LANDYA MCCAFFERY, District Judge.
Harley-Davidson Credit Corporation ("Harley-Davidson") brought suit against RASair, LLC ("RASair") and Mark Galvin, alleging claims for breach of contract against both defendants. Default was entered against RASair, and the court granted in part Harley-Davidson's motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim against Galvin.
On April 24, 2008, RASair entered into a loan with Eaglemark Savings Bank ("Eaglemark") for $250,000, for the purpose of purchasing a Cessna 421C, bearing a manufacturer's serial number 421C0171, and a United States Registration mark N42ILW (the "Aircraft"). The loan was evidenced by an "Aircraft Secured Promissory Note" dated April 24, 2008 (the "Promissory Note"). As security for the loan, RASair granted to Eaglemark a first priority security interest in the Aircraft, including the Aircraft's airframe, engines, propellers, and record logs. The security interest was evidenced by an "Aircraft Security Agreement," also dated April 24, 2008. On the same day, Galvin executed an "Unconditional and Continuing Guaranty," in which he personally guaranteed RASair's performance under the Aircraft Security Agreement and the Promissory Note (the "Guaranty"). The court will refer to the Promissory Note, the Aircraft Security Agreement, and the Guaranty collectively as the "Loan Documents."
At some point, Eaglemark assigned the Promissory Note and the Aircraft Security Agreement to Harley-Davidson. On approximately August 24, 2010, RASair defaulted on the Promissory Note by failing to pay the amount due.
On September 6, 2011, after several months of discussions with Galvin and in accordance with the terms of the Loan Documents, Harley-Davidson repossessed the Aircraft. Immediately upon repossession, the Aircraft was placed in the custody of Specialty Aircraft Services, Incorporated ("SAS"), a dealer that specializes in the sale of repossessed and foreclosed aircraft. SAS was tasked with selling the Aircraft, and the proceeds of the sale were to be applied to RASair and Galvin's outstanding debt related to the Aircraft.
While in SAS's custody, the Aircraft's audio panel was vandalized. Harley-Davidson had Specialty Aircraft Leasing, Incorporated ("SAL") repair the audio panel and make several other repairs to improve the condition of the Aircraft.
SAS subsequently sold the Aircraft in November of 2011 for $155,000. The proceeds of the sale, less expenses, were applied to the obligations owed under the Promissory Note to Harley-Davidson. Harley-Davidson asserted that the remaining balance owed is $108,681.50, which includes the expenses incurred to repair the Aircraft, other than the cost for repairing the audio panel which was not included. On December 14, 2011, Harley-Davidson mailed to RASair and Galvin letters for "Demand of Repayment of Deficiency." Neither RASair nor Galvin paid any of the remaining balance. This action followed, and default was entered against RASair.
Harley-Davidson moved for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim against Galvin. Galvin objected, arguing that the Aircraft was not sold in a commercially reasonable manner as required under the Loan Documents and the Uniform Commercial Code. In its order dated September 4, 2014, the court granted Harley-Davidson's motion, holding that "Galvin has raised no genuine issues of material fact concerning the commercial reasonableness of the disposition of the Aircraft." Or. (doc. no. 45) at 19.
Galvin moves for reconsideration of the court's order granting Harley-Davidson's motion for summary judgment. Harley-Davidson objects.
In general, "motions for reconsideration are appropriate only in a limited number of circumstances. . . ."
Galvin contends that the court's order granting summary judgment was based on a manifest error of law because it did not properly credit his affidavit. Galvin also argues that the court's order was based on factual errors, because the evidence in the record demonstrates that the sale of the Aircraft was commercially unreasonable.
Galvin contends that "[t]he Court applied an incorrect standard when it discounted the Defendant's affidavit as `self-serving.'" Def.'s Mem. (doc. no. 49-1) at 2. Galvin concedes that his affidavit was self-serving, but argues that the court should have given it significant weight because it had adequate factual support in the record. Galvin contends that had the court properly considered his affidavit, it would not have granted Harley-Davidson's motion for summary judgment.
Although Galvin contends that the court discounted his affidavit because it was self-serving, that is not the case. In its order, the court cited Galvin's statement that based on his "`experience in the aviation industry . . . lack of the[] avionics during showing and test flights could cause a difference in the sale price, to a retail buyer, equivalent to the difference between the [sic] what the buyer paid in this instance ($155,000) and the retail Blue Book value of over $269,000.'" Or. (doc. no. 45) at 10-11 (quoting Galvin Aff. (doc. no. 39-1) at ¶ 20). The court concluded that the affidavit was insufficient because it "does not provide a factual basis for those assertions. . . ."
In his motion for reconsideration, Galvin contends that the value statement in his affidavit was supported by a Blue Book estimate of the price of the Aircraft, as well as eBay listings for the prices of the missing radio components.
Galvin also appears to contend that his experience in the aviation industry is a sufficient factual basis for the court to consider his affidavit as to the value of the Aircraft. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the nonmoving party to `set forth specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue for trial.'"
As stated in the order, "Galvin did not cite any examples where missing radio components at the time of purchase cause any diminution in the sales price of a plane." Or. (doc. no. 45) at 11 n.6. Galvin's statement, which relies on his general experience in the aviation industry without giving specific examples, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
More importantly, as the court noted, even if Galvin's statement as to the Aircraft's value could be credited, it would be insufficient to defeat Harley-Davidson's motion for summary judgment. As the court noted in its order, "Galvin states in his affidavit that the missing components `could' cause a diminution in value of $100,000, and does not point to any evidence showing that the missing components
Therefore, Galvin has not shown that the court committed legal error when it held that Galvin's statement in his affidavit was insufficient to avoid summary judgment.
Galvin's remaining arguments suggest that the court made a factual error by misunderstanding the record evidence as to the Aircraft's value. Galvin contends that had the court properly considered all the record evidence, it would have found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the commercial reasonableness of the sale.
Galvin's arguments as to the court's factual findings merely repeat his arguments in his objection to the motion for summary judgment. He has not demonstrated that the court made a manifest factual error.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for reconsideration (doc. no. 49) is denied.
SO ORDERED.