MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
RICHARD G. KOPF, District Judge.
This matter is before me for initial review1. Terrell Wilkins (Wilkins) has filed a § 2255 motion and an amended motion. Because it plainly appears that the motions are untimely and also that there is no basis to excuse the late filings, the motions will be denied with prejudice. Briefly, I next explain why that is so.
I begin with the following reproduction of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) that sets forth what is the equivalent of a statute of limitations for filing § 2255 motions:
(f) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(Italics added.)
An un-appealed criminal judgment becomes final when the time for filing a direct appeal expires. Anjulo-Lopez v. United States, 541 F.3d 814, 816 n. 2 (8th Cir. 2008). The judgment in this case was entered on July 18, 2011. (Filing no. 43.) Had Wilkins wished to file an appeal, he was required to do so within 14 days. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). He did not file an appeal, and his conviction thus became final on July 28, 2011. See Murray v. United States, 313 Fed.Appx. 924 (8th Cir. 2009). From that date, Wilkins had one year to timely file a § 2255 motion. His motion was filed on October 31, 2016 (filing no. 61), but it was insufficient because, and among other things, he asserted no grounds for relief. Per my order, he filed an amended motion on December 1, 2016. (Filing no. 63.)
Wilkins essentially claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because trial counsel did not attack several of his past convictions that were counted for criminal history purposes. Essentially, he asserts that his counsel should have attacked some unspecified convictions because Wilkins did not have counsel when those convictions were imposed.
The motion and amended motion are untimely as much more than one year passed after the judgment of conviction was filed. Wilkins claims that he did not know about the time limit, his lawyer failed to tell him about it, and he just recently learned that his lawyer should have attacked his criminal history because some of the underlying criminal convictions were imposed without counsel.2 Despite these assertions, Wilkins provides me with zero evidence that he was duly diligent for purposes of discovering his claims as explicitly required by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4).
For example, he fails to tell me what he did to investigate his claim, and when he first found that he had a valid claim. Moreover, since his claim is founded upon the fact that some of the earlier convictions were secured without counsel, it is apparent that Wilkins was aware of the predicate facts at the time those convictions were obtained.
Moreover, he cannot take advantage of the "exceedingly narrow window" of equitable tolling because equitable tolling requires a showing of diligence just like § 2255(f)(4). See, e.g. Deroo v. United States, 709 F.3d 1242, 1246 (8th Cir. 2013) ("`Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.' Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005). `Equitable tolling is an exceedingly narrow window of relief.' Riddle v. Kemna, 523 F.3d 850, 857 (8th Cir.2008) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, ___ U.S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 641, 653-54 (2012). Just as [the defendant] failed to show diligence under § 2255(f)(4), he fails to establish the first element for equitable tolling.").3
Wilkins may also think that the October 14, 2015 sentence reduction order (filing no. 60), issued pursuant to a retroactive amendment to the Guidelines, restarted the clock. Because such reduction orders are not "judgments of conviction" under the statute quoted above, the clock was not restarted. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 796 F.3d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 2015) (a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) does not restart the clock for AEDPA's one-year limitations) (citations omitted). But, even if the clock started over, Wilkins' first § 2255 motion in this case was filed more than a year after his sentence was reduced.
Finally, a defendant cannot appeal an adverse ruling on a § 2255 motion unless he or she is granted a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1). The standards for certificates (1) where the district court reaches the merits or (2) where the district court rules on procedural grounds are set for in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-485 (2000). I have applied the appropriate standard and determined that the defendant is not entitled to a certificate of appealability.
IT IS ORDERED that the § 2255 motions (filing nos. 61 and 63) are denied with prejudice, no certificate of appealability will be issued, and judgment will be entered by separate document.
