U.S. v. Garcia, 8:16CR308. (2018)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20180529a83
Visitors: 6
Filed: May 25, 2018
Latest Update: May 25, 2018
Summary: ORDER MICHAEL D. NELSON , Magistrate Judge . This matter is before the court on Defendant Diana Guzman's unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [78]. Counsel is seeking additional time to consider the need to file a motion concerning Defendant's ability to aid in her defense. For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Diana Guzman's unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [78] is granted as follows: 1. The jury trial, as to both defendants, now set for June 12, 2018, is continued to Ju
Summary: ORDER MICHAEL D. NELSON , Magistrate Judge . This matter is before the court on Defendant Diana Guzman's unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [78]. Counsel is seeking additional time to consider the need to file a motion concerning Defendant's ability to aid in her defense. For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Diana Guzman's unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [78] is granted as follows: 1. The jury trial, as to both defendants, now set for June 12, 2018, is continued to Jul..
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ORDER
MICHAEL D. NELSON, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on Defendant Diana Guzman's unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [78]. Counsel is seeking additional time to consider the need to file a motion concerning Defendant's ability to aid in her defense. For good cause shown,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Diana Guzman's unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [78] is granted as follows:
1. The jury trial, as to both defendants, now set for June 12, 2018, is continued to July 31, 2018.
2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the ends of justice will be served by granting this continuance and outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between today's date and July 31, 2018, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
Source: Leagle
