ROBERT F. ROSSITER, JR., District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs' objection (Filing No. 177 in the lead case, 8:15CV396) to the magistrate judge's
The plaintiffs object to that decision but state they "do not seek a full reversal of [the denial] Order." Rather, they request "an Order compelling Defendants to produce just APP sales data for dealers Plaintiffs serviced prior to being terminated by UWC (Request No. 1 of Plaintiffs' Fifth Request for Production of Documents)."
The plaintiffs' objection is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Under that statute, the Court may reconsider the magistrate judge's rulings if "it has been shown that the magistrate judge's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Id.; accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). "A finding is clearly erroneous when `although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Lisdahl v. Mayo Found., 633 F.3d 712, 717 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).
After careful review, the Court finds no compelling basis to set aside the magistrate judge's Order denying the plaintiffs' Motion to Compel. The proper scope of discovery is set by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), which provides in part
Though broad, the rule still requires "[s]ome threshold showing of relevance [to] be made before parties are required to open wide the doors of discovery and to produce a variety of information which does not reasonably bear upon the issues in the case." Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1992). Under Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i), the Court must also limit discovery if "the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive."
In this case, the plaintiffs have limited their objection to the following request:
The plaintiffs claim this information about the APP program is relevant to their "fraud claim because it tends to show the [defendants'] promise of a long-term partnership" was disingenuous.
The plaintiffs executed the CRAs in 2013. Those agreements related to the VehicleOne program, not the APP program. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants moved forward with plans to replace the VehicleOne program with the APP program in 2015, generally terminating their agreements with the plaintiffs effective July 1, 2015. Given this timeline and the nature of the plaintiffs' fraud-in-the-inducement claims, the plaintiffs do not adequately explain how sales data from January 1, 2015, to the present about a program not even mentioned in the CRAs is probative of the defendants' sincerity or alleged misrepresentations at the time the parties executed the CRAs in 2013. Even if the Court were to conclude the information is marginally relevant, the Court would still deny the request. The requested information is largely cumulative and not "proportional to the needs of the case, considering" the relative importance of the requested information and the balance of the benefits and burdens of production.
Because the plaintiffs have failed to make a threshold showing of how the requested information is relevant to any of the claims or defenses at issue in this case, the plaintiffs' objection (Filing No. 177 in 8:15CV396, 8:15CV398, 8:15CV400; Filing No. 184 in 8:15CV401; Filing No. 175 in 8:15CV402; Filing No. 147 in 8:16CV276, 8:16CV328; Filing No. 146 in 8:16CV346; Filing No. 145 in 8:16CV361, 8:16CV362; and Filing No. 141 in 8:16CV416) to the magistrate judge's May 22, 2018, Order denying their Motion to Compel is overruled.
IT IS SO ORDERED.