U.S. v. VALENTIN, 8:13CR178. (2013)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20130910d53
Visitors: 19
Filed: Sep. 09, 2013
Latest Update: Sep. 09, 2013
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT, III, Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the court on the unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [40]. The parties require additional time to complete pretrial negotiations. For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the unopposed motion to continue trial [40] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for October 1, 2013 is continued to November 19, 2013. 2. Defendant is ordered to file a waiver of speedy trial as soon as practicable. 3. In accordance with 18 U
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT, III, Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the court on the unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [40]. The parties require additional time to complete pretrial negotiations. For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the unopposed motion to continue trial [40] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for October 1, 2013 is continued to November 19, 2013. 2. Defendant is ordered to file a waiver of speedy trial as soon as practicable. 3. In accordance with 18 U...
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ORDER
F.A. GOSSETT, III, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on the unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [40]. The parties require additional time to complete pretrial negotiations. For good cause shown,
IT IS ORDERED that the unopposed motion to continue trial [40] is granted, as follows:
1. The jury trial now set for October 1, 2013 is continued to November 19, 2013.
2. Defendant is ordered to file a waiver of speedy trial as soon as practicable.
3. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the ends of justice will be served by granting this continuance and outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between today's date and November 19, 2013, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
Source: Leagle
