SUSAN D. WIGENTON, District Judge.
Before the Court is Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey's ("Rutgers") Motion to Dismiss the Complaint ("Motion to Dismiss") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). This Court, having considered the parties' submissions, decides the Motion to Dismiss without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons stated below, this Court
Plaintiff John Roe ("John Roe") is a thirty-two year old male with "severe mental retardation and cerebral palsy." (Compl. ¶ 3.) Because of his mental retardation, John Roe allegedly has the mental capacity of "an eighteen month old infant." (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 11.) John Roe's mother, Plaintiff Jane Roe ("Jane Roe"), and John Roe's brother, Plaintiff Richard Roe ("Richard Roe"), are co-guardians of John Roe. (
Defendant Anna Stubblefield ("Stubblefield") is a professor and the Philosophy Department Chairperson at Rutgers. (
During the spring of 2008, Richard Roe attended a course taught by Stubblefield at Rutgers University. (
During the summer of 2010, Stubblefield "arranged for [John Roe] to allegedly present his alleged research at the Autism National Committee conference scheduled for October 2010." (Compl. ¶ 31.) According to Plaintiffs, "[Stubblefield] acted under the guise of facilitating [ ] John Roe's presentation to the conference." (Compl. ¶ 31.) Also during the summer of 2010, Stubblefield allegedly gained consent to take John Roe to a pool party and sexually exploited him there. (
On or about May 25, 2011, Stubblefield met with Richard Roe and Jane Roe and informed them of her sexual relations with John Roe. (
On February 28, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division in Essex County. On March 21, 2013, Rutgers removed the action to this Court. On April 22, 2013, Rutgers filed the instant Motion to Dismiss.
The adequacy of pleadings is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which requires that a complaint allege "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." This Rule "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."
In considering a Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must "`accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.'"
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Section 1983 confers liability on "[e]very person who, under color of any statute . . . subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). To state a cause of action pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law; and (2) that the violation of that right was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.
The Fourth Amendment provides "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]" U.S. Const. Amend. IV. "Generally, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, "[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. "In order to assert a claim for violation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must allege (1) a protected interest and (2) the State deprived plaintiff of that interest using procedures that were not constitutionally adequate."
In Count I, Plaintiffs allege that Rutgers "intentionally and willfully disregarded [its] own policies and procedures and the laws of the State of New Jersey in prohibiting sexual contact between adults on individuals that lack the mental capacity to consent to sexual contact" and that Rutgers "conspired to" or "intentionally and willfully violated" Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. (Compl. ¶ 56.) Plaintiffs concede that Rutgers "cannot be vicariously liable for [] Stubblefield's violation of John Roe's Civil Rights without some action or deliberate indifference to [John] Roe's Civil Rights." (Pls. Opp. at 12.) However, Plaintiffs argue that Rutgers "is liable for its own actions, policies and/or customs (permitting facilitative communication, human research and turning a deliberate indifference to the abuse perpetrated by its staff)." (Pls. Opp. at 12.)
Although Plaintiffs do not refer to any policy in the Complaint, in their brief, Plaintiffs point to Rutgers's "Institutional Review Board (IRB)" policy relating to the use of human subjects for research purposes. (Pls. Opp. at 4) The policy "protects the rights and welfare of human research subjects while facilitating ethical research." (Pls. Opp. at 4 (citing Ex. C).) Plaintiffs also allege it was Rutgers's "custom and practice [] to ignore [the ethical guidelines]."
In Count II, Plaintiffs allege that Rutgers "acted with a deliberate indifference to Plaintiff" in failing to "train, supervise and discipline its employees." (Compl. 63.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that Rutgers facilitated Stubblefield's acts which resulted in violations of Plaintiffs' rights. (Compl. ¶¶ 63-68.)
Based on the Complaint and the briefs, this Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to set forth a viable claim for violation of Plaintiffs' Constitutional Rights in Counts I and II. Although Plaintiffs assert that Rutgers's "`customs' and `policies' were the moving force behind the unconstitutional acts of its agent," Plaintiffs do not demonstrate that Rutgers permitted faculty to sexually assault human research subjects or that it condoned discrimination. As Rutgers points out, Plaintiffs do not allege how Rutgers disregarded its policies. Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not allege that Rutgers knew about Stubblefield's alleged sexual assault before they were notified by Richard Roe or that Rutgers and Stubblefield conspired to assault John Roe. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Rutgers has acted with "deliberate indifference" to Plaintiffs. In fact, when Rutgers became aware of Stubblefield's actions, Rutgers notified the police and the Essex County Prosecutor along with separating Stubblefield from the community. (
The principle of respondeat superior—liability of a public entity for the acts and omissions of its employees—is governed by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:2-2(a). Under the TCA, "[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a public employee within the scope of his employment in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." N.J.S.A. 59:2-2(a). Four factors that courts should consider when determining whether an employee's act is within the scope of his employment include whether:
On the other hand, "an employee's act is outside of the scope of his or her employment `if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.'"
In this case, based on the allegations set forth in the Complaint, Plaintiffs fail to establish a viable claim against Rutgers for the intentional torts of sexual assault, assault, and invasion of privacy. Although Stubblefield was a Rutgers employee, her actions were allegedly intentional and not within the scope of her employment. Stubblefield was employed as a philosophy professor at Rutgers and the University had no role in her engaging in sexual relations with a non-student. Plaintiffs provide no facts relating the alleged sexual relations as being within Stubblefield's scope of employment. Furthermore, Stubblefield's alleged actions were not foreseeable and could not reasonably be actuated by a purpose of serving Rutgers. To the extent that Stubblefield's actions constituted criminal conduct, Rutgers would not be held vicariously liable for such acts.
Plaintiffs assert in the Complaint that Rutgers owed a duty of care to Plaintiffs based on its status as a state university. (
To establish negligence under a theory of respondeat superior, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Stubblefield's actions were within the scope of her employment.
New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) protects employees from discrimination in the workplace.
In this matter, Plaintiffs fail to adequately establish a claim under NJLAD. Plaintiffs do not allege that John Roe was an employee who suffered employment discrimination. Plaintiffs also fail to allege that John Roe was denied access to a public place. Instead, in their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Rutgers permitted Stubblefield "to target and exploit Plaintiff" based on his status as a disabled person. (Compl. ¶ 87.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs assert that "[a]s a result of the discrimination by Defendants . . . John Roe was assaulted, sexually abused, denied the appropriate educational opportunities, forced to attend events and go places without his consent or the informed consent of his Plaintiff guardians." (Compl. ¶ 88.) These allegations do not amount to anything more than conclusory statements. Even looking at the Complaint as a whole, Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to establish a viable LAD claim. In their briefing, Plaintiffs argue that Rutgers is a place of "public accommodation" and focus on the applicability of LAD. (Pl. Opp. 23-26.) However, establishing that Rutgers is a public accommodation alone without any supporting allegations of denial of access is not enough to establish a claim under LAD.
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 699, "[o]ne who, without more, alienates from its parent the affections of a child, whether a minor or of full age, is not liable to the child's parent." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 699 (1977). The accompanying comment states, in pertinent part,
Plaintiffs allege that Stubblefield, as an agent of Rutgers, intentionally interfered with the parental-child rights of Jane Roe and John Roe. (Compl. ¶ 94.) According to Plaintiffs, Rutgers is liable if Plaintiffs can demonstrate that Stubblefield seduced John Roe. (Pls. Opp. 29.) Plaintiffs further argue that they "need only prove that such a claim is plausible." (Pls. Opp. 29.)
Rutgers argues that "Plaintiffs are in a quandary" with this argument. According to Rutgers, if John Roe has the mental capacity of "an eighteen month old infant," Plaintiffs would have to argue that someone with the mental equivalence of a toddler is capable of being "seduced" and subsequently alienated from his family. (Rutgers Br. 17;
In its two-paragraph count, Plaintiffs fail to provide factual allegations to support a claim for Rutgers's interference with parental-child rights. Looking at the Complaint as a whole, Plaintiffs still do not allege sufficient facts to establish this claim. Additionally, Plaintiffs do not allege that John Roe was alienated from his family. As previously discussed, theories relying on respondeat superior are not applicable based on the facts of this case as Stubblefield's actions were far outside the scope of her employment. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' cause of action against Rutgers for interference with parental-child rights fails.
This Court has discretion to grant a party leave to amend its pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2).
For the reasons stated above, Rutgers's Motion to Dismiss is