U.S. v. YOUNG, 8:12CR24. (2012)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20120717a71
Visitors: 14
Filed: Jul. 16, 2012
Latest Update: Jul. 16, 2012
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT, III, Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the court on the defendant's Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [44]. The parties require additional time to complete pretrial negotiations. For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the unopposed motion to continue trial [44] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for July 31, 2012 is continued to September 25, 2012. 2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the ends of justice will be
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT, III, Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the court on the defendant's Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [44]. The parties require additional time to complete pretrial negotiations. For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the unopposed motion to continue trial [44] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for July 31, 2012 is continued to September 25, 2012. 2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the ends of justice will be ..
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ORDER
F.A. GOSSETT, III, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on the defendant's Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [44]. The parties require additional time to complete pretrial negotiations. For good cause shown,
IT IS ORDERED that the unopposed motion to continue trial [44] is granted, as follows:
1. The jury trial now set for July 31, 2012 is continued to September 25, 2012.
2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the ends of justice will be served by granting this continuance and outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between today's date and September 25, 2012, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
Source: Leagle