STEVEN J. McAULIFFE, District Judge.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), claimant, Tina Raymond, moves to reverse or vacate the Commissioner's decision denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the "Act").
For the reasons discussed, claimant's motion is denied, and the Commissioner's motion is granted.
In October of 2016, claimant filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"), alleging that she was disabled and had been unable to work since February 13, 2013. Claimant was 49 years old at the time of her alleged onset of disability and had acquired sufficient quarters of coverage to remain insured through December 31, 2018. Claimant's application was denied and she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ").
In January of 2018, claimant, her attorney, an independent medical expert (Dr. John Kwock, a board certified orthopedic surgeon), and a vocational expert appeared before an ALJ, who considered claimant's applications de novo. During Dr. Kwock's testimony, claimant became agitated and left the room. She returned and Dr. Kwok completed his testimony, as did claimant. At that point, the hearing had gone on for about an hour, the ALJ indicated that he had to end it soon, and the vocational expert had yet to testify. Claimant's attorney asked the ALJ for a continuance, so the vocational expert could give testimony. Claimant's counsel also asked that the ALJ arrange for claimant to undergo a psychological examination. The ALJ agreed to continue the hearing, but declined to rule on the request for a psychological examination until after he had the opportunity to more carefully review claimant's medical records — particularly those related to her mental health. Ultimately, the ALJ declined to order the psychological examination and neither claimant nor her counsel arranged for claimant to undergo such an examination.
The hearing was continued to May 16, 2018, at which the ALJ heard testimony from a second independent medical expert, Dr. James Claiborn (a board certified psychologist), and Jane Gerrish, an impartial vocational expert. Four weeks later, the ALJ issued his written decision, concluding that claimant was not disabled, as that term is defined in the Act, at any time prior to the date of his decision. Claimant requested review by the Appeals Council. That request was denied. Accordingly, the ALJ's denial of claimant's application for benefits became the final decision of the Commissioner, subject to judicial review. Subsequently, claimant filed a timely action in this court, asserting that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
Claimant then filed a "Motion for Order Reversing Decision of the Commissioner" (document no. 7). In response, the Commissioner filed a "Motion for an Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner" (document no. 9). Those motions are pending.
A detailed factual background can be found in claimant's statement of facts (document no. 8) and the Commissioner's statement of facts (document no. 10). Those facts relevant to the disposition of this matter are discussed as appropriate.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court is empowered "to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." Factual findings and credibility determinations made by the Commissioner are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
An individual seeking DIB benefits is disabled under the Act if he or she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act places a heavy initial burden on the claimant to establish the existence of a disabling impairment.
In assessing a disability claim, the Commissioner considers both objective and subjective factors, including: (1) objective medical facts; (2) the claimant's subjective claims of pain and disability, as supported by the claimant's testimony or that of other witnesses; and (3) the claimant's educational background, age, and work experience.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
With those principles in mind, the court reviews claimant's motion to reverse and the Commissioner's motion to affirm his decision.
In concluding that claimant was not disabled within the meaning of the Act, the ALJ properly employed the mandatory five-step sequential evaluation process described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
Next, the ALJ concluded that claimant retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform the exertional demands of "light" work, subject to the following limitations: "she can perform no more than frequent fingering or feeling with the right hand. She can frequently push and pull with the right hand. The claimant should not be in a position that requires a production pace."
Nevertheless, the ALJ continued to the final step in the analysis. Relying upon the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that, notwithstanding claimant's limitations, "there are other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can also perform."
Claimant challenges the ALJ's decision on four grounds, asserting that he erred: (1) by failing to arrange for her to undergo a mental status examination to assess the extent of her alleged memory problems; (2) by failing to give adequate weight to claimant's subjective complaints of disabling symptoms (particularly those relating to her panic attacks); (3) by failing to give adequate weight to the opinions of claimant's treating physician, Dr. Anthony Mollano regarding her "permanent impairment rating" (related to her award of workers' compensation benefits); and, finally, (4) by making factual findings that were not supported by substantial evidence.
Claimant faults the ALJ for failing to arrange for her to undergo a mental status examination to assess the extent of her claimed memory issues. This court (Barbadoro, J.) has previously discussed the scope of an ALJ's obligation to fully develop the evidentiary record, noting:
Claimant correctly notes that Dr. Claiborn, the non-examining board-certified psychologist, testified that complaints of memory loss are "really pretty subjective" and to evaluate any actual deficit in memory functioning, claimant would have to undergo a formal mental status examination. Admin. Rec. at 49. But, as the ALJ pointed out, the medical records repeatedly note that claimant retained normal memory.
The ALJ supportably credited Dr. Claiborne's medical opinion. And, given the sparse record evidence of claimant's alleged memory impairment, the court cannot conclude that the ALJ erred when he determined that it was not necessary to arrange for claimant to undergo a mental status examination.
Next, claimant asserts that the ALJ failed to properly credit her claims of debilitating panic attacks, overall joint pain and swelling, and pain and numbness in two of her fingers. The court disagrees.
The ALJ amply supported his RFC decision with references to the medical record. For example, the ALJ noted that "[a]lthough the claimant has subsequently complained of joint pains attributed to fibromyalgia, objective physical examinations do not establish substantial deficits in strength, mobility, and motor skills." Admin. Rec. at 25. He supported that conclusion by, for example, discussing the clinical reports of Dr. Julia Bolding (a rheumatologist who examined claimant in April of 2017) and Dr. Borislan Nikolov, to whom claimant was referred for a neurological consultation. Dr. Bolding diagnosed claimant as suffering from fibromyalgia, after claimant reported that more than 11 of 18 fibromyalgia tender points were positive, "many with vocalization and withdrawal." Admin. Rec. at 1811. Yet, Dr. Bolding also opined that claimant's "somatic complaints are far out of proportion to physical findings."
In May of 2017, one month after her consultation with Dr. Bolding, claimant saw Dr. Nikolov for a comprehensive neurological evaluation. Dr. Nikolov reported that, upon musculoskeletal examination, claimant displayed "no joint deformities. Full range of motion. No joint swelling or redness. No muscular pain on palpation."
The ALJ also noted that, in that same general timeframe (February 10, 2017), claimant was seen by Peter Loeser, MD, for an orthopedic examination. While Dr. Loeser acknowledged claimant's assertions of "constant daily severe pain in all joints to an equal degree,"
From the record evidence, the ALJ sustainably concluded that although claimant has been diagnosed with fibromyalgia — an impairment the ALJ deemed "severe" — the "objective physical examinations do not establish substantial deficits in strength, mobility, and motor skills."
The ALJ did not erred in assessing claimant's testimony and/or her subjective complaints of disabling pain. He properly evaluated claimant's symptoms and limitations, and his findings are amply supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Finally, claimant seems to assert that her various outbursts at the two hearings before the ALJ compel the conclusion that her panic attacks are, standing alone, disabling.
In discussing the weight that will be ascribed to the opinions of "treating sources," the regulations applicable to claimant's appeal provide that, "Generally, we give more weight to medical opinions from [the claimant's] treating sources, since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [the claimant's] medical impairment(s)." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
Here, claimant faults the AJL for not giving more substantial weight to the opinion of a treating physician, Dr. Anthony Mollano. Dr. Mollano treated claimant for an injury to her right wrist (a longitudinal split tear of the ulnar tendon), which she sustained after slipping and falling at work on February 11, 2013. In December of 2014, Dr. Mollano submitted a letter in which he stated:
Admin. Rec. at 609 (emphasis supplied). But, as the ALJ noted, Dr. Mollano's opinion that claimant has "residual impairment of her [right] forearm" and a "permanent impairment rating" is "vague and not a function-by-function assessment of the claimant's abilities despite her right wrist impairment."
Moreover, during the "examination under anesthesia" referenced in his letter, Dr. Mollano reported:
After the induction of general anesthesia, I was easily and lightly able to manipulate the forearm into full supination. The elbow had full range of motion. I was able to fully pronate and fully supinate the forearm. There was no snapping of the ECU tendon. The DRUJ was stable. There was no crepitation. There was no indication for steroid injections or any other treatments. A sugar-tong splint was placed with the elbow at 90 degrees in full supination with the plan being to keep the splint on for 2 weeks and then start therapy thereafter.
Having reviewed the evidence of record, the court cannot conclude that the ALJ erred in his consideration of Dr. Mollano's opinion that claimant suffers from a "permanent impairment rating" or in his decision to afford it little evidentiary weight.
Finally, claimant generally asserts that the ALJ's factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence. First, she claims the ALJ failed to adequately support his findings concerning her physical limitations. Specifically, she seems to claim that the ALJ failed to adequately account for the symptoms of her fibromyalgia. The court disagrees.
The ALJ amply supported his conclusions about claimant's physical limitations with citations to record evidence. As to claimant's fibromyalgia, it is true that a rheumatologist formally diagnosed claimant with fibromyalgia (and the ALJ properly determined that it is a "severe" impairment). But, the symptoms of that impairment (and the extent to which they impose limitations upon claimant) are, at best, unclear. Dr. John Kwock, the non-examining physician who reviewed claimant's medical records and testified at the first hearing explained it well:
Admin. Rec. at 67-68.
In short, the record amply supports the ALJ's conclusions about the physical limitations imposed upon claimant as a result of her fibromyalgia.
Claimant also takes issue with the ALJ's decision to discount the opinion of Dr. Mollano, as expressed in his letter dated December 9, 2014. But, as discussed above, the ALJ's decision to give that particular opinion "little evidentiary weight," Admin. Rec. at 29, is fully supported by the record.
The ALJ's written decision in this case is comprehensive and his findings and conclusions are well-supported by the record. Judicial review of that decision is both limited and deferential. This court is not empowered to consider claimant's application de novo, nor may it undertake an independent assessment of whether she is disabled under the Act. Consequently, the issue before the court is not whether it believes claimant is disabled. Rather, the permissible inquiry is "limited to determining whether the ALJ deployed the proper legal standards and found facts upon the proper quantum of evidence."
Having carefully reviewed the administrative record and the arguments advanced by both the Commissioner and the claimant, the court concludes that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's conclusion that claimant was not disabled, as that term is used in the Act, at any time prior to the date of his decision (June 20, 2018). The ALJ's determination of claimant's RFC, his stated reasons for crediting some medical opinions while discounting others, and his analysis of claimant's subjective allegations of disabling symptoms are well-reasoned and supported by substantial evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in the Commissioner's legal memorandum, claimant's motion to reverse the decision of the Commissioner (document no. 7) is denied, and the Commissioner's motion to affirm his decision (document no. 9) is granted. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the case.
