MEMORANDUM OPINION
JEROME B. SIMANDLE, Chief Judge.
This matter comes before the Court upon Respondent's filing of the answer [Docket Entries Nos. 6 and 7] to Petitioner's § 2241 application [Docket Entry No. 1], at it appears that:
1. The instant matter was initiated upon the Clerk's receipt of a transfer order from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ("EDPA"). See Docket Entry No. 1-3. The transfer order indicated that Petitioner, a federal inmate previously confined in a federal prison in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and thereafter transferred to the FCI Fort Dix, Fort Dix, New Jersey, filed an application with the EDPA [see id.] challenging the decision by the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") to deny Petitioner's request for calculation of a certain sentence imposed by the EDPA as running "retroactively" concurrent to Petitioner's other federal sentence, imposed by the EDPA prior to the sentence at issue.1 See Docket Entry No. 1-3.
2. This Court directed Respondent to answer the Petition [see Docket Entry No. 3], pointing out that the legal regime governing the claim raised in the Petition was as follows:
Petitioner raised challenges based on the holding of Ruggiano v. Reish[, 307 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2002)]. In Ruggiano, the Court of Appeals explained that the sentencing court's authority under § 5G1.3(c) to "adjust" a sentence is distinct from the BOP's authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) to "credit" a sentence, even though the benefit to the defendant may be the same. See Ruggiano, 307 F.3d at 131-33. Specifically, the "adjustment" that the sentencing court exclusively can award under § 5G1.3(c) is a sentence reduction designed to account for time spent in custody on a prior conviction. [When the federal court sitting in habeas review faces the task of] determin[ing] what type of "adjustment" the sentencing court intended to apply, "the appropriate starting point is to ascertain the meaning that . . . should [be] ascribe[d] to the sentencing court's directives." Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2000). When the oral pronouncement of sentence and written sentence are in conflict, the oral sentence prevails. See United States v. Chasmer, 952 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir. 1991). . . . [W]hen there is no conflict, "but rather only ambiguity in either or both [sentence pronouncements], the controlling oral sentence `often [consists of] spontaneous remarks' that are `addressed primarily to the case at hand and are unlikely to be a perfect or complete statement of the surrounding law.'" Ruggiano, 307 F.3d at 133 (quoting Rios, 201 F.3d at 268). Importantly, "in interpreting the oral statement, . . . the context in which this statement is made is essential." Id. at 134.
Docket Entry No. 2, at 6-7.
3. Respondent duly complied with this Court's order to answer [see Docket Entries Nos. 6-7 (Respondent's answer)], and Petitioner waived his opportunity to traverse. See Docket, generally (indicating that no traverse was received); see also Docket Entry No. 3, at 2 (the Court's order informing Petitioner of his opportunity to traverse). The answer is exceedingly detailed [see Docket Entry Nos. 6] and, being duly served upon Petitioner [see Docket Entry No. 6-4 (reproducing certificate of service)], sets forth both the factual predicate underlying this matter and Respondent's legal position with meticulousness allowing this Court to dispense with recital of the same, since the Court writes solely for the parties.2 Therefore, it shall suffice to state only that: (a) Petitioner, by then already a convicted felon, was arrested by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ("Commonwealth") on August 5, 2003, and charged with a panoply of state penal offenses; (b) although Petitioner made bond on these state charges, he was arrested by federal law enforcement authorities on January 30, 2004, for possession of firearm by a convicted felon; (c) while, on March 19, 2004, the Commonwealth entered nolle prosequi with regard to Petitioner's state charges, the EDPA convicted and sentenced Petitioner, on July 26, 2004, on the basis of his possession of firearm charge, and Petitioner's 57-month federal sentence ensuing from that conviction (hereinafter "first EDPA" conviction) began to run;3 and (d) another federal indictment, based on a series of controlled substance offences,4 which were loosely related to Petitioner's possession of firearm offense, was filed with the EDPA on November 17, 2004, and eventually produced, apparently upon Petitioner's guilty plea, the conviction underlying Petitioner's next EDPA sentence (hereinafter "second EDPA" sentence), which calculation is disputed in the instant matter. See Docket Entries Nos. 6, 6-1, 6-2 and 7 (setting forth the same in much greater detail and replicating the relevant underlying record).
4. The parties are not in dispute that Petitioner's second EDPA sentence was a term of 120 months ordered to run concurrently with Petitioner's first, i.e., 57-month EDPA sentence imposed on the grounds of Petitioner's possession of firearm. The issue in dispute is limited to whether the judge imposing Petitioner's second EDPA sentence ordered it to run: (a) "prospectively" concurrent with Petitioner's first EDPA sentence, i.e., by adjusting Petitioner's second EDPA sentence so it would run concurrent to Petitioner's first EDPA sentence from the point when the second EDPA sentence was imposed; or (b) "retroactively" concurrent, i.e., by adjusting Petitioner's second EDPA sentence so it would be deemed triggered on the date when Petitioner's first EDPA sentence was triggered. Addressing this narrow inquiry, Respondent relies on: (a) the fact that the sentencing court expressly acknowledged that it had authority, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 5G1.3, to adjust, in some way, Petitioner's second EDPA sentence; and, especially, on (b) the relevant exchange that took place between the sentencing judge, Petitioner and Petitioner's counsel during Petitioner's sentencing hearing (conducted with regard to Petitioner's second EDPA sentence):
Petitioner's counsel: Your Honor, I'd just — a point of clarification, if I may. [There is a relevant provision in the sentencing] guidelines . . ., and the Probation office cites that provision, it says that: ["]In a situation where the defendant is already serving a sentence on a related case, the Court shall adjust the sentence for any period of imprisonment already served on the undischarged term of imprisonment, if the Court determines that such period of imprisonment will not be credited to the federal sentence by the Bureau of Prisons["]. What I'm trying to understand, Your Honor, is whether [Petitioner's second EDPA] sentence is . . . intended to encompass [Petitioner's entire first EDPA sentence] or whether [Your Honor] intends to impose a concurrent sentence of a hundred and twenty months that will make [Petitioner's] total sentence . . . greater than that [i.e., whether Your Honor wishes to impose your sentence to run "prospectively" concurrent, starting from this point on]?
The judge: . . . [T]he only thing I'm doing here is, . . . I'm recognizing that the sentence [in Petitioner's first EDPA case] is related to this offense[,] and I'm directing that it [would] run concurrent with that one.
Petitioner's counsel: So, a hundred —
The judge: . . . [A]nd that's all what I'm . . . doing. So, any questions?
. . .
Petitioner: I have a question.
The judge: . . . [D]o you have a question?
Petitioner: That means everything is ran together?
The judge: I'm giving you a hundred and twenty months [sentence with regard to the second EDPA conviction] before me. And I'm directing that because the [first EDPA] case that you have . . . is related to this offense, [so] this sentence run concurrent to the extent that you'd be given credit for that time towards this sentence. . . . That's all .. . I'm doing.
Petitioner: Okay.
Docket Entry No. 6, at 6-7 (quoting Docket Entry No. 6-3, at 47-49). 5. In light of the foregoing, Respondent asserts that there is no basis for reading "retroactive" concurrence into the sentence imposed upon Petitioner in connection with his second EDPA conviction,5 since the totality of statements made by the sentencing judge suggests that the concurrence intended was a "prospective" one. The Court finds Respondent's position well warranted.
6. Having its attention expressly drawn to the issue of "prospective" vs. "retroactive" concurrence by Petitioner's counsel, the sentencing court clarified that its actions were limited to "directing that [Petitioner's second EDPA] sentence would run concurrent with" the sentence imposed in Petitioner's first EDPA case. Docket Entry No. 6-3, at 47-49. While, admittedly, the sentencing court's statement, "[the second EDPA] sentence [would] run concurrent to the extent that you'd be given credit for that time towards this sentence," [id. at 48] is not of crystal clear,6 leaving the reader to wonder about the meaning of the word "that" in the phrase "for that time," the controlling oral statements by the sentencing judge appear to be: (a) the phrase "to the extent" utilized in the directive that the second EDPA sentence should be concurrent to the first EDPA sentence only "to the extent"; (b) the word "only" in the sentencing court's phrase "the only thing I'm doing here"; and (c) the word "all" utilized in the sentencing court's twice repeated clarification "that's all what I'm doing" and "[t]hat's all I'm doing." Docket Entry No. 6-3, at 48 (emphasis supplied). These three utterances supply the necessary context to the word "that" utilized in the phrase "for that time," since they indicate, with a sufficient degree of clarity, the sentencing court's intention to downward depart Petitioner's sentence "only" "to [a certain] extent," "that's all." Since, under § 5G1.3(c), the maximum downward departure is equal to retroactive concurrence, this chain of utterances indicates the sentencing court's intent to grant Petitioner something "less" than such maximum downward departure, but still some concurrence nonetheless. That, necessarily, leaves only one option under § 5K1.3(c): the only concurrence that is less than "retroactive" concurrence is the "prospective" one.
7. Thus, if the Court were to focus on the totality and overall context of Petitioner's sentencing judge's utterances — as this Court must, under the guidance provided in Ruggiano, 307 F.3d at 133, and Rios, 201 F.3d at 268 — the case at bar presents circumstances readily distinguishable from, if not directly opposite to those addressed in Ruggiano. In Ruggiano, the defendant requested the application of § 5G1.3, and his sentencing court responded with a directive that the defendant would "receive credit for the amount of time that he had served," Ruggiano, 307 F.3d at 131 (emphasis supplied), expressly utilizing the past perfect construction of the verb "serve" to underscore that the defendant would be granted downward departure corresponding to his prior period of incarceration. In line with that oral past perfect construction, the written judgment entered in Ruggiano expressly stated, "Defendant [shall] receive credit for [the] time served," id. (emphasis supplied), again utilizing the past form of the verb "serve" to underscore downward departure corresponding to the defendant's prior imprisonment. Here, in contrast, not a single word uttered by Petitioner's sentencing judge evinced the intent to resort to retroactive concurrence, and the totality of oral utterances made by Petitioner's sentencing judge indicated the intent to downwardly depart Petitioner's 120-month second EDPA sentence by something less than retroactive concurrence.7 Furthermore, in full accordance with Petitioner's sentencing judge's oral statements — and in striking contrast with the circumstances presented in Ruggiano — Petitioner's written judgment of conviction contained no wording indicative of the sentencing judge's intent to resort to retroactive concurrence.8 See Docket Entry No. 6-2.
8. Therefore, this Court finds that the BOP correctly distilled the intent of Petitioner's sentencing court when it read Petitioner's second EDPA sentence as imposed to run "prospectively" concurrent to his first EDPA sentence.
9. Accordingly, this Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief in the instant matter, and his Petition will be denied. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.