NOEL L. HILLMAN, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court by way of a motion [Doc. No. 85] for summary judgment by Defendants Gilberto Morales and Isidoro Reyes pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Court has considered the parties' submissions and decides this matter pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78.
For the reasons expressed below, Defendants' motion will be granted.
In his amended complaint [Doc. No. 49], Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights as well as state law claims for malicious prosecution and alleged violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
As the Court has previously explained, "[i]n this case, Plaintiff, Perman Pitman, contends that he was wrongfully arrested and imprisoned for a murder he did not commit. After spending two years in jail because he was unable to make bail, Plaintiff pled guilty to a downgraded charge of manslaughter. [Approximately] [t]wo years later, the Camden County Prosecutor's Office ("CCPO") disclosed exculpatory evidence, at which time Plaintiff's Judgment of Conviction and guilty plea were vacated and Plaintiff was released from jail. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed the present civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law based on his wrongful arrest and subsequent prosecution." (Op. [Doc. No. 40] 2, Dec. 30, 2011.) By Opinion and Order dated December 30, 2011, several Defendants were dismissed from this suit, and Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint.
The essence of Plaintiff's civil rights claims arises from his arrest, conviction, and imprisonment for the September 2005 shooting death of Robert A. Mays ("Mays").
On or about February 8, 2006, approximately four months after Mays was killed, Defendant Palmira White, the Court Administrator for the City of Camden Municipal Court, issued a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest for the alleged felony murder of Mays.
At the time he was arraigned, Plaintiff's bail was allegedly set so high that he was unable to post bail and remained in prison "during the entire pre-trial process" for nearly two years. (
Facing an indictment that charged him with murder, felony murder, armed robbery, conspiracy, possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and unlawful possession of a handgun, Plaintiff represents that he "reluctantly agreed to the plea agreement" which dismissed all of those charges in lieu of the amended single charge for manslaughter because he was feeling "[d]epressed, broken, ... cornered and abused by the system" and he had "no trial date and [there was] no end in sight[.]" (
As the Court previously noted, "[i]t now appears, by its own admission, that the State should never have allowed Plaintiff to plead guilty." (Op. [Doc. No. 40] 5, Dec. 30, 2011.) Plaintiff asserts in the amended complaint that on February 23, 2010, the CCPO sought Plaintiff's immediate release from prison and an Order vacating his conviction. (
As the Court explained in the December 30, 2011 Opinion, in response to the discovery of the note, the CPPO filed a Motion and Order for Dismissal of Plaintiff's Indictment on February 23, 2010. (
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's amended complaint asserts a number of claims against various Defendants. At this time, the Court focuses only on the claims against the moving Defendants Morales and Reyes.
In the present motion, Defendants Gilberto Morales and Isidoro Reyes seek the entry of summary judgment in their favor on all of Plaintiff's claims against them. Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that "`the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'"
An issue is "genuine" if it is supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor.
Initially, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Plaintiff brings his federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the§ party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
"To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a person acting under color of state law engaged in conduct that violated a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States."
Here, Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated, including his right to a fair trial, along with his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. (
Defendants Morales and Reyes are named as Defendants in Count I for purported Fourteenth Amendment Due Process deprivations; Count II
In the present motion, Defendants Morales and Reyes argue that "[n]either [D]efendant was actually involved in the decision to arrest and/or prosecute [Plaintiff]" and "[c]onsequently, the allegations of the [a]mended [c]omplaint have no bearing on the conduct of ... Reyes and ... Morales." (Br. in Supp. of the Mot. for Summ. J. of Defs. Reyes and Morales [Doc. No. 85-5] (hereinafter, "Defs.' Br."), 3.) The Court addresses the claims brought against each of these Defendants separately below.
Although Plaintiff's amended complaint purports to assert claims against Morales for a wide variety of conduct he allegedly engaged in, it is clear from the parties' statements of material fact and the briefing on the motion that Defendant Morales' involvement in the underlying criminal matter was extremely limited. With respect to Morales, a thorough review of the amended complaint reveals that only one paragraph is specifically directed to Morales' conduct. Even that lone paragraph alleges in a conclusory fashion that Morales "acted in conjunction with" the other individual Defendants "to investigate, contrive evidence, arrest and imprison" Plaintiff. (Am. Compl. ¶ 14.)
Despite the sparse allegations of the amended complaint, it is undisputed for purposes of the present motion that in September of 2005, Morales, in his capacity as the "sergeant of detectives in the homicide division of the Camden Police Department[,]" was "in charge of six detectives, including ... Reyes." (Defs.' SOF ¶ 9; Pl.'s Ans. ¶ 9.) On the night that Mays was shot and killed, Morales was the supervisor on call for homicides, while Reyes was the detective on call. (Defs.' SOF ¶ 11; Pl.'s Ans. ¶ 11.) As a result, both Morales and Reyes were called to the scene of the Mays homicide, along with Defendant Woshnak of the Camden County Prosecutor's Office. (Defs.' SOF ¶ 10; Pl.'s Ans. ¶ 10.) At that time, Reyes — not Morales — "was assigned to investigate the death of Mays in conjunction with the Camden County Prosecutor's Office." (Defs.' SOF ¶ 12; Pl.'s Ans. ¶ 12.)
The record reflects that the investigation into Mays' death began that night by Reyes and Woshnak, and Plaintiff admits that "Morales did not participate in the investigation[.]" (Defs.' SOF ¶ 39; Pl.'s Ans. ¶ 39.) Furthermore, the parties do not dispute that Morales' role was limited solely to the extent he served as "the superior officer to ... Reyes at the time of the investigation" and would receive verbal updates about the investigation from Reyes on a regular basis. (Defs.' SOF ¶¶ 39, 41; Pl.'s Ans. ¶¶ 39, 41.) Plaintiff further admits that Morales did not know Mays, Tommie Smith, Tyrone Smith, or Acevedo, nor did Morales interview anyone connected to the underlying criminal investigation. (Defs.' SOF ¶¶ 40, 42; Pl.'s Ans. ¶¶ 40, 42.) It is also undisputed that Morales "was not involved in the decision-making process to determine if there was enough probable cause to arrest" Plaintiff. (Defs.' SOF ¶ 52; Pl.'s Ans. ¶ 52.) To the extent Morales had any involvement with respect to the arrest warrant issued against Plaintiff, it appears that Morales simply received a telephone call from the Camden County Prosecutor's Office advising of the warrant and requesting that a detective accompany the prosecutor to present the probable cause statement to the City Clerk, and that Morales informed Reyes — the detective on the Mays investigation — to go to the City Clerk concerning Plaintiff's arrest warrant.
Plaintiff asserts in the amended complaint that Defendant Morales violated Plaintiff's rights to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment based on his alleged fabrication of false inculpatory evidence, his alleged failure to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence, and apparent acts which coerced Plaintiff into falsely pleading guilty to a downgraded charge of manslaughter. To succeed on a claim for deprivation of procedural due process rights under Section 1983, Plaintiff must show (1) that he was deprived of an individual interest of liberty or property encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the procedures used by the state to effect this deprivation were constitutionally inadequate.
Though the Court remains mindful that the evidence of the non-moving party, Plaintiff, is to be believed and that all reasonable inferences his favor must be made at the summary judgment stage, the Court concludes that Defendant Morales is entitled to summary judgment on Count I of Plaintiff's amended complaint. The undisputed material facts presented to the Court by both Plaintiff and Defendant Morales in connection with this motion demonstrate that Morales was not involved in any significant aspect of the investigation into Mays' death which lead to Plaintiff's arrest and ultimately to his prosecution.
Plaintiff has expressly admitted that Morales did not interview any witnesses and "did not participate in the investigation." (Defs.' SOF ¶¶ 39, 42; Pl.'s Ans. ¶¶ 39, 42.) Therefore, evidence that Morales had the occasion to fabricate false inculpatory evidence is completely absent here. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to demonstrate that Defendant Morales was involved in either obtaining Plaintiff's arrest warrant
Thus, a claim against Defendant Morales asserting that he violated Plaintiff's rights by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence cannot proceed where the record contains no facts showing that Morales was even aware of the existence of such evidence, let alone actively failed to disclose it.
On this motion for summary judgment, Defendant Morales has met his initial burden by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff's case with respect to Count I when Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof at trial.
"Malicious prosecution is a common law tort that occurs when an official initiates a criminal proceeding without probable cause."
Based on the undisputed facts set forth above, it is unclear how Morales could be liable for a claim of malicious prosecution under Section 1983. The record demonstrates that Morales had virtually no involvement in the underlying criminal investigation that led to Plaintiff's arrest. He did not participation in the investigation conducted by Reyes and Woshnak, he did not know any of the relevant individuals questioned in the investigation, he did not conduct any interviews of these individuals, he did not prepare any reports relevant to the investigation, and he was not involved in the decision-making process to determine if there was enough probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Morales' role was limited to the extent he was Reyes' superior officer and received updates from Reyes on the status of the investigation.
However, for purposes of Section 1983, it is insufficient to assert liability based upon the theory of respondeat superior.
Without deciding the issue and assuming for the purposes of argument only that Reyes — who reported to Morales — engaged in wrongdoing here, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that Morales himself participated in that alleged wrongdoing or that he had actual knowledge of it, and acquiesced in Reyes' conduct. On the contrary, Plaintiff admits that Morales had no role in determining whether there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, let alone that Morales had input or participated in the decision to institute criminal proceedings against Plaintiff. In the absence of any evidence that Morales was personally involved in the prosecution of Plaintiff, the Court must grant summary judgment to Morales on Count II of the amended complaint.
As other courts in this District have previously recognized, "the New Jersey Civil Rights Act is interpreted analogously to 42 U.S.C. § 1983."
For purposes of the present motion, it is undisputed that although Reyes was assigned to investigate the death of Mays as part of a joint homicide investigation by the Camden Police Department and the Camden County Prosecutor's Office, the CCPO was the lead agency on this investigation and Defendant Woshnak was the lead investigator. (Defs.' SOF ¶¶ 12-13, 15, 17, 38; Pl.'s Ans. ¶¶ 12-13, 15, 17, 38.) The record also demonstrates that in his role as lead investigator, Woshnak wrote all of the reports relevant to the investigation, without any input from Reyes. (Defs.' SOF ¶¶ 15-17; Pl.'s Ans. ¶¶ 15-17.) In fact, Reyes was not involved in the drafting and execution of any reports in any manner, nor was he, or anyone else from the Camden Police Department, normally even copied on these reports. (Defs.' SOF ¶ 16; Pl.'s Ans. ¶ 16.)
The parties also agree that during the course of the investigation, Reyes never interviewed any of the relevant individuals by himself, and that Woshnak was always present for these interviews. (Defs.' SOF ¶ 21; Pl.'s Ans. ¶ 21.) The record also demonstrates that Reyes "never made a determination as to whether ... Acevedo was a reliable witness" and that Reyes did not have any discussions with anyone from the CCPO about Acevedo's reliability. (Defs.' SOF ¶ 25; Pl.'s Ans. ¶ 25.)
The record is also undisputed with respect to which individuals and what agency made the decision to process a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest. "The decision to process a warrant for the arrest of [Plaintiff] was made within the Camden County Prosecutor's Office" and approval and execution of the warrant itself, along with the probable cause statement in support of the warrant, was made by the section chief of the CCPO prior to being delivered to the City Clerk. (Defs.' SOF ¶¶ 44-45, 51, 54; Pl.'s Ans. ¶¶ 44-45, 51, 54.) Plaintiff further admits that "Reyes did not prepare the probable cause statement against" Plaintiff in this matter. (Defs.' SOF ¶ 55; Pl.'s Ans. ¶ 55.) Although Reyes did not prepare the probable cause statement, he admits that he believed the probable cause statement offered in support of the warrant he signed against Plaintiff was true particularly in light of the statement from the second witness — Skipper Grant — who stated that he saw Plaintiff's vehicle parked at the corner of 5th and York, just a half a block from where Mays was shot. (Defs.' SOF ¶¶ 46, 58-60; Pl.'s Ans. ¶¶ 46, 58-60.)
It is also undisputed that Reyes was no longer connected with the investigation of Plaintiff at the time Plaintiff pled guilty, that Reyes never had any contact with Defendant Harry Collins and had no knowledge of the sticky note allegedly written by Collins, and that he only learned of that note by reading about it in the Courier Post. (Defs.' SOF ¶¶ 49, 70; Pl.'s Ans. ¶¶ 49, 70.)
Similarly to Defendant Morales and several of the individuals Defendants, Plaintiff asserts in the amended complaint that Defendant Reyes violated Plaintiff's rights to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment based on his alleged fabrication of false inculpatory evidence, his alleged failure to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence, and apparent acts which coerced Plaintiff into falsely pleading guilty to a downgraded charge of manslaughter. To succeed on a claim for deprivation of procedural due process rights under Section 1983, Plaintiff must show (1) that he was deprived of an individual interest of liberty or property encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the procedures used by the state to effect this deprivation were constitutionally inadequate.
Even believing Plaintiff's evidence and making all reasonable inferences in his favor, as with Defendant Morales, the Court again concludes that Defendant Reyes is entitled to summary judgment on Count I of Plaintiff's amended complaint. The undisputed material facts presented to the Court by both Plaintiff and Defendant Reyes demonstrate that there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Reyes had the occasion to fabricate false inculpatory evidence, was aware of exculpatory and impeachment evidence that should have been disclosed to Plaintiff's criminal defense counsel, or coerced Plaintiff into making a false plea. Plaintiff has expressly admitted that while Reyes was assigned to investigate the Mays' shooting, Woshnak, and not Reyes, was the lead investigator on the case. It is further undisputed that Reyes did not prepare any of the written reports or statements that were part of the underlying criminal investigation, and that Woshnak drafted these reports without any input from Reyes. The record also reflects that Reyes was not even copied on these reports. Moreover, Reyes did not conduct any of the interviews with witnesses or persons of interest on his own — Woshnak was present for all of these interviews. It thus appears to the Court that it was Woshnak, not Reyes, who drafted any related reports generated from these interviews. Thus, evidence that Reyes had the occasion to fabricate false inculpatory evidence is completely absent here.
Furthermore, while Reyes did sign the arrest warrant against Plaintiff, the record makes clear that the decision to process, draft, approve and execute the warrant was handled entirely by the Camden County Prosecutor's Office. This included the drafting of the probable cause statement offered in support of Plaintiff's arrest. It is clear that Reyes' involvement was limited to his role in signing the warrant as requested by the Prosecutor's Office and that nothing known to Reyes at the time he signed the warrant should have caused him to question the existence of probable cause. As for subsequent events, nothing presented to the Court establishes that Reyes ever learned about the sticky note written by Collins or that Acevedo recanted his statements prior to the time that Plaintiff entered his plead, thus Reyes could not have failed to disclose exculpatory evidence here. Similarly, it is undisputed that Reyes was no longer involved in this case at the time that Plaintiff entered his plea and there is no evidence demonstrating that Reyes had any authority, ability, or even the opportunity to offer Plaintiff a plea agreement for a downgraded charge of manslaughter, let alone the occasion to coerce Plaintiff into making a false plea.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Reyes for violating Plaintiff's rights by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence cannot proceed where the record contains no facts showing that Reyes was even aware of the existence of such evidence, let alone actively failed to disclose it.
As set forth
Before the Court can properly address the merits of Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, the Court must consider Defendant Reyes' argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's federal claim.
Qualified immunity attaches if the official can demonstrate his or her conduct was "objectively reasonable."
Defendant Reyes argues that it was objectively reasonable for him "to believe that probable cause existed to arrest" Plaintiff given that there was "eyewitness testimony, which directly implicated [Plaintiff] in the homicide of Mays, and it was corroborated by the physical evidence at the scene." (Defs.' Br. 19.) Plaintiff counters that Defendant Reyes has "fallen well short of showing that [his] conduct was objectively reasonable." (Br. In Opp'n to Defs.' Morales and Reyes' Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 87] (hereinafter, "Pl.'s Opp'n"), 3.)
According to Plaintiff, Reyes disregarded the "glaring inconsistency" which exists between the statement provided by Acevedo and the statements provided by Tommie and Tyrone Smith. (
Defendant Reyes argues here that because sufficient evidence existed to support a finding of probable cause for the arrest of Plaintiff, he is entitled to qualified immunity since Plaintiff cannot establish that his constitutional rights were violated because the proceedings brought against him were not instituted without probable cause.
"To obtain qualified immunity in a § 1983 action premised on malicious prosecution, a police officer must show his actions were objectively reasonable under prevailing Fourth Amendment doctrines."
Important for purposes of this motion, "[a] `credible report from a credible witness' can suffice, ... and evidence that might exonerate a defendant does not defeat probable cause."
Reyes asserts that it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff because there was eyewitness testimony from two witnesses (Acevedo and Skipper Grant) that implicated Plaintiff in additional to physical evidence at the scene which corroborated the witnesses' testimony. (Defs.' Mem. 19; Defs.' SOF ¶¶ 46, 60; Pl.'s Ans. ¶¶ 46, 60.) Reyes further argues that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how any inconsistencies between Acevedo's statement and the statements of the Smith brothers made it unreasonable for Reyes to rely on the testimony of Acevedo given the additional corroboration evidence gathered in the investigation. (Defs.' Reply 12.) Reyes contends that relying on Acevedo's statement was also objectively reasonable given that Acevedo passed a voice computer stress analysis for truthfulness. (Defs.' Reply 12; Defs.' SOF ¶ 48; Pl.'s Ans. ¶ 48.) Reyes takes the position that "a reasonable police officer possessing the same information could have believed that the arrest of ... Plaintiff was warranted[,]" and thus his conduct was objectively reasonable and he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Defs.' Reply 12.)
Plaintiff's arguments to defeat qualified immunity here are minimal, insufficient, and unpersuasive in light of the undisputed facts presented in the present motion. The Court agrees with Reyes that a reasonable officer in his shoes, aware of the same facts and circumstances, would have probable cause to arrest because the facts and circumstances in Reyes' knowledge at that time were adequate for a reasonable person to believe that the offense of murder had been committed by Plaintiff.
Having found that probable cause existed for the arrest of Plaintiff at that time, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that a constitutional deprivation occurred here as a result of Reyes' conduct. In the absence of such a constitutional deprivation, the qualified immunity inquiry is at an end.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion [Doc. No. 85] for summary judgment is granted. An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Plaintiff alleges, however, that Acevedo's "statements were contradicted by physical evidence and statements by other witnesses" and that the CCPO and the individual Defendants subsequently "learned that ... Acevedo had recanted his statements and ... had been paid to falsely identify [Plaintiff] as the assailant." (
Plaintiff's failure to cite to the record in support of its denial to these facts violates Local Civil Rule 56.1(a) which provides that the "opponent of summary judgment shall furnish, with its opposition papers, a responsive statement of material facts, addressing each paragraph of the movant's statement, indicating agreement or disagreement and, if not agreed, stating each material fact in dispute and citing to the affidavits and other documents submitted in connection with the motion." L. Civ. Rule 56.1(a) (emphasis added).
As a result of Plaintiff's failure, the Court "will consider any statement of fact which was not denied by ... Plaintiff with a citation to the record as undisputed for the purposes of this motion for summary judgment."
