U.S. v. Castellon, 4:18CR3088. (2019)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20190307c42
Visitors: 10
Filed: Mar. 05, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 05, 2019
Summary: ORDER CHERYL R. ZWART , Magistrate Judge . Defendant Castellon has moved to continue the pretrial motion deadline, (Filing No. 448), because the parties are currently engaged in plea discussions. The motion to continue is unopposed. Based on the showing set forth in the motion, the court finds the motion should be granted. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 1) Defendant's motion to continue, (Filing No. 448), is granted. 2) As to all remaining defendants, pretrial motions and briefs shall be
Summary: ORDER CHERYL R. ZWART , Magistrate Judge . Defendant Castellon has moved to continue the pretrial motion deadline, (Filing No. 448), because the parties are currently engaged in plea discussions. The motion to continue is unopposed. Based on the showing set forth in the motion, the court finds the motion should be granted. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 1) Defendant's motion to continue, (Filing No. 448), is granted. 2) As to all remaining defendants, pretrial motions and briefs shall be f..
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ORDER
CHERYL R. ZWART, Magistrate Judge.
Defendant Castellon has moved to continue the pretrial motion deadline, (Filing No. 448), because the parties are currently engaged in plea discussions. The motion to continue is unopposed. Based on the showing set forth in the motion, the court finds the motion should be granted. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
1) Defendant's motion to continue, (Filing No. 448), is granted.
2) As to all remaining defendants, pretrial motions and briefs shall be filed on or before April 5, 2019.
3) As to all remaining defendants, trial of this case is continued pending resolution of any pretrial motions filed.
4) The ends of justice served by granting the motion to continue outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, and as to all remaining defendants, the additional time arising as a result of the granting of the motion, the time between today's date and April 5, 2019, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, because although counsel have been duly diligent, additional time is needed to adequately prepare this case for trial and failing to grant additional time might result in a miscarriage of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1), (h)(6) & (h)(7). Failing to timely object to this order as provided under this court's local rules will be deemed a waiver of any right to later claim the time should not have been excluded under the Speedy Trial Act.
Source: Leagle
