutorily defined duties require them to enforce state law. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 23-1201; § 23-1701.02 (Reissue 2007). The allegations in the Amended Complaint sufficiently encompass the Merrick County Defendants,
The Court will not enter the Proposed Consent Decree because it affects the rights and duties of nonconsenting parties, and it is not narrowly tailored. Counts VI and VII will be dismissed as moot. Counts III through V, and VII will be dismissed under the Younger abstention doctrine, because criminal proceedings are ongoing wherein Phelps-Roper may raise her constitutional challenges. The Court will also dismiss Judge Hutton and the Nebraska Supreme Court as Defendants. The Merrick County Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings will be denied. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Filing No 122) regarding the Court's orders of April 19, 2010 (Filing No. 93), and April 26, 2010 (Filing No. 95). In support of her motion, Plaintiff submitted a brief (Filing No. 123) and Index of Evidence (Filing No. 124). Defendants have not responded to Plaintiff's motion. The Court has carefully reviewed the motion, brief, and Index of Evidence and concludes that Plaintiff's Motion should be denied.
The Court's Amended Order of April 19, 2010 (Filing No. 93) (the "Abstention Order"), and its Order of June 21, 2010 (Filing No. 116), include detailed recitations of the procedural and factual background of this case, that the Court will not repeat here. In the April 19th Order, the Court determined that it would abstain from hearing Plaintiff Shirley L. Phelps-Roper's ("Phelps-Roper") claims that could be addressed as defenses to her pending criminal charges in Sarpy County Court, including her facial challenge
Phelps-Roper's instant motion argues that Judge Kopf's Order requires this Court to reconsider its decision to abstain. Specifically, Phelps-Roper asks the Court to reconsider its decision to abstain from her facial challenge to the Flag Mutilation Statute, and to the constitutionality of her pending prosecution. For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that the changed circumstances do not alter the outcome of its Abstention Order.
NECivR 60.1 states, "Motions for reconsideration are disfavored, and the court will ordinarily deny them without a showing of (1) manifest error in the prior ruling or (2) new facts or legal authority, neither of which could have been brought to the court's attention earlier with reasonable diligence."
Phelps-Roper argues that reconsideration is appropriate as to her facial challenge to the Nebraska Flag Mutilation Statute, and as to the constitutional challenge to her pending prosecution. As discussed below, abstention is still appropriate as to her pending criminal charges. As to her facial challenge, abstention is no longer applicable under any of the abstention doctrines. However, Phelps-Roper and other members of her church are no longer in jeopardy of any adverse action with respect to the enforcement of the Flag Mutilation Statute, no case or controversy remains.
Phelps-Roper still has an adequate opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of her arrest and prosecution in state court. She argues that the prosecution pending against her is based solely on activity protected under the First Amendment, and is therefore unconstitutional. In its Abstention Order, the Court declined to address this issue because the state court can address it in Phelps-Roper's criminal proceedings. For this Court to reconsider its earlier order, it must conclude that Judge Kopf's Order obviates
The Court disagrees with Phelps-Roper's claim that "[t]he Nebraska state court system has had ample opportunity to state the constitutionally-obvious, but will not." (Filing No. 123 at 4.) Phelps-Roper has not shown that a Nebraska court has applied the law in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution. Additionally, she cites no state court decisions that have reached the merits of her "unconstitutional arrest and prosecution" claim. This Court will not assume that Nebraska state courts are incapable or unwilling to protect Phelps-Roper's constitutional rights when given the opportunity to do so. See Neal v. Wilson, 112 F.3d 351, 357 (8th Cir.1997).
The Court also concludes that no new facts or evidence demonstrate that Phelps-Roper's claims now fit within the "bad faith" exception to the Younger abstention doctrine. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 435, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). As noted in the Abstention Order, to show bad faith prosecution, a plaintiff must establish that the prosecution was undertaken solely to discourage exercise of constitutional rights, with no expectation of convictions. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124, 95 S.Ct. 1524, 44 L.Ed.2d 15 (1975); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 621, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968). In other words, bad faith is not determined by the likelihood of success on the merits, but by a showing of maliciousness on the part of the prosecutor. The Flag Mutilation Statute has been permanently enjoined as applied to Megan and members of her church, of which Phelps-Roper is one, and clearly cannot be enforced against Phelps-Roper. However, Phelps-Roper has not demonstrated that the charges for disturbing the peace and negligent child abuse are dependent upon the Flag Mutilation Statute, although the facts may overlap. Phelps-Roper has not demonstrated that her prosecution is pending solely for the purpose of harassment. Therefore, she has not demonstrated bad faith and the Younger abstention doctrine still applies as to her claim that her prosecution is unconstitutional.
Even if none of the abstention doctrines applies to Phelps-Roper's facial challenge to the Flag Mutilation Statute, under Judge Kopf's Order, the statute cannot be enforced against Phelps-Roper. Accordingly, the Court is faced with the question of whether a plaintiff who is in no jeopardy that a statute will be enforced against her may nevertheless challenge the constitutionality of the statute on its face. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) (stating that federal injunctive and declaratory relief may be available when no state prosecution is pending and a plaintiff demonstrates a genuine threat of enforcement) (emphasis added). Though Phelps-Roper appears to have met the requirements for standing,
In this case, Judge Kopf's Order declared that the Flag Mutilation Statute is unconstitutional as applied to "Megan." The Order also permanently enjoined the enforcement of the Flag Mutilation Statute "as applied to members of her church, the Westboro Baptist Church, so long as Plaintiff and members of her church otherwise act peacefully while desecrating the American or Nebraska flag during their religiously motivated protests[.]" (Filing No. 124-1 at 3 (emphasis added).) Because enforcement of the Flag Mutilation Statute has been enjoined against all members of the Westboro Baptist Church, it cannot be applied to Phelps-Roper, and this Court cannot afford her any more relief than already has been granted under Judge Kopf's Order. The Court's inability to grant further relief renders Phelps-Roper's facial challenge moot, and the case does not fit within the exception to the mootness doctrine.
Federal courts do not have the power to remove a state law from the statute books. "The binding effect of a federal judgment depends on doctrines of claim and issue preclusion and of precedent." Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 Harvard L.Rev. 1321, 1340 (2000). "[N]either declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly interfere with enforcement of contested statutes or ordinances except with respect to the particular federal plaintiffs." Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975). In other words, "it generally does not matter whether a court purports to hold a statute unconstitutional or merely pronounces that conclusion in ruling on an as-applied challenge." Fallon, supra at 1340.
Though the plaintiffs are different, the injunction in Judge Kopf's Order protects the actions of both Megan and Phelps-Roper. A favorable ruling from this Court on Phelps-Roper's facial challenge would not provide any additional protection to Phelps-Roper's peaceful protest activities. Therefore, Phelps-Roper's facial challenge to the Nebraska Flag Mutilation Statute is moot and will not be addressed by this Court.
IT IS ORDERED: Plaintiff Shirley L. Phelps-Roper's Motion for Reconsideration (Filing No 122) regarding the Court's orders of April 19, 2010 (Filing No. 93), and April 26, 2010 (Filing No. 95) is denied.
