OPINION
STANLEY R. CHESLER, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the motion filed by pro se Defendant Nelson Otero ("Otero") for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) [docket entry 92]. Plaintiff the United States of America (the "Government") has opposed the motion. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny Otero's motion.
I. BACKGROUND
The Superseding Indictment charged Otero and his co-defendant Maxcime Cagan with one count of conspiracy to commit robberies in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, seven counts of committing Hobbs Act robberies and seven corresponding counts of using, possessing and carrying firearms in connection with the various Hobbs Act robberies. The case was tried to a jury. On April 12, 2012 the jury returned a verdict of guilty against Otero and Cagan on all fifteen counts.
Otero now moves for a judgment of acquittal on two grounds. He argues that (1) the Government did not prove that the charged Hobbs Act robberies obstructed, delayed, or affected interstate commerce and (2) Title 18 of the United States Code was never enacted by Congress.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
A judgment of acquittal may be based solely on the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29; United States v. Cicco, 938 F.2d 441, 446 (3d Cir. 1991). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, "the court must view the evidence and the inferences logically deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the government." United States v. McNeill, 887 F.2d 448, 450 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1087 (1990). A motion for judgment of acquittal should not be granted unless the defendant demonstrates that "no reasonable juror could accept the evidence as sufficient to support the conclusion of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987). The Third Circuit has held that the burden on the defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a heavy one. United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 421 (3d Cir. 1992).
B. Analysis
Otero maintains that he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the Government failed to present sufficient evidence that his conduct in connection with the Hobbs Act charges "affected or could have affected interstate commerce," an essential element of a Hobbs Act violation. See Third Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction 6.18.1951-7; 18 U.S.C. § 1951. He fails, however, to carry his burden of making the required demonstration that there was insufficient evidence to support interference with interstate commerce and thus to uphold the jury's finding.
The Third Circuit has held that evidence that "the defendants' conduct produces any interference with or effect upon interstate commerce, whether slight, subtle or even potential" is sufficient to uphold a Hobbs Act prosecution. United States v. Haywood, 363 F.3d 200, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2004). "A jury may infer that interstate commerce was affected to some minimal degree from a showing that the business assets were depleted." Id. (quoting United States v. Zeigler, 19 F.3d 486, 493 (10th Cir.1994)).
As the Government details in its brief in opposition to Otero's motion, for each substantive count of robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, the Government presented evidence showing that the victim businesses, located in the State of New Jersey, sold products that were not from New Jersey but rather came from other states and countries. It also put forth evidence at trial that each of the victim businesses' assets were depleted as a result of the robberies. For example, several of the substantive Hobbs Act counts involved robberies of four separate 7-Eleven stores in various cities throughout New Jersey. Witnesses associated with each of the stores testified that the individuals who committed each respective robbery stole cash and, in some instances, cigarettes. An employee of a supplier to each of the subject 7-Elevens testified that he reviewed invoices from the supplier to each of the 7-Eleven stores and that the invoices listed products, including various brands of cigarettes, which originated outside the State of New Jersey. As to the other subject stores underlying the substantive Hobbs Act charges, the Government presented similar evidence of stolen cash as well as the out-of-state origin of products sold by the stores. Such evidence is clearly sufficient, under the standard articulated by the Third Circuit in Haywood, to permit a jury to conclude that interstate commerce was affected by Otero's conduct and thus uphold their conclusion of Otero's guilt on the Hobbs Act charges beyond a reasonable doubt. See Haywood, 363 F.2d at 209-10; Coleman, 811 F.2d at 807.
Otero's Rule 29 motion based on the insufficiency of evidence must therefore be denied.
To the extent that Otero bases his motion for judgment of acquittal on the invalidity of Title 18 of the United States Code, the motion lacks merit because a Rule 29 motion can be grounded only in the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29; see also United States v. Frumento, 426 F.Supp. 797, 802 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Additionally, the Third Circuit has rejected attacks on the district court's jurisdiction over criminal matters based on the argument that 18 U.S.C. § 3231 was not properly enacted. See, e.g., United States v. Abdullah, No. 07-1705, 2008 WL 3165900, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 6, 2008); United States v. Coplin, No. 08-2004, 2008 WL 2699669, at *2 (3d Cir. July 11, 2008) (citing United States v. Risquet, 426 F.Supp.2d 310, 311 (E.D. Pa. 2006)).
An appropriate form of Order denying the motion for judgment of acquittal will be filed.
ORDER
This matter having come before the Court on the motion filed by pro se Defendant Nelson Otero ("Otero") for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) [docket entry 92]; and Plaintiff the United States of America having opposed the motion; and the Court having considered the papers filed by the parties; and for the reasons expressed in the Opinion filed herewith;
IT IS on this 8th day of June, 2012,
ORDERED that Defendant Otero's motion for judgment of acquittal [docket entry 92] be and hereby is DENIED.
