U.S. v. RANDALL, 4:15CR3099. (2015)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20151104952
Visitors: 12
Filed: Nov. 03, 2015
Latest Update: Nov. 03, 2015
Summary: ORDER CHERYL R. ZWART , Magistrate Judge . Defendant has moved to continue the pretrial motion deadline, (filing no. 22), because the defendant is awaiting additional discovery from the government and needs to review that discovery before deciding if pretrial motions should be filed. The motion to continue is unopposed. Based on the showing set forth in the motion, the court finds the motion should be granted. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 1) Defendant's motion to continue, (filing no. 22),
Summary: ORDER CHERYL R. ZWART , Magistrate Judge . Defendant has moved to continue the pretrial motion deadline, (filing no. 22), because the defendant is awaiting additional discovery from the government and needs to review that discovery before deciding if pretrial motions should be filed. The motion to continue is unopposed. Based on the showing set forth in the motion, the court finds the motion should be granted. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 1) Defendant's motion to continue, (filing no. 22), ..
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ORDER
CHERYL R. ZWART, Magistrate Judge.
Defendant has moved to continue the pretrial motion deadline, (filing no. 22), because the defendant is awaiting additional discovery from the government and needs to review that discovery before deciding if pretrial motions should be filed. The motion to continue is unopposed. Based on the showing set forth in the motion, the court finds the motion should be granted. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
1) Defendant's motion to continue, (filing no. 22), is granted.
2) Pretrial motions and briefs shall be filed on or before November 30, 2015.
3) Trial of this case is continued pending resolution of any pretrial motions filed.
4) The ends of justice served by granting the motion to continue outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, and the additional time arising as a result of the granting of the motion, the time between today's date and November 30, 2015, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, because despite counsel's due diligence, additional time is needed to adequately prepare this case for trial and failing to grant additional time might result in a miscarriage of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B).
Source: Leagle
