U.S. v. SANCHEZ, 8:13CR396. (2014)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20140826a18
Visitors: 18
Filed: Aug. 25, 2014
Latest Update: Aug. 25, 2014
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT, III, District Judge. This matter is before the court on the unopposed Motion for Continuance of Trial [79] as counsel has recently been offered a revised plea agreement. Counsel needs additional time to investigate the issues and to explore plea negotiations. The defendant has complied with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial [79] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for September 9, 2014 is continued to De
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT, III, District Judge. This matter is before the court on the unopposed Motion for Continuance of Trial [79] as counsel has recently been offered a revised plea agreement. Counsel needs additional time to investigate the issues and to explore plea negotiations. The defendant has complied with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial [79] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for September 9, 2014 is continued to Dec..
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ORDER
F.A. GOSSETT, III, District Judge.
This matter is before the court on the unopposed Motion for Continuance of Trial [79] as counsel has recently been offered a revised plea agreement. Counsel needs additional time to investigate the issues and to explore plea negotiations. The defendant has complied with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial [79] is granted, as follows:
1. The jury trial now set for September 9, 2014 is continued to December 2, 2014.
2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the ends of justice will be served by granting this continuance and outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between today's date and December 2, 2014, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
Source: Leagle
