NOEL L. HILLMAN, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, denying the application of Plaintiff for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income ("Social Security benefits") under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. The issue before the Court is whether the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in finding that there was "substantial evidence" that Plaintiff was not disabled at any time since her January 18, 2008 application for benefits for an alleged onset of disability on March 29, 1989. For the reasons stated below, this Court will affirm the ALJ's decision.
Plaintiff was born on March 29, 1989 with gastroschisis, which is a congenital condition that caused her to be born with her intestines outside of her body. Immediately after her birth, Plaintiff received surgery to close her abdominal cavity, and as a result, she has experienced chronic abdominal pain and other related side-effect ever since. When she entered school, she scored low on reading and intelligence tests, and was diagnosed with a learning disability. Other than working as a part-time cashier at two fast-food restaurants in 2009 and 2010, Plaintiff has not engaged in any substantial employment because she claims that her chronic pain precludes her from working.
After a hearing before an ALJ, it was determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. Plaintiff appealed the decision, and the Appeals Council denied review rendering the ALJ's decision final. Plaintiff now seeks this Court's review.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Congress provided for judicial review of the Commissioner's decision to deny a complainant's application for Disability Insurance Benefits.
A reviewing court has a duty to review the evidence in its totality.
The Commissioner "must adequately explain in the record his reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence."
The Third Circuit has held that access to the Commissioner's reasoning is essential to a meaningful court review:
The Social Security Act defines "disability" for purposes of an entitlement to a period of disability and disability insurance benefits as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations for determining disability that require application of a five-step sequential analysis.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f). Entitlement to benefits is therefore dependent upon a finding that the claimant is incapable of performing work in the national economy.
This five-step process involves a shifting burden of proof.
In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of disability (Step One). The ALJ next found that Plaintiff's chronic pain was severe (Step Two). The ALJ then found that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet the medical equivalence criteria (Step Three). At Step Four, the ALJ found that even though Plaintiff was not capable of performing her previous job as a cashier, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform unskilled, sedentary work with a sit/stand option (Step Five).
Plaintiff presents four arguments for review: (1) the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff's residual functional capacity; (2) the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff's testimony of disabling pain and limitations; (3) the ALJ failed to give proper weight to her treating physicians; and (4) the ALJ did not properly assess Plaintiff's ability to perform the jobs suggested by the vocational expert.
With regard to Plaintiff's arguments that the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff's testimony about her pain and limitations, and that the ALJ did not give proper weight to Plaintiff's treating physicians, the record demonstrates otherwise. In her decision, the ALJ fully credited Plaintiff's testimony about her pain and limitations, and credited her medical evidence—over the state agency examiners' findings, which the ALJ gave no weight
Plaintiff's first and fourth arguments require a closer examination of the ALJ's decision. Plaintiff claims that the ALJ did not properly assess her RFC by finding that she was capable of performing unskilled, sedentary work. Plaintiff also claims that when the ALJ made that determination, she improperly evaluated Plaintiff's ability to perform the jobs suggested by the vocational specialist.
Unskilled work "is work which needs little or no judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period of time." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568. Sedentary work "involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567.
In determining that Plaintiff was capable of performing unskilled, sedentary work, the ALJ specifically detailed Plaintiff's complaints and resulting limitations on her physical and mental abilities. Plaintiff takes issue with how the ALJ discounted and discredited some of the evidence, arguing that the ALJ had no basis in the record to do so.
The ALJ noted that even fully crediting her complaints about how her physical condition limited her abilities, Plaintiff's daily activities (going to the store, movies and library, playing with her one-year-old cousin outside, doing some light household cleaning), the infrequency of outpatient treatment after June 2008, the absence of significant weight loss, the limited use of home remedies for treatment, a lengthy car trip from North Carolina to New Jersey, and the maintenance of a healthy pregnancy, along with the state agency psychological consultant's report, all supported a finding that she could physically and mentally meet the basic demands of sedentary, unskilled work. Thus, even though the ALJ found some faults with Plaintiff's testimony, other evidence substantially supports the ALJ's finding regarding Plaintiff's RFC.
As to the specific jobs Plaintiff was found to be capable of performing, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in not being more specific in the "sit/stand" option for sedentary work.
Even though it is true that the jobs in which a person can sit or stand with a degree of choice are typically professional and managerial ones, and "unskilled types of jobs are particularly structured so that a person cannot ordinarily sit or stand at will," unskilled, sit/stand option jobs do exist in the national economy. SSR 83-12. When presented with a claimant who requires the ability to sit and stand at will in an unskilled job, the Regulations require that an ALJ consult a vocational specialist "to clarify the implications for the occupational base."
In this case, the ALJ asked the vocational specialist to consider all of Plaintiff's limitations, including her need to sit and stand as she needs to in a unskilled, sedentary job. The vocational specialist identified two jobs—ticket checker and lens installer—that matched Plaintiff's abilities as described by the ALJ. Under these circumstances, any lack of specificity as to the frequency of sitting or standing is immaterial, as the worker's ability to sit and stand at will while performing these jobs allows the worker to choose for herself the frequency that corresponds to her own needs.
Consequently, the ALJ did not err in finding that Plaintiff's severe limitations from her physical condition and subjective pain, in combination with her moderate cognitive impairments, still rendered her capable of performing sedentary, unskilled work with a sit/stand option.
For the reasons expressed above, the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff was not totally disabled is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. An accompanying Order will be issued.
(R. at 81.)
There are two problems with Plaintiff's arguments. First, the ALJ did not find Plaintiff's learning disability, standing alone, to be a "severe" impairment, instead finding it "moderate" after evaluating four functional areas. (R. at 78-79.) As a result, the determination of whether Plaintiff is disabled cannot be based solely on her learning disability or mental impairments. Second, even though the ALJ did not find that Plaintiff's cognitive function was severe, the ALJ recognized Plaintiff's limitations in this area, and found that her mental limitations, in conjunction with her physical disabilities, reduced her RFC to unskilled work: "[T]he record demonstrates that this complex of symptoms could reasonably be expected to cause a moderate difficulty in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace." (R. at 78, citing 20 C.F.R. §416.920a(d)(1).) Thus, the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff's physical and mental limitations in combination when making the RFC determination.