ORDER

JOSE L. LINARES, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court by way of the following motions filed by pro se Defendant Andrew Cox ("Defendant"): (1) Motion to Disqualify the instant District Court Judge [Docket Entry No. 86]; (2) Motion for Removal and Sanctioning of Government Attorneys [Docket Entry No. 89]; and (3) Motion for Release Pending Sentencing [Docket Entry No. 78]; the Court having considered the submissions of the Parties in support of and in opposition to the instant motions, and for the reasons set forth in this Court's accompanying Opinion,

IT IS accordingly on this 31st day of May, 2012,

ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Disqualify the instant District Court Judge is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Removal and Sanctioning of Government Attorneys is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Release Pending Sentencing is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees [Docket Entry No. 108] is DENIED without prejudice to the refiling of the same; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant's request for the return of his property are DENIED without prejudice pending the resolution of his Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant's pending Motions as against the Government [Docket Entry Nos. 88, 90, 92, 95 and 108] shall proceed before the instant Judge along with Defendant's discovery request filed with his Motion for Release [Docket Entry No. 78]; and it is further

ORDERED that the Government shall have fourteen (14) days from the issuance of this Order to file its opposition, if any, to Defendant's pending Motions, including his discovery request; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant shall file his reply thereto, not to exceed ten (10) pages, by June 21st, 2012; and it is further

ORDERED that a hearing on Defendant's pending Motions is hereby set before this Court in Courtroom 5D, 50 Walnut Street, Newark, New Jersey, on July 10th, 2012 at 1:30 p.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

OPINION

This matter comes before the Court by way of the following motions filed by pro se Defendant Andrew Cox ("Defendant"): (1) Motion to Disqualify the instant District Court Judge [Docket Entry No. 86]; (2) Motion for Removal and Sanctioning of Government Attorneys [Docket Entry No. 89]; and (3) Motion for Release Pending Sentencing [Docket Entry No. 78]. The Court has considered the submissions of the Parties in support of and in opposition to the instant motions, and decides the motion on the papers pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. For the reasons stated herein, pro se Defendant's motions are denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant was originally indicted with one count of distribution of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) on February 9, 2011. [Docket Entry No. 14]. Prior to his indictment, Defendant was released on bail following a bail hearing before Magistrate Judge Patty Shwartz. [Docket Entry No. 13]. The conditions of Defendant's release established a set of computer/internet restrictions, including "No Computers — defendant is prohibited from possession and/or use of computers or connected devices," however, "by consent of other residents in the home, any computers in the home utilized by other residents shall be approved by Pretrial Services, password protected by a third party custodian approved by Pretrial Services, and subject to inspection for compliance by Pretrial Services." [Id.]. On March 16, 2011, Defendant was arraigned and a bail revocation hearing was held which resulted in the modification of the conditions of his release, namely, prohibiting Defendant's "access to a computer at his request," prohibiting "any computers in the home [and] no connected devices allowed in the home," and finally requiring "Shannan Maitland . . . [to] surrender her computer to the nearest office of Pretrial Services by March 16, 2011 at 5:00 pm to be searched by Government authority." [Docket Entry Nos. 17, 19]. Defendant's bail was revoked on April 15, 2011, following a bail revocation hearing before Magistrate Judge Shwartz where she affirmed her finding of a violation of the no-computer-use requirement of the conditions of bail as well as found that Defendant had demonstrated an inability to provide truthful information to the Court while under oath. [Docket Entry Nos. 21, 22, 24].

On June 15, 2011, a Superseding Indictment was returned by a Grand Jury for six counts of distribution of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A), and Defendant was arraigned on July 7, 2011. [Docket Entry Nos. 27, 31]. Defendant filed a motion for review of Magistrate Shwartz's revocation of bond on July 14, 2011, and on August 3, this Court denied Defendant's motion following a bail review hearing on June 8, 2011. [Docket Entry Nos. 34, 37]. Defendant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion seeking, inter alia, to dismiss the Superseding Indictment, and Defendant supplemented that motion on September 16, 2011. [Docket Entry Nos. 40, 46]. The Government filed a motion in limine on September 19, 2011, and the Court entered its Opinion and Order resolving the pending pre-trial motions before it on October 17 and 19, 2011 when it, inter alia, granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment. [Docket Entry Nos. 48, 60, 62]. A Second Superseding Indictment was returned on October 19, 2011 by a Grand Jury, consisting in six counts of distribution of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). [Docket Entry No. 63]. Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court's October 17 Order, and Defendant's motion was denied on November 9, 2011. [Docket Entry Nos. 65, 71]. On November 17, 2011, a plea agreement was entered as to Andrew Cox in which Defendant pled guilty to all six counts of the Second Superseding Indictment. [Docket Entry No. 77].

On March 1, 2012, Defendant filed his first pro se motion before this Court, moving to be released from custody "pending appeal, before entry of a Judgment of Conviction." [Docket Entry No. 78]. Defendant's motion was denied without prejudice on grounds that Defendant's submissions could not be considered due to the fact that he continued to be represented by counsel and filed the motion pro se. [Docket Entry No. 79]. On April 9, 2012, Defendant's Counsel filed a motion to withdraw as Defendant's attorney, and on April 13, 2012, Defendant filed a motion for leave to appear, to proceed pro se and for the Court to appoint stand-by counsel. [Docket Entry Nos. 84, 85]. Prior to the Court's review of those motions, Defendant filed seven additional motions, including two of the three instant motions under review as well as: (1) a motion requesting Pre-Trial Services to produce documents [Docket Entry No. 87]; (2) a motion to dismiss the complaints filed and indictments returned against him [Docket Entry No. 88]; (3) a motion to disclose why his case was sealed in January, 2011 [Docket Entry No. 90]; (4) a motion to produce all grand jury materials [Docket Entry No. 92]; and (5) a motion to withdraw his guilty plea [Docket Entry No. 95].1

On April 30, 2012, this Court held oral argument on Defendant's motion to proceed pro se as well as on Defendant's Counsel's motion to withdraw. [Docket Entry Nos. 97, 99]. For the reasons set forth on the record at that hearing, and following this Court's review of the Parties' submissions, this Court granted Defendant's motion to proceed pro se as well as Defendant's Counsel's motion to withdraw, appointing Mr. Michael Pedicini, Esq. as stand-by counsel to the Defendant. [Docket Entry No. 100]. The Court also established a schedule for resolving Defendant's pending motions, beginning with the instant motions, and reopened Defendant's Motion for Release Pending Sentencing as his own pro se motion. [Id.].2 The Government filed its Opposition to the instant Motions on May 11, 2012. [Docket Entry No. 105]. On May 15, 2012, Defendant filed a letter requesting to withdraw his Motion to Disqualify the instant District Court Judge, but also sought to file a reply to the Government's Opposition to that Motion. [Docket Entry No. 106]. On May 16, 2012, in the abundance of caution, the Court did not deem the Motion to Disqualify as withdrawn, and gave Defendant the opportunity to file his reply, if any, to the Government's Opposition to that Motion. [Docket Entry No. 107]. The Court not having received a reply in the seven days prior to the motion return date pursuant to L. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(3), and fourteen (14) days having passed since the issuance of said Order, the Court rules on the Motions based on the timely-filed briefings of the Parties.

II. DISCUSSION

1. Motion to Disqualify the Instant District Court Judge

Defendant seeks to disqualify the instant Judge on grounds that the undersigned engaged in "a very disturbing pattern of non-neutral bias towards me, and improper motive in judicial decision making which severely compromised the integrity of the federal courts."3 (Def. Br. [#86], at 1). Specifically, Defendant sets forth three general bases for his motion to disqualify: 1) refusing to re-instate Defendant's bond at his June 8, 2011 bond hearing (Id., at 11-12); 2) denying Defendant's pre-trial claims, including: a) claims in his motion to dismiss regarding Speedy Trial Act violations, the Government's bad faith, and the validity and constitutionality of his arrest and search warrants, b) his request for production of Grand Jury materials, c) his motion for reconsideration, and d) his motion for release pending sentencing (Id., at 12-27, 31-36); and 3) an ex parte communication with Defendant's Counsel, Mr. Michael Orozco, on November 16, 2011 (Id., at 34-35).4 Defendant states that the motive for the bias is "to cover-up [sic] the corruption of Judge Patty Shwartz and assist her Third Circuit nomination, . . . [and] to protect his own promotion or political aspirations." (Id., at 11). Defendant asserts that the instant Judge conspired with Judge Shwartz to violate his constitutional rights, and speculates that "the standard incentives of sex, money, and power must be thoroughly investigated." (Id., at 30-31).

The Government argues in opposition that Defendant's motion should be denied "because it is speculative, not based in evidence, and draws irrational inferences from rulings in this case." (Gov't Opp'n Br., at 1). Specifically, the Government contends that the record is "devoid of any objective indicia of partiality for or against the defendant. The defendant's motion instead is based upon a strong disagreement with the Court's decisions regarding bail and pre-trial motions, which the defendant has expressed repeatedly throughout various filings in this case. . . . Because disagreement with rulings is not a basis for disqualification and reassignment, and no objective reasonable observer could conclude that this Court has exhibited a high degree of favoritism or antagonism toward either party such that the Court could not make a fair judgment, the defendant's motion must be denied." (Id., at 2).

Defendant does not cite to any statutory provisions pursuant to which his Motion to Disqualify the Instant Judge is brought. The Court accordingly construes Defendant's Motion as brought pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, reviewing it according to the standards set out for each.

a. Disqualification on the Basis of 28 U.S.C. § 144 Bias or Prejudice

Section 144 is the narrower of the two provisions and provides as follows:

28 U.S.C. § 144. It is first "the responsibility of the district judge against whom an affidavit is filed to assess the legal sufficiency of the affidavit," and the "mere filing of an affidavit under this section does not automatically disqualify a judge." United States v. Townsend, 478 F.2d 1072, 1073 (3d Cir. 1973). The facts alleged in a timely-filed affidavit must be accepted as true for the purposes of the motion for disqualification. See United States v. Vespe, 868 F.2d 1328, 1340 (3d Cir. 1989). An individual seeking to disqualify a judge on the basis of bias under Section 144 must meet a three-part test: (1) the facts alleged must be stated with particularity and be material; (2) if true, the facts would convince a reasonable person of the existence of bias; and (3) the facts show that the bias is of a personal nature. United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 528 (3d Cir. 1973).

The express language of § 144 requires that a party's affidavit must be "accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record" that states the affidavit was "made in good faith." Although the Court may construe Defendant's motion brief as an affidavit, Defendant has failed to include a certificate of counsel. As other courts have noted, the purpose behind the § 144 requirement that a motion for recusal or disqualification contain a certificate of counsel is to prevent "abuse by protecting against obviously untruthful affidavits and unjustified attempts by a party to disqualify a judge." Heimbecker v. 555 Assocs., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6636, * 16 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2003)(citing Morrison v. U.S., 432 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir. 1970)); see also Cizek v. Davis, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23113, * 4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2010). The requirement of including a certificate of counsel applies even when the moving party is proceeding pro se. See Cizek, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23113, at * 4-5; United States v. Pungitore, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, * 8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2003)(finding the absence of a certificate of counsel is a valid basis to deny a motion to disqualify under Section 144, and affirming other courts in holding that "this procedural safeguard against abuse applies equally to pro se litigants"); Thompson v. Mattleman, Greenberg, Schmerelson, Weinroth & Miller, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7100, * 4 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 1995)(following the requirements of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits in affirming that, "if the moving party is proceeding pro se, . . . the certificate may be signed by any member of the bar of this Court"). Since Defendant failed to include with his motion a certificate of counsel, the Court denies Defendant's Motion for Disqualification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144.

b. Disqualification based on 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)

Section 455(a) provides that "[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate [magistrate judge] of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); see In re Kensington Int'l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 220 (3d Cir. 2003). "Under § 455(a), if a reasonable man, were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality under the applicable standard, then the judge must recuse." Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 167 (3d Cir. 2004)(quoting Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions), 148 F.3d 283, 343 (3d Cir. 1998)). The assessment is thus an objective one where the Court asks whether the record reasonably supports the appearance of prejudice or bias suggestive of a high degree of favoritism or antagonism towards a party such that it would be impossible for the judge to make a fair judgment. Untied States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 213 (3d Cir. 2007)(citing Litekey v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994)). Section 455(b) lists five circumstances under which a justice, judge or magistrate judge must recuse himself, and those circumstances include, inter alia, where the judge "has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding."5 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).

Both § 455(a) and (b) are unavailing to Defendant. Courts have consistently found that "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. . . . In and of themselves (i.e., apart from surrounding comments or accompanying opinion), they cannot possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required . . . when no extrajudicial source is involved. Almost invariably, they are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal." Litekey, 510 U.S. at 555 (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966)); see also Massachusetts Sch. of Law at Andover v. ABA, 107 F.3d 1026, 1043 (3d Cir. 1997). Therefore, Defendant's arguments which rely on this Court's findings, holdings and reasoning in prior pre-trial motions filed in the instant action cannot serve as a valid basis for a § 455 recusal on their own, nor can they serve as the basis for the instant Judge's reliance on an extrajudicial source without facts asserted in Defendant's affidavit about such sources. Rather, Defendant's arguments concerning this Court's prior rulings are grounds for appeal.

Further, the "factual accuracy of affidavits submitted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 may be scrutinized by the court deciding the motion for recusal." United States v. Sciarra, 851 F.2d 621, 625 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1988). In engaging in such scrutiny, the Court cannot conclude that the instant Judge would appear to be partial or that the record reasonably supports the appearance of bias or prejudice. All of Defendant's allegations regarding the instant Judge's purported collusion with Judge Shwartz or Government counsel, beyond the fact that this Court in certain instances agreed with their legal arguments as they applied to this case, are speculative. Defendant cites to no facts pertaining to collusion beyond such agreement, nor does he refer to instances in which the instant Judge looked to or relied on extrajudicial sources that are named. The Court on the basis of Defendant's affidavit cannot find a reasonable factual basis for recusal. Similarly, and for the same reasons, there is no evidence that would support the applicability of any of the five circumstances provided for under § 455(b). Therefore, Defendant's motion for recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 is also denied.

2. Motion to Remove and Sanction the Government Attorneys

Defendant also moves to remove and sanction Government attorneys Shana Chen and Jane Yoon on grounds of "fraud and statutory obstruction of justice to defraud both the Court and my defense." (Def. Br. [# 89], at 1). Specifically, Defendant contends that Ms. Chen lied to this Court regarding: (1) the arrest and search warrants issued as well as the searches conducted in the instant matter, along with purported Constitutional violations resulting from said arrest and search; (2) withholding materials from Defendant in pretrial discovery; (3) the motivation behind filing the Government's Superseding Complaint; and (4) the Government's Speedy Trial Act violations and purported cover-ups regarding such violations. (Id., at 2-14).

The Government responds to Defendant's Motion by arguing that Defendant points to "no evidence to support [his] accusations because there is none and resorts to rehashing arguments that already have been examined by the Court." (Gov't Opp'n Br., at 2). The Government thus contends that Defendant's Motion should be dismissed as baseless. (Id.).

Defendants in federal criminal actions have sought to disqualify prosecutors on a variety of grounds, including impermissible conflicts of interest based on their relationship to a prior or related proceeding or based on their actual, alleged, or potential status as a witness. However, as Defendant does not present such grounds in the instant Motion, the Court will construe Defendant's Motion as seeking prosecutorial disqualification on the basis of government misconduct and obstruction of justice. In reviewing whether a United States Attorney should be disqualified, a court must "appropriately balance proper considerations of judicial administration against the United States' right to prosecute the matter through counsel of its choice, i.e., the duly appointed United States Attorney." United States v. Whittaker, 268 F.3d 185, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2001)(citing United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1063 (1999)). The interests to be balanced include the defendant's right to a fair trial free from improper prosecutorial motives, the government's interest in retaining its chosen counsel, and the court's interest in protecting the integrity of the proceedings and maintaining public confidence in the judicial system. United States v. Vega, 317 F.Supp.2d 599, 603 (D.V.I. 2004). "The disqualification of Government counsel is a `drastic measure and a court should hesitate to impose it except where necessary." Id. at 602 (quoting United States v. Bolden, 353 F.3d 870, 878 10th Cir. 2003). Courts have accordingly allowed the disqualification of government counsel only in limited circumstances. Id.; see also Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 807 (1987)(holding that an appointed prosecutor with an actual conflict of interest in representing another party may not be appointed); United States v. Heldt, 215 U.S. App. D.C. 206 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(counsel may be disqualified where bona fide allegations of bad faith performance of official duties by said government counsel are found in a civil case); United States v. Prantil, 764 F.2d 548, 552-53 (9th Cir. 1985)(prosecutor may be disqualified where they will act as a witness at trial). Since disqualifying government attorneys implicates separation of powers issues, "the generally accepted remedy is to disqualify `a specific Assistant United States Attorney . . ., not all the attorneys' in the office." Vega, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (citing Bolden, 353 F.3d at 879 (quotations and citations omitted)). "Only the most extraordinary circumstances would justify the removal of an entire United States Attorney's Office from a case. Disqualification of an entire United States Attorneys Office is nearly unprecedented." United States v. Manna, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77982, * 23 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2006)(citing Whittaker, 268 F.3d 185).

In making the above-cited contentions against the Government attorneys assigned to the instant case, Defendant repeats arguments made in his Omnibus Motion and the Motion for Reconsideration regarding bad faith on the part of the Government, arguments this Court has already considered in its October 17 and 18 Opinion and Order as well as its November 9, 2001 Order denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. Defendant thus may not use the instant Motion to Disqualify Government Attorneys as a means to relitigate the issues and concerns addressed and resolved in said Opinions and Orders, although the Defendant may appropriately address those concerns on appeal. Specifically, the arguments Defendant makes with respect to the Government's conduct pertaining to his arrest, the search warrant and any Speedy Trial Act violations were extensively discussed and reviewed in the above-cited Opinions and Orders.

To the extent that Defendant seeks to demonstrate the Government's misconduct and obstruction of justice beyond this Court's review of the Government's conduct in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Court finds that the balance of considerations favor retaining the duly appointed Government counsel. First, the Government's purported delayed disclosure to Defendant of the September catalog does not constitute a Brady violation since "no denial of due process occurs if Brady material is disclosed in time for its effective use at trial." Smith v. Lamas, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136025, * 4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2011). To find a Brady violation, "a court must find that some prejudice ensued to the defendant." Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 256 n. 10 (3d Cir. 2005). "Where the government makes Brady evidence available during the course of a trial in such a way that a defendant is able to effectively use it, due process is not violated and Brady is not contravened." United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 924 (3d Cir. 1987); see also, United States v. Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408, 411-12 (1st Cir. 1986)(holding that Brady was not contravened where the government disclosed impeachment material of the chief government witness five days into trial because petitioner was able to effectively cross-examine said witness); United States v. Clark, 538 F.2d 1236, 1237 (6th Cir. 1976)(concluding that the disclosure of a negative fingerprint report to the defense on the third day of trial was consistent with Brady). In addition, disqualification of government counsel for failure to make a required disclosure is a sanction which is available only where the failure to disclose is deliberate, pervasive and severe. See, e.g., United States v. La Rouche Campaign, 695 F.Supp. 1290 (D. Mass. 1988). The only alleged Brady violation committed in the instant case is the purported delayed disclosure of the September catalog, and that material was disclosed to Defendant at the latest prior to Defendant's filing of his Motion for Reconsideration. The prejudice to Defendant was thus minimal. Moreover, Defendant points to the September catalog for the purpose of challenging the probable cause determination of Magistrate Judge Deavers, and this Court has already reviewed whether the search warrant issued had a substantial basis; the arguments and allegations in Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration did not disturb that finding. Therefore, Defendant was able to effectively use said disclosure even prior to his trial, or in this case, his guilty plea, so even if the Court were to find a Brady violation, it would not be so deliberate, pervasive or severe as to warrant the extreme sanction of removal of Government counsel. Defendant's Motion for the Removal and Sanctioning of the Government Attorneys is thus denied.

3. Motion for Release Pending Sentencing

Defendant moves for release from custody "pending appeal, before entry of a Judgment of Conviction." (Def. Br. [# 78], at 1). In Defendant's Brief, he primarily reasserts the claims stated in his Omnibus Motion reviewed by this Court in its October 17 and 19 Opinion and Order. Specifically, Defendant argues that: (1) the Criminal Complaint against him should have been dismissed for malicious prosecution, government misconduct, for Speedy Trial Act violations, and/or under Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(b) (Id., at 2-9, 16-28); (2) the search warrant was invalid as it was based on stale information and lacked probable cause (Id., at 9-10, 11-16); and (3) the arrest warrant was invalid (Id., at 10-11). In his conclusion, however, Defendant addresses the grounds for his release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(c) and 3143. (Id., at 29-34). Defendant first argues that he is not likely to flee because: (1) his case will likely be reversed on appeal; (2) the Government has his passport; (3) he has a very supportive family structure; (4) he does not have the financial resources to successfully evade the U.S. government; and (5) he has proven that he is not a flight risk by returning for both bond revocation hearings on March 16, 2011 and April 15, 2011. (Id., at 29). Second, Defendant asserts that he is not a danger to the community because the crime for which he is awaiting sentence "never even happened," and he "fully complied with the Court's amended orders that no one else was allowed to assist him in building a defense." (Id., at 29-31). Further, Defendant contends that his psychological evaluations indicate that he is mentally stable and does not require treatment. (Id., at 32). Defendant also argues that he "has a substantial history of service to his country and his community," and that all of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A) favor his release, including his personal character, mental condition, family ties, employment history, financial resources, time and ties in the community, past conduct, lack of drug or alcohol abuse or criminal history, and appearance at all court proceedings. (Id.). Finally, Defendant states that, if he should not be released pursuant to § 1343, he should be released under § 1342(c) on a conditional release order requiring electronic monitoring and conditions as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1)(B)(iv)-(viii). (Id., at 33).

The Government argues that the Defendant's Motion for Release Pending Sentencing should be denied because the offenses to which he pled guilty involved victims who were minors, and he now faces a sentence in the range of 210 to 262 months' imprisonment. (Gov't Br., at 3). In addition, the Government contends that Defendant has put forward no clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to release, but merely "rehashe[s] the issues that were litigated in pre-trial motions and has made discovery demands to which he is not entitled under any rule or case law." (Id.). Finally, the Government claims that Defendant's "lack of acknowledgment of any wrongdoing in connection with his bail violation further supports his continued detention" since he maintains that the prohibition against any use of connected devices in Judge Shwartz's bail order was "erroneous." (Id.).

Since there is no appeal pending in Defendant's case, and Defendant has not yet been sentenced, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) is not available to him. (See May 1, 2012 Hr'g Tr. 19:18-20:10 [Docket Entry No. 99]). Further, since Defendant has pled guilty and is not, prior to review of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, awaiting trial, his request for release may not be directly reviewed under 18 U.S.C. § 3142, "Release or detention of a defendant pending trial." The Court will accordingly consider Defendant's request for release under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a), "Release or detention of a defendant pending sentence," which provides as follows:

18 U.S.C. § 3143(a).

In deciding Defendant's July 14, 2011 Motion for Review of Magistrate Shwartz's Revocation of Bond, this Court construed Defendant's Motion as a motion for reconsideration of this Court's June 8, 2011 decision denying Defendant's initial review request of Judge Shwartz's bail revocation order. [Docket Entry No. 37]. The July 14 Order found that Defendant's second motion for review was untimely as a motion for reconsideration, and, further, that Defendant had not "cited to any intervening change in law or offered any `newly available' evidence to otherwise justify reconsideration of this Court's June 8, 2011 decision." (July 14, 2011 Order, at 2-3). Likewise, in the instant Motion, Defendant presents no new information regarding his flight risk, his danger to the community, or the totality of the circumstances which this Court reviewed in its determination that Judge Shwartz's revocation order was appropriate. Defendant merely reiterates arguments he has made on prior occasions in seeking to overturn the April 15, 2011 revocation of bail, and continues to deny that the conditions of his bail were ever violated. (Defs. Br. [#78], at 31 ("it is unknown why his initial release conditions included no internet access, to the point Defendat attempting to use his skills as a JD/LLM attorney and receive assistance from his fiancé [sic] (including legal research!) in saving his freedom and proving Government fraud was argued as a `criminal enterprise.' . . . Even with the erroneous internet restriction for a non-internet crime, Defendant fully complied with the Court's amended orders that no one else was allowed to assist him in building a defense, following their clarification on 16 March 2011. . . . Defendant was only remanded on 15 April 2011 because he was trying to prove the Government was committing fraud and obstruction of justice, which he has now done with the Government's help"); Id., at 33-34 ("Defendant was meticulous in complying with the few restrictions (in subsections iv-viii) that actually applied to his specific case, such as place of abode, travel, and regular reporting to Pre-Trial Services, prior to Defendants revocation on 15 April 2011."). Defendant's factual and legal disagreement with this Court's findings regarding the appropriateness of his bail revocation does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that he does not pose a danger to the community and that he is not a flight risk. Given the nature and severity of the charges to which Defendant has pled guilty, the circumstances surrounding the revocation of Defendant's bail, and the lack of clear and convincing evidence presented in Defendant's Motion, the Court denies Defendant's request for release from detention pending sentencing.6

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's Motions to Disqualify the Instant Judge, to Remove and Sanction the Government Attorneys, and for Release Pending Sentencing are DENIED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.