U.S. v. ROMAN-LOPEZ, 8:14CR376. (2015)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20150217d12
Visitors: 16
Filed: Feb. 13, 2015
Latest Update: Feb. 13, 2015
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT, III, Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the court on the unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [17]. Counsel needs additional time to explore plea negotiations. The defendant shall comply with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Continue trial [17] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for February 24, 2015 is continued to March 31, 2015. 2. Defendant shall file a waiver of speedy trial as soon as practical. 3. In acc
Summary: ORDER F.A. GOSSETT, III, Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the court on the unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [17]. Counsel needs additional time to explore plea negotiations. The defendant shall comply with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Continue trial [17] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for February 24, 2015 is continued to March 31, 2015. 2. Defendant shall file a waiver of speedy trial as soon as practical. 3. In acco..
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ORDER
F.A. GOSSETT, III, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on the unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [17]. Counsel needs additional time to explore plea negotiations. The defendant shall comply with NECrimR 12.1(a). For good cause shown,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Continue trial [17] is granted, as follows:
1. The jury trial now set for February 24, 2015 is continued to March 31, 2015.
2. Defendant shall file a waiver of speedy trial as soon as practical.
3. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the ends of justice will be served by granting this continuance and outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between today's date and March 31, 2015, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
Source: Leagle
