U.S. v. BROOKINS, 8:14CR262. (2014)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20141126f76
Visitors: 12
Filed: Nov. 25, 2014
Latest Update: Nov. 25, 2014
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT, Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the court is unopposed defendant's motion to continue trial [38] as defendant has agreed to plead to a state charge in return for a dismissal of the federal charges. The court finds good cause being shown and the trial shall be continued. The defendant has previously complied with NECrimR 12.1(a). IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for December 9, 2014 is continued to
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT, Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the court is unopposed defendant's motion to continue trial [38] as defendant has agreed to plead to a state charge in return for a dismissal of the federal charges. The court finds good cause being shown and the trial shall be continued. The defendant has previously complied with NECrimR 12.1(a). IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for December 9, 2014 is continued to J..
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ORDER
F.A. GOSSETT, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court is unopposed defendant's motion to continue trial [38] as defendant has agreed to plead to a state charge in return for a dismissal of the federal charges. The court finds good cause being shown and the trial shall be continued. The defendant has previously complied with NECrimR 12.1(a).
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to continue trial is granted, as follows:
1. The jury trial now set for December 9, 2014 is continued to January 27, 2015.
2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the ends of justice will be served by granting this continuance and outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between today's date and January 15, 2015, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel for the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
Source: Leagle
