JOHN M. GERRARD, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on a filing from pro se defendant Bryan S. Behrens captioned as a "Motion for Relief and Judicial Notice" (filing 414) that asks several things of the Court. The motion will be denied.
Behrens first complains that he did not receive copies of status reports filed by the receiver, which he learned of from the Court's approval (filing 411) of the receiver's eighth status report (filing 410). He has asked the Court to provide him with "a copy of filing 411 and the filing that corresponds to the sixth and seventh status report filings." Filing 414 at 1. The Court assumes that Behrens is actually asking for filing 410, as he admits having received filing 411.
Behrens does not explain why he wants copies of those filings, and the Court can see no useful purpose for them at this point. They were filed months and even years ago, and the time for any objection to them is long past. Even the Court's filing 411, accepting the receiver's most recent status report, was filed 2 months ago. The Court has provided Behrens with copies before, as a courtesy, where his interests were more directly implicated. See, e.g., filing 370. But the Court is not obliged to subsidize a fishing trip. And as the Court has explained before, Behrens does not have the right to receive copies of documents without payment. See, 28 U.S.C. § 1915; Lewis v. Precision Optics, Inc., 612 F.2d 1074, 1075 (8th Cir. 1980); see also, Jackson v. Fla. Dep't of Fin. Servs., 479 Fed. Appx. 289, 292-93 (11th Cir. 2012); Harless v. United States, 329 F.2d 397, 398-99 (5th Cir. 1964); Douglas v. Green, 327 F.2d 661, 662 (6th Cir. 1964); Hullom v. Kent, 262 F.2d 862, 863-64 (6th Cir. 1959); In re Fullam, 152 F.2d 141, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Parker v. Dir. of Dep't of Corrs, 2010 WL 7746630, at *1 (E.D. Va. Feb. 16, 2010). Behrens may obtain copies of any public filing by tendering payment pursuant to NEGenR 1.2(f) or NEGenR 1.3(a)(1)(A)(iii) and the fee schedule for electronic public access set by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
The Court does note an ongoing pattern in which Behrens claims not to have received filings that were, according to their certificate of service, provided to him. See, e.g., filing 410 at 3. The receiver says that they were sent. Filing 415 at 1. The Court has no reason to doubt the receiver. Behrens' bald assertion that he did not receive things that were sent to him is insufficient. If Behrens is truly having trouble getting his mail, he should take that up with prison officials through whatever administrative channels may be available to him.
Next, Behrens claims that the receiver was required by 28 U.S.C. § 754 to file a "notice of receivership" in the "District Court of Missouri" regarding tail commissions payable by Kansas City Life. Filing 414 at 2. That statute provides that
§ 754. Behrens says that he has not been provided with a copy of that "order" and wants one provided to him.
No such "order" is in this Court's record, nor would that be surprising— there is nothing in the statute requiring a filing made in another district court to also be filed in the court of appointment. And the Court could not provide Behrens with a copy of something it does not have, even if it was willing to do so.
But the Court is familiar enough with Behrens' filings at this point to see where this is headed, so it's best to nip it in the bud: there is also nothing in the record to suggest that a filing in Missouri is or was required with respect to the Kansas City Life commissions. Section 754 operates, in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 1692, to permit the Court to obtain jurisdiction in a district where receivership property is located, when there is no other basis of jurisdiction. See, S.E.C. v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1145 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ariz. Fuels Corp., 739 F.2d 455, 460-61 (9th Cir. 1984). But § 754 does not divest the Court of jurisdiction it already has. See, Ross, 504 F.3d at 1145-48; Ariz. Fuels Corp., 739 F.2d at 460-61; Donell v. Braun, 546 F.Supp.2d 1013, 1016 (D. Nev. 2008); S.E.C. v. Infinity Grp. Co., 27 F.Supp.2d 559, 564 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Tcherepnin v. Franz, 439 F.Supp. 1340, 1344 (N.D. Ill. 1977). Kansas City Life has not disputed the receiver's authority, and has voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. Had the receiver failed to comply with § 754 and then been required to litigate in Missouri, Kansas City Life could have potentially raised the statute as a shield. But nothing permits Behrens to use it as a sword.
Behrens informs the Court that he has filed for bankruptcy (again)
The receiver argues that the bankruptcy proceeding does not stay this case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), which excepts from the automatic stay
The Court agrees. See, S.E.C. v. First Fin. Grp. of Tex., 645 F.2d 429, 437-40 (5th Cir. 1981); S.E.C. v. Bilzerian, 131 F.Supp.2d 10, 14 (D.D.C. 2001); S.E.C. v. Towers Fin. Corp., 205 B.R. 27, 28-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also, Bd. of Governors v. MCorp Fin. Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 39-41 (1991); In re Commonwealth Cos., Inc., 913 F.2d 518, 521-27 (8th Cir. 1990). This S.E.C. enforcement action is clearly excepted from the bankruptcy stay. Nor do the receiver's activities involve enforcement of a "money judgment" within the meaning of § 362(b)(4). The Court's judgment ordered disgorgement of the receivership entities' ill-gotten gains, see filing 85 at 2, and the remedy of disgorgement is within the police power exception to the bankruptcy stay. Towers Fin. Corp., 205 B.R. at 30-31; see also, Teltronics, Ltd. v. Kemp, 649 F.2d 1236, 1239-42 (7th Cir. 1981); Nicklaus v. Bank of Russellville, 336 F.2d 144, 146-47 (8th Cir. 1964).
Furthermore, the bankruptcy court also agrees, having expressly declined to interfere with the receivership.
Both the bankruptcy court and now this Court have rejected Behrens' implication that his bankruptcy filing divests the receiver of any authority to administer the receivership. Behrens has admitted using last-minute bankruptcy filings to delay other proceedings "because they worked[.]" In re Behrens, 501 B.R. at 356. They will not work here.
Behrens claims that documents remaining in the possession of the receiver, which the receiver had previously sought permission to destroy, should be returned to him at an Omaha address. Filing 414 at 2. He claims he might need the documents for his bankruptcy proceeding and for tax purposes. Filing 414 at 2-3. In response, the receiver suggests that the documents be retained by the receiver until Behrens is released from prison, or that they be given to the bankruptcy trustee. Filing 415 at 3.
The Court views the receiver's position as retreating from his previous motion for permission to destroy the documents.
Finally, Behrens asks whether a protective order is still in place, or whether there is an order allowing the receiver "to have conversations with and to exchange documents filed in this case as well as documents in the possession of the receiver to any other party." Filing 414 at 4-5. To be clear: the receiver was directed, in the order appointing him, to maintain the privacy and confidentiality of information obtained during the course of the receivership. Filing 85 at 8. But the receiver was also conferred with broad authority to locate, possess, and administer receivership assets, and manage the claims process—which would be hard to do without talking to anyone— and was expressly authorized to "[c]ommunicate with vendors, investors, governmental and regulatory authorities, and others, as appropriate." Filing 85 at 5. The Court is aware of nothing to suggest that the receiver has not performed his duties appropriately.
IT IS ORDERED:
