BRUCE A. HARWOOD, Bankruptcy Judge.
On March 13, 2013, Ellen Bridget Stone (the "Debtor") commenced this adversary proceeding, alleging that Highlands Fuel Delivery, LLC, d/b/a Irving Energy Distribution and Marketing ("Highlands") violated the discharge injunction imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 524(a). Specifically, the Debtor alleges that Highlands's action in not affirmatively withdrawing its pre-petition motion for periodic payments in a pending state court lawsuit, resulting in the issuance of a bench warrant after the entry of the Debtor's bankruptcy discharge, constituted a violation of the discharge injunction.
On October 11, 2013, after the completion of discovery, Highlands filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 14) ("Highlands's Motion"). On November 12, 2013, the Debtor filed an Opposition and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 19) (the "Debtor's Motion"). On December 10, 2013, Highlands filed an Objection (Doc. No. 23) (the "Objection") to the Debtor's Motion. On December 16, 2013, the Court held a non-evidentiary hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, heard oral argument from the parties, and took the matter under submission.
This Court has authority to exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 157(a), and U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire Local Rule 77.4(a). This is a core proceeding in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).
The facts relevant to Highlands's potential liability for a violation of the discharge injunction are not in dispute. However, in the event the Court finds Highlands liable, Highlands disputes the Debtor's alleged damages.
Prior to the Debtor's bankruptcy, Highlands commenced a small claims action against her in the District Division of the New Hampshire Circuit Court (the "Small Claims Action"). On June 12, 2012 (also prior to the petition date), Highlands obtained a judgment against the Debtor in the Small Claims Action in the amount of $2,594.38 (the "Judgment").
On July 6, 2012 (the "Petition Date"), the Debtor filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. On July 11, 2012, notice of the Debtor's bankruptcy case was sent to Highlands by first class mail to a PO Box address. On July 12, 2012, Highlands filed a motion for periodic payments (the "Motion for Periodic Payments") in the Small Claims Action on account of the Judgment. As a part of the Motion for Periodic Payments, Highlands requested that a law enforcement officer effect personal service of any orders of notice that the state court issued in the Small Claims Action. Highlands understood that it would be responsible for such service costs.
On July 25, 2012, Highlands received notice of the Debtor's bankruptcy. Upon receipt of the notice, Highlands "re-coded" the Debtor's account from "collection" to "bankruptcy status." Neither party filed a suggestion of bankruptcy in the Small Claims Action at any time. Highlands alleges that it took no further affirmative collection action, and effectively any action, with regard to the Debtor or the Judgment after July 12, 2012.
On September 26, 2012, the state court sent the following to Highlands: (1) Instructions to [Highlands] for Serving Orders of Notice by Law Enforcement Officer (the "Instructions")
On October 3, 2012, the Court issued a discharge of the Debtor pursuant to § 727 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Discharge Order"). According to the Court's docket, the Discharge Order was served on Highlands on October 5, 2012. Highlands admits that it received notice of the Discharge Order. On October 19, 2012, the Court closed the Debtor's bankruptcy case. On January 17, 2013, the state court held a hearing on the Motion for Periodic Payments. Neither the Debtor nor Highlands appeared at the hearing. After the hearing, the state court issued an order dated January 23, 2013, directing that a bench warrant issue against the Debtor (the "Bench Warrant Order").
On January 28, 2013, the following events took place: (1) the state court issued an order — apparently sua sponte — vacating the Bench Warrant Order because there had been no service of the Instructions and the Order of Notice on the Debtor; (2) the Debtor became aware of the Bench Warrant Order; (3) Debtor's counsel filed a Motion to Vacate Arrest Warrant (the "Motion to Vacate") requesting that the state court vacate its issuance of the Bench Warrant Order; and (4) Debtor's counsel filed a motion to reopen the Debtor's bankruptcy case to pursue a violation of the discharge injunction.
On January 30, 2013, Debtor's counsel received notice that the state court had vacated the Bench Warrant Order. On February 26, 2013, the state court issued an order denying the Debtor's Motion to Vacate as moot, noting that the court had vacated the Bench Warrant Order on January 28, 2013, prior to the Debtor's Motion to Vacate. On March 13, 2013, the Debtor commenced this adversary proceeding.
Highlands argues that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor because it did not commit any act with knowledge of the Discharge Order, nor did the Discharge Order clearly and unambiguously set forth the precise conduct and acts that the Discharge Order and the discharge injunction prohibit.
The Debtor argues that she is entitled to summary judgment in her favor because Highlands's failure to affirmatively request that the state court refrain from holding the hearing on the Motion for Periodic Payments, and issuing the Bench Warrant Order, is sufficient to constitute a violation of the discharge injunction. The Debtor further argues that there is no mens rea requirement for violations of the discharge injunction, because such violations are remedied through the bankruptcy court's civil contempt powers under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, and civil contempt does not contain a mens rea element.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
In this case, the parties essentially agree on all the facts relevant to liability. What they disagree on is the legal significance of those facts, and which party may be entitled to summary judgment. Additionally, Highlands disputes the Debtor's alleged damages. Accordingly, it is appropriate for the Court to consider the matter of liability on summary judgment.
Section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code governs a debtor's bankruptcy discharge. Section 524(a) provides, in relevant part, that "A discharge in a case under this title... (2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived...."
"Generally, a discharge in bankruptcy relieves a debtor from all pre-petition debt, and § 524(a) permanently enjoins creditor actions to collect discharged debts."
Highlands had actual knowledge of the Debtor's bankruptcy as of July 25, 2012, and received notice of the Discharge Order in October 2012. The parties agree that Highlands took no actions after July 12, 2012, when it filed the Motion for Periodic Payments.
In the First Circuit, "courts are to use an objective test in determining whether a creditor's actions were improperly coercive under the circumstances."
Here, Highlands's intent in filing the Motion for Periodic Payments on July 12, 2012 was unquestionably coercive against the debtor, even though Highlands may then have been unaware of the chapter 7 petition filed six days earlier. Since the action was coercive when taken, it remained coercive until such time as it may be effectively withdrawn. Put another way, Highlands intended that the state court act upon the Motion for Periodic Payments when Highlands filed it, and Highlands did not effectively prevent continuation of that action — even if it was the state court, not Highlands, which caused the Bench Warrant Order to be issued. Whether or not Highlands was responsible for all of the circumstances that led to the Debtor becoming aware of the Bench Warrant Order is irrelevant. Similarly, whether or not Highlands intended by its actions or inaction to ultimately collect the discharged Judgment is not determinative.
"Although § 524 does not expressly set forth a private right of action, a bankruptcy court properly may enforce § 524(a)'s discharge injunction by invoking its equitable powers under § 105(a) as necessary or appropriate to assure its efficacy."
Highlands's attempt to distinguish between a party violating § 524(a)'s discharge injunction as a matter of law and a Bankruptcy Court enforcing that injunction through its contempt powers under § 105(a) seems subtle at best. Indeed, in
Both parties discuss
Highlands further argues that the Discharge Order does not, within its four corners, "state that any creditor has the affirmative obligation to withdraw or dismiss litigation, or discrete motions in such litigation, that were pending" on the Petition Date, and thus Highlands's failure to act cannot be contemptuous of the Discharge Order. Notwithstanding the analysis above, the Court disagrees that the Discharge Order was unclear.
As explained in note 4, above, the Discharge Order granted the Debtor a discharge under § 727 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Discharge Order's explanatory language notes that "a creditor is not permitted to contact a debtor by mail, phone, or otherwise, to file or continue a lawsuit, to attach wages or other property, or to take any other action to collect a discharged debt from the debtor" (emphasis added). The discharge itself "operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (emphasis added). The prohibition on continuing a lawsuit is not ambiguous. As one Bankruptcy Court noted, in examining virtually identical language in § 362(a)(1)
Finally, Highlands argues that even if the Discharge Order or § 524(a) of the Bankruptcy Code placed an affirmative duty on Highlands to act after the entry of the Discharge Order, Highlands "did in fact engage in conduct designed to comply with" that duty. In support of this argument, Highlands notes that the state court itself confirmed that it entered the Bench Warrant Order in error, and suggests that the state court contravened its own rules and procedures by holding a hearing on the Motion for Periodic Payments. Highlands appears to rely on language in the Instructions
The Instructions do not say that the state court would not hold the scheduled hearing on the Motion for Periodic Payments if service was not returned; they simply require that service be returned to the state court by the deadline of January 7, 2013. Further, the Instructions suggest that the only consequence of the moving party's (i.e., Highlands) failure to appear at the hearing would be that the moving party waived its right to examine the Debtor. In this case, Highlands had no actual information from the state court that the hearing on the Motion for Periodic payments was cancelled.
The checklist-like document provided by the New Hampshire Circuit Court Service Center contained the following language: "If you don't provide the court with proof of service, and the defendant does not appear, the case will be closed with no further order." The Court notes that the document from which that language came does not appear to have the force of law.
The Rules of the Circuit Court of the State of New Hampshire — District Division suggest that Highlands's inaction was not certain to prevent the state court from holding the hearing. Rule 1.21 (governing motions for periodic payments) states, in relevant part:
Nowhere does Rule 1.21 state that a moving party's failure to file a return of service will result in the state court cancelling a hearing. However, the rule does suggest a situation in which both the moving party and the judgment debtor fail to appear and the state court still issues an order — including an order for the judgment debtor's arrest.
Thus, Highlands's inaction was not a course of "action" that was reasonably certain to prevent the continuation of the Small Claims Action. Moreover, Highlands was in the best position to take affirmative steps to prevent the state court from proceeding. As one bankruptcy court put it, "[t]he creditor is in the driver's seat and very much controls what is done thereafter if it chooses. If the `continuation' is to be stayed, it cannot choose to do nothing and pass the buck to the garnishee or the court in which the garnishment is filed... Positive action on the part of the creditor is necessary so that `continuation' is stayed."
For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that Highlands violated the discharge injunction of § 524(a).
This opinion constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052. The Court will issue a separate order, consistent with this opinion, granting the Debtor's Motion on the issue of liability, and scheduling a hearing on damages. At such hearing, Highlands may argue the extent to which the circumstances of this case present mitigating factors in the Court's determination of any damages to which the Debtor may be entitled.
The `Return of Service' form MUST be returned to the court by January 07, 2013, after service has been made on the [Debtor]. Please include a copy of your paid bill for sheriff's fees in order that these costs may be added to your claim. Effective July 1, 2009 if you ask the court to issue new orders of notice a fee of $25.00 will be assessed.
You, as plaintiff need not appear at this hearing, but if you do not, you waive your right to examine the [Debtor] regarding his/her assets.