RENÉE MARIE BUMB, District Judge.
Plaintiff Deborah Heart and Lung Center ("Plaintiff"), a not-for-profit charity hospital, alleges two claims against the Defendants — Virtua Health, Inc. and Virtua Memorial Hospital Burlington County (the "Virtua Defendants"), Presbyterian Medical Center of the University of Pennsylvania Health System, University of Pennsylvania Health System, Penn Cardiac Care at Cherry Hill, and Clinical Health Care Associates of New Jersey, P.C. (the "Penn Defendants"), and The Cardiology Group, P.A. ("Defendant CGPA").
First, Plaintiff claims that the Defendants conspired with one another, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, to exclude Plaintiff from the market for certain critical, advanced cardiac interventional procedures, thereby restricting consumers' choice of providers for these procedures, and forcing consumers to pay higher prices.
Second, Plaintiff claims that these efforts were part of an overlapping conspiracy by the Defendants, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, for the Virtua Defendants to monopolize the market for emergent/primary angioplasties — a submarket of the larger market for advanced cardiac interventional procedures that is the subject of the first alleged conspiracy. Defendants have moved to dismiss on a number of grounds.
For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff's Section 1 claim and GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff's Section 2 Claim.
Plaintiff is a 139-bed hospital located in Burlington County, New Jersey and is nationally renowned for the quality of its cardiology and pulmonary services, as well as its high scores for patient satisfaction.
Plaintiff competes with the much larger Virtua Defendants, who operate three hospitals in the area with nearly 900 beds. Since 2005, the Virtua Defendants have made Defendant CGPA the exclusive provider of cardiology services at Defendant Virtua Memorial Hospital, one of the three hospitals the Virtua Defendants operate.
Until 2007, the Virtua Defendants were unable, under New Jersey law, which regulates what procedures hospitals may perform based on area need by issuing Certificates of Need, to provide any of the advanced cardiac interventional procedures that are at issue in this litigation. Those procedures fall in to two broad categories: (1) elective — non-emergent angioplasty, electrophysiology, and cardiac surgery (the "Elective Procedures"); and (2) emergency — emergent/primary angioplasty (the "Emergency Procedures"). Plaintiff contends that the relevant geographic market for the Elective Procedures consists of Burlington County, New Jersey, as well as parts of Atlantic, Camden, Mercer, and Ocean Counties, also in New Jersey, and the Philadelphia area. As for the relevant geographic market for Emergency Procedures, Plaintiff claims that the market is slightly smaller and consists of Burlington County, as well as portions of Camden, Mercer, and Ocean Counties, but not Atlantic County or the Philadelphia area.
Historically, because the Virtua Defendants were largely unable to perform the procedures at issue
All this changed when, according to Plaintiff, the Defendants conspired to exclude Plaintiff and, ultimately, drive it out of business and allow Defendant Virtua Memorial Hospital to monopolize the market for Emergency Procedures.
According to Plaintiff, Defendants entered into an anti-competitive conspiracy in 2007 premised on two interlocking written agreements: first, between the Virtua Defendants and Defendant CGPA, making CPGA the exclusive provider of cardiology services at Virtua; and second, between CGPA and the Penn Defendants, making the Penn Defendants the exclusive recommended referral of CGPA. These agreements, Plaintiff contends, form the building blocks of the larger conspiracies to exclude Plaintiff from receiving transfers from the Virtua Defendants, drive it out of the market, and allow the Virtua Defendants to monopolize the Emergency Procedures market. Plaintiff claims that, as a result of these conspiracies, the Virtua Defendants transferred almost all patients requiring advanced cardiac care to the Penn Defendants. Plaintiff claims that, to enforce this larger agreement, the Virtua Defendants monitored, and reported to the other Defendants, instances of "leakage" — occasions when Virtua Defendants' patients were transferred to other hospitals besides those of the Penn Defendants.
Plaintiff alleges that, in many instances, in contravention of patients' rights under the New Jersey Patients' Bill of Rights, patients of the Virtua Defendants had their requests to transfer to Plaintiff denied, or were coerced not to transfer through the use of false and malicious statements. According to Plaintiff, the Virtua Defendants attempted to compensate for the greater distance to Penn Presbyterian, which previously made Penn an unattractive choice for patients requiring Emergency Procedures, by utilizing helicopter transfers. However, Plaintiff alleges that the helicopter transfers still regularly exceeded medically recommended transfer time limits.
Plaintiff claims that these actions resulted in harm to both Plaintiff and consumers: Plaintiff lost business to the Penn Defendants and consumers faced higher costs, less choice, and greater medical risk. In particular, according to Plaintiff, patients transferred to the Penn Defendants faced higher fees in the form of: "out of pocket expenses related to insurance co-pays and deductibles and balance billing" which do not occur at Deborah. Medicare, Medicaid, and third party insurers also faced increased costs from lengthier ambulance transportation to Penn Presbyterian and helicopter transport. Patients and insurers were both harmed because, according to Plaintiff, the conspiracy enabled the Penn Defendants to charge supracompetitive prices for the procedures at issue. Finally, Patients were deprived of their choice in hospital and, in the case of Emergency Procedures, subjected to unnecessary medical risk because of the lengthier transport time.
To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
The Court conducts a three-part analysis when reviewing a claim:
Plaintiff makes two claims: (1) that Defendants have violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act (conspiracy to restrain trade); and (2) that Defendants have violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act (conspiracy to monopolize the Emergency Procedures market).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks antitrust standing to pursue its claims. The Third Circuit applies a 5-factor test to assess antitrust standing. The factors are:
The first two factors relate to whether Plaintiff has suffered an "antitrust injury."
First, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendants' conspired to harm Plaintiff and that that conspiracy caused Plaintiff harm in the form of lost patient revenues. Second, Plaintiff's loss of revenues from its exclusion is among the types of harm the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.
Therefore, Plaintiff has antitrust standing to maintain its claims and this Court must turn to whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged the elements of its antitrust claims.
"To establish a violation of Section 1, a plaintiff must prove: (1) concerted action by the defendants; (2) that produced anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and geographic markets; (3) that the concerted actions were illegal; and (4) that it was injured as a proximate result of the concerted action."
"Concerted action is established where two or more distinct entities have agreed to take action against the plaintiff."
Plaintiff has adequately plead, through both direct and circumstantial evidence, that Defendants are engaging in concerted action to exclude Plaintiff from receiving patient transfer from the Virtua Defendants. Directly, Plaintiff has demonstrated that there are two interlocking written agreements: first, between the Virtua Defendants and Defendant CGPA, making CPGA the exclusive provider of cardiology services at Virtua; and second, between CGPA and the Penn Defendants, making the Penn Defendants the exclusive recommended referral of CGPA. According to Plaintiff, these interlocking agreements, in practice, make the Penn Defendants the exclusive advanced cardiac procedural referral of the Virtua Defendants. This direct evidence of agreement is supported by four strong pieces of circumstantially pled evidence: (1) the powerful shift in the Virtua Defendants' transfer pattern (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 75, 77); (2) that the shift in patients needing Emergency Procedures was made despite increased medical risks and costs (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 181-185, 208); (3) coercive conduct by the Virtua Defendants and CGPA to prevent patients from exercising their choice of hospital, in the face of a statutory obligation to allow that very choice (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 78-174)
The Virtua Defendants and CGPA argue that Plaintiff has failed to establish concerted action because Plaintiff failed to show that the events at issue are
First, Defendants overstate the Plaintiff's burden on a motion to dismiss. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff's "allegations need not rule out all potential alternative explanations" and instead must only adduce enough factual material taken as true to plausibly suggest an agreement was made.
Second, Plaintiff has, in fact, plausibly and specifically alleged economic incentive from these Defendants. The Virtua Defendants and CGPA both stood to gain from the potential elimination of a rival. In an e-mail, CGPA's President contemplated the possibility of Plaintiff being driven out of business and hypothesized that that process could be accelerated by no longer transferring certain cardiac patients there. Plaintiff's exit from the market would result in new patients and an enhanced possibility of the Virtua Defendants being awarded a Certificate of Need to perform additional cardiac interventional procedures — a possibility the Virtua Defendants are alleged to have considered and studied.
Third, these Defendants have failed to offer a plausible explanation that the events at issue were the result of independent conduct, rather than the result of an agreement.
Finally, the Penn Defendants argue that a Section 1 claim requires, and they lacked, a unity of purpose with the other Defendants, since the alleged goal of their co-defendants was to shutdown Deborah, and their economic motivation was not predicated on Deborah's shutdown, but on a the "influx of new patients" as a result of the transfers — a legitimate business interest. But the complaint need not have alleged "that the parties to an agreement had identical motives" or that a party's motive was anti-competitive — only that they "had a plausible reason to participate in the conspiracy."
Accordingly, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged the first element of a Section 1 claim.
A plaintiff may demonstrate that concerted action produced adverse, anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and geographic markets in two ways: (1) through direct evidence of actual anticompetitive effects; or (2) through proof of the defendant's market power, which acts as a proxy for anticompetitive effect.
While, in both cases, a plaintiff must make some showing of a relevant market, where a plaintiff demonstrates direct evidence of actual anticompetitive effects, the plaintiff's burden is diminished and it must only demonstrate "the rough contours of a relevant market."
Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged direct anticompetitive effects, there is no need to, and the Court will not, separately assess whether Plaintiff adequately alleged market power.
While Plaintiff's allegations of supracompetitive pricing for the procedures at issue are too conclusory to be credited
They do not reflect, as Defendants alternately contend: (1) a de minimis, non-cognizable harm to competition; (2) a harmless substitution of one provider of the procedures at issue — Plaintiff — for another — the Penn Defendants; or (3) "increased competition" from the Penn Defendants. Those conclusions do not follow. Prior to the alleged conspiracy, the Penn Defendants competed freely with Plaintiff and other hospitals in the area. Once the conspiracy began, however, Plaintiff alleges that it was largely excluded from competition. Thus, the diversion of patients at issue was not the product of increased competition from the Penn Defendants, who were already competitors, but the exclusion of Plaintiff. That exclusion was harmful, not harmless, to consumers for the reasons detailed above and affected a significant harm on the market. Plaintiff has therefore, contrary to Defendants' arguments otherwise, satisfied its burden to show anticompetitive harm that was more than a de minimis restraint of trade.
Defendants also argue that the higher prices patients transferred to the Penn Defendants pay, through co-pays and other payments that they do not need to pay at Plaintiff, cannot constitute a competitive harm because: (1) they are the product of a regulatory anomaly rather than Plaintiff's competitive merits; (2) the regulatory exemption is itself anti-competitive; and (3) holding otherwise would mean that any transfer, other than to Plaintiff, could constitute a competitive harm. On the first issue, Defendants have cited no authority, and this Court can find none, suggesting that it would be improper to find anticompetitive harm because of Plaintiff's admitted regulatory advantage.
Finally, Defendants argue that the alleged agreement is not anticompetitive, and therefore there is no anticompetitive harm, because there is no duty to cooperate. But the anticompetitive harm alleged is the exclusion of Plaintiff as a choice for patients, not that Defendants have an affirmative obligation to direct patients to Plaintiff, or give Plaintiff access to Defendants' patients.
Plaintiff has also sufficiently alleged, at a minimum, the rough contours of the marketplace for both the Elective and Emergency Procedures. For the former, Plaintiff has adequately alleged a marketplace in Southern New Jersey and Philadelphia. For the latter, Plaintiff has adequately alleged a more restricted geographic market, which excludes Philadelphia, in light of the need for patients needing emergency treatment to receive more rapid care and the alleged greater transport time in transit to Philadelphia. That the Virtua Defendants are, in fact, transferring patients to the Penn Defendants in Philadelphia for Emergency Procedures does not disturb this analysis. Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Philadelphia hospitals are not a suitable medical alternative and that patients are only being transferred there as a result of the conspiracy. It is therefore plausible that Philadelphia is not part of the relevant market. In any event, regardless of whether Philadelphia is part of the market for Emergency Procedures, Plaintiff's allegations certainly allege the "rough" market contours required in a direct evidence case.
Concerted action that unreasonably restrains trade is illegal.
Plaintiff has alleged that it has lost revenues because patients who would have sought treatment at its hospital are instead diverted to the Penn Defendants as the result of Defendants' conspiracy. Therefore, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that it was injured, in the form of lost patients and revenues, as a proximate result of Defendant's concerted actions.
The elements of a conspiracy to monopolize include at least three elements: "(1) a combination or conspiracy; (2) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) specific intent to monopolize."
However, while a dangerous probability of success is not a required element, the likelihood of success may be highly significant to whether the defendants could plausibly have had the specific intent to monopolize the market at issue.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired with the intent that the Virtua Defendants monopolize the market for Emergency Procedures. At the time Defendants allegedly entered into the conspiracy (Plaintiff alleges it began sometime in 2007), the Virtua Defendants had either no ability, or very limited ability, to perform any of the Emergency Procedures at issue. And any future ability to perform these procedures depended on Virtua obtaining a Certificate of Need from the state. Virtua also faced robust competition from at least Plaintiff, Cooper, and Lourdes.
Against this backdrop, Defendants argue that successful monopolization of the Emergency Procedures market is, and was, implausible and, with respect to the Penn Defendants and CGPA, there is no reason why they these entities would support a monopoly by Virtua. Therefore, Defendants argue, it is implausible that they would have had the intent that the Virtua Defendants monopolize the relevant Emergency Procedures market. Plaintiff counters that there are plausible economic reasons why Defendants could have shared such intent. Plaintiff misapprehends its burden. It is not sufficient that there may be some plausible reasons that Defendants
Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden. On the allegations before the Court in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, successful monopolization of the Emergency Procedures market was implausible given the competitive landscape and that the Virtua Defendants were not even approved for such Procedures, let alone participants in the market. In the face of these allegations, which are highly suggestive of a lack of specific intent, Plaintiff has failed to offer more than conclusory allegations of specific intent and argument why the Defendants rationally could have possessed such intent. Plaintiff has not offered non-conclusory allegations suggesting that Defendants did have such intent. Plaintiff has thus failed to plausibly allege that Defendants shared a specific intent for the Virtua Defendants to monopolize the Emergency Procedures market. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a Section 2 claim.
For all these reasons, Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiff's Section 1 claim is DENIED and Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Section 2 claim is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Section 2 Claim is dismissed without prejudice.
As described below, Plaintiff has adequately alleged actual anticompetitive effect, obviating any need for a demonstration of market foreclosure.