U.S. v. Javier, 8:18CR197. (2019)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20190401d82
Visitors: 4
Filed: Mar. 29, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 29, 2019
Summary: ORDER SUSAN M. BAZIS , Magistrate Judge . This matter is before the court on the Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [28]. Defendant is pursuing a transfer by Rule 20. Additional time is required to complete the steps of transfer to the Southern District of Florida. For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Continue Trial [28] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for April 1, 2019, is continued to July 22, 2019. 2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(A),
Summary: ORDER SUSAN M. BAZIS , Magistrate Judge . This matter is before the court on the Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [28]. Defendant is pursuing a transfer by Rule 20. Additional time is required to complete the steps of transfer to the Southern District of Florida. For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Continue Trial [28] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for April 1, 2019, is continued to July 22, 2019. 2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(A), ..
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ORDER
SUSAN M. BAZIS, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on the Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [28]. Defendant is pursuing a transfer by Rule 20. Additional time is required to complete the steps of transfer to the Southern District of Florida. For good cause shown,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Continue Trial [28] is granted, as follows:
1. The jury trial now set for April 1, 2019, is continued to July 22, 2019.
2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the ends of justice will be served by granting this continuance and outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between today's date and July 22, 2019 shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
Source: Leagle
