OPINION

FREDA L. WOLFSON, District Judge.

Esvin Quinonez Mazariegos, who is currently confined at FCI Fairton in New Jersey, filed a paid Complaint and Amended Complaint concerning injuries he sustained during an attack by gang members while he was confined as a pretrial detainee at Monmouth County Correctional Institution ("MCCI"). Presently before the Court are a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment filed by Third Party Defendant Correct Care Solutions, LLC ("CCS"), a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment filed by Monmouth County, Monmouth County Correctional Institution ("MCCI"), Warden Brian Elwood, and MCCI Corrections Officer Christopher Dixon ("the County Defendants"), and Plaintiff's opposition to these motions and his request for appointment of counsel. For the reasons expressed below and pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court will deny the motion filed by CCS to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment without prejudice; deny the motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment filed by the Monmouth County Defendants without prejudice; after screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), dismiss the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 failure to protect claim without prejudice against Monmouth County, Brian Elwood, Classification Officer John Doe, Dr. John Doe, Nurse Jane Doe, and Nurse John Doe; allow the § 1983 failure to protect claim to proceed past dismissal against Christopher Dixon; dismiss the § 1983 inadequate medical care claim without prejudice against Christopher Dixon and Classification Officer John Doe; allow the § 1983 failure to protect claim to proceed past dismissal against Monmouth County, Brian Elwood, Dr. John Doe, Nurse Jane Doe, and Nurse John Doe; and appoint counsel for Plaintiff, subject to his filing, and this Court's granting, his application to proceed in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1).

I. BACKGROUND

On July 15, 2011, federal officials arrested Plaintiff pursuant to an arrest warrant and federal criminal complaint charging him with illegal reentry by an alien who was deported from the United States. See United States v. Quinonez-Mazariegos, Crim. No. 12-0467 (MLC) (D.N.J. filed July 12, 2012). On July 2, 2013;, pursuant to a plea agreement, Plaintiff pled guilty to one count of being an alien who knowingly entered the United States after being deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). On October 9, 2013, Plaintiff was sentenced to a 51-month term of imprisonment.

In the meantime, on August 27, 2012, while Plaintiff was being held as a pretrial detainee at the MCCI in Freehold, New Jersey, he signed the Complaint in this action. (ECF No. 1.) The initial Complaint names only MCCI as defendant. Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that, while he was detained at MCCI, he was attacked by inmates and his eyes were "severely damaged." (ECF No. 1 at 5.) He asserts that, although doctors were supposed to monitor his eye, he received no follow-up medical care for seven months. He alleges that when he was ultimately examined by an eye doctor, the doctor "told me I had glaucoma from trauma." Id.

By Order entered September 13, 2012, this Court administratively terminated the case because Plaintiff had not prepaid the $350 filing fee or applied to proceed in forma pauperis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 2.) On October 1, 2012, Plaintiff paid the filing fee and the Clerk filed the Complaint. (ECF No. 3.) On January 28, 2013, Plaintiff signed, and presumably handed to jail officials for mailing to the Clerk, a document labelled motion to supplement the complaint. (ECF Nos. 4, 6.)1 The body of this motion contains what appears to be an Amended Complaint naming MCCI Warden Brian Elwood, MCCI Corrections Officer Dixon, Classification Officer John Doe, Doctor John Doe, Nurse John Doe, and Nurse Jane Doe. Id. As no responsive pleading had been filed at the time Plaintiff sought to amend the Complaint, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1)(B), on March 21, 2013, this Court granted the motion to amend the Complaint and deemed ECF No. 6 to be Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 7.)

Plaintiff, who is pro se, sets forth additional facts in the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 6.) He alleges that while he was incarcerated at MCCI in 2011, he informed Correction Officer Dixon that certain gang members had threatened his life, but "nothing was done to investigate" the threat and his "pleas for help w[ere] ignored." (ECF No. 6 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that on October 7, 2011, while he was housed with county and state inmates in the maximum security unit of the jail, several "Surenos-13 gang members" assaulted him for over six minutes. Id. He asserts that, "[w]hile plaintiff was being attacked and beat[en], defendant Di[xon] was nowhere to be found," and Officer Valentino eventually called the code. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was taken to a hospital by ambulance and he had severe injuries to his eyes and on his torso, stomach, chest, arms, and back. In addition, he contends that Defendants Warden Elwood and Classification Officer John Doe "were aware that [MCCI] ha[d] a gang problem, and they [took] no corrective action to control and/or abide by State Administrative Regulations regarding gang control." Id.

Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant Doctor John Doe "refused to provide plaintiff with any aftercare treatment, pain medication and [an] eye doctor referral to determine the extent of [his] eye injury," and Nurses John Doe and Jane Doe "refused to place plaintiff's name [on] the sick call list" and ignored his requests for medical treatment. (ECF No. 6 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that after seven months, he "was finally sent to see an eye specialist who diagnosed [his] eye injury as glaucoma due to the trauma from being assaulted and beat[en]." Id. He states that he now "has a permanent eye injury as a direct result [of] the delay in providing [him] with specialist medical care." Id. For violation of his rights, he seeks injunctive relief and damages. Id. at 5.

The Monmouth County Defendants filed an Answer substantially denying Plaintiff's allegations and raising several affirmative defenses, as well as filing a Third Party Complaint against Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Answer and Third Party Complaint, ECF No. 17.) In the Third Party Complaint, the County Defendants assert that CCS contractually agreed to hold the County and its employees harmless for claims arising out of the provision of medical care to inmates at MCCI. Id. In response to the Third Party Complaint, CCS filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or, alternatively, for summary judgment. (ECF No. 22-4.) CCS, further, moved to dismiss the Third Party Complaint against it as moot. Id. The County Defendants thereafter filed a cross motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint or, alternatively, for summary judgment, which substantially mirrors CCS's motion. (ECF No. 28.)

Plaintiff, who is now a federally sentenced inmate confined at FCI Fairton in New Jersey, filed a certification and several letters in opposition to these motions, wherein he repeatedly asked this Court to appoint counsel. (ECF Nos. 27, 29, 30, 31.) Plaintiff argues that the Court should not dismiss his Amended Complaint until he has been able to obtain the facility's video of the attack, other discovery, and an attorney to represent him in this action; that Correction Officer Dixon is liable because he failed to respond reasonably when Plaintiff complained about the threats made to his safety from the gang members who later attacked him; and that, as a result of the incident, Plaintiff is now blind in his left eye and losing vision in his right eye. (ECF No. 27 at 3.) In his letter dated October 28, 2013, Plaintiff states that he has not yet received from the County Defendants the video, photographs, reports, and log book, which he attempted to subpoena; that on February 17, 2013, an optometrist recommended that Plaintiff see a specialist "as soon as possible because he couldn't control [Plaintiff's] eye pressure;" that Plaintiff filed several requests and grievances because he was experiencing blurriness in the left eye; that his left eye went blind on April 15, 2013; and that he needs the assistance of counsel. (ECF No. 30 at 2.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants' Hybrid Motions

Defendant CCS filed what it calls a "Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint of Plaintiff and the Third Party Compliant of Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment." (ECF No. 22 at 1. Without providing further detail in the motion, CCS states that it seeks, "pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for an Order dismissing the Amended Complaint of Plaintiff and the Third Party Complaint of Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs for failure to state a claim or, alternatively, for summary judgment." Id. Similarly, the County Defendants' motion is labelled "Cross-Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment." (ECF No. 28 at 1.) In the body of this motion, the County Defendants move, "pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for an Order dismissing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim or, alternatively, for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56." Id. This Court will review the applicable court rules and case law to determine whether such motions comply with the rules and are proper where the plaintiff is a pro se prisoner.

Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a party to assert the defense of "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" by motion, and provides that a motion asserting this defense "must be made" before filing an answer, if a responsive pleading is allowed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(g), entitled "Joining Motions," provides that "[a] motion under this rule may be joined with any other motion allowed by this rule." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(1). Rule 56 authorizes a party to file a summary judgment motion at any time until 30 days after the close of discovery, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b), provided the motion identifies each claim, or part of each claim, on which summary judgment is sought. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ("A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense — or the part of each claim or defense — on which summary judgment is sought"). Rule 12(d) allows a district court to convert a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) to a summary judgment motion under limited circumstances after notice to the non-moving party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ("If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion").

The Monmouth County Defendants filed their motion to dismiss or for summary judgment after filing an Answer. This implies that the County Defendants' motion is brought under Rules 12(c) and 56,2 but none of the Defendants have adequately supported a Rule 56 motion. In addition, neither motion complies with the procedural requirements of Rule 56. For example, the motions do not identify each claim or defense — or the part of each claim or defense — on which summary judgment is sought, as required by Rule 56(a), and Defendants have not supported their factual assertions by citing to depositions, affidavits, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials in the record, as required by Rule 56(c)(1)(A).

Compliance with the notice requirements of Rules 12 and 56 is particularly important where the plaintiff is a pro se prisoner. See Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2010). In Renchenski, the Third Circuit instructed "State and Federal Governments, as well as our district courts, [to] work together to ensure pro se prisoner-plaintiffs receive adequate notice of an imminent motion for summary judgment." Renchenski, 622 F.3d at 340-41. To this end, Renchenski requires the following notice for pro se prisoners when the court converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion:

Renchenski, 622 F.3d at 340 (footnote omitted).

The Renchenski Court cited several decisions of sister circuits with approval, including Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 101 (7th Cir. 1982). In Lewis v. Faulkner, the district court dismissed a pro se prisoner's civil rights complaint where, instead of filing an answer, defendants filed "something called `Motion To Dismiss, Or In The Alternative, For Summary Judgment.'" Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's order of dismissal on the ground that "a prisoner who is a plaintiff in a civil case and is not represented by counsel is entitled to receive notice of the consequences of failing to respond with affidavits" to a hybrid motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Id. at 102. As the Seventh Circuit explained:

Lewis, 689 F.2d at 101.

Applying Lewis's rationale here, this Court finds that Defendants' hybrid motions did not provide clear notice to the prisoner pro se Plaintiff here regarding his obligation to defend a summary judgment motion. See Lewis, 689 F.2d at 101; Visintine v. Zickefoose, Civ. No. 11-4678 (RMB), 2012 WL 6691783 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2012); Potter v. Glover, Civ. No. 09-4304 (WJM) slip op. at ECF No. 77, pp. 5-9 (D.N.J. Nov. 13, 2012).3 It follows from Renchenski and Rules 12 and 56 that, where the plaintiff is pro se, a defendant should avoid filing a hybrid motion to dismiss that does not comply with the governing rules, and which creates unnecessary confusion for a pro se litigant, as is evident from Plaintiff's letters in this case.4 This Court will deny Defendants' hybrid motions without prejudice for failure to comply with Rules 12 and 56, and as inconsistent with the reasoning of Renchenski. See Lewis, 689 F.2d at 101; Visintine, 2012 WL 6691783; Potter, Civ. No. 09-4304 (WJM) slip op. at ECF No. 77, pp. 5-9.

Even if the Court were to consider Defendants' motions to dismiss on the merits, this Court would not dismiss the Amended Complaint in toto. As illustrated below, several of Plaintiff's claims withstand sua sponte screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, which is governed by the same standard as that applicable to motions to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).5 Only certain of Plaintiff's claims against certain Defendants warrant dismissal without prejudice under this standard.

B. Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

Where "a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity," federal law requires a district court to screen the complaint to identify cognizable claims, and to dismiss any claim that "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b)(1). This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) because Plaintiff is a prisoner within 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c)6 and he "seeks redress from a governmental entity," 28 U.S.C. 1915A(a).7

"[A] pleading that offers `labels or conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In deciding dismissal under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, "a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).

C. Federal Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 383 (1884). "[T]hey have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto." Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). Section 1983 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides in relevant part:

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show two elements: (1) a person deprived him or caused him to be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Pursuant to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), this Court construes Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as raising the following claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) failure to protect Plaintiff from a serious risk to his safety, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, against Defendants Monmouth County,8 MCCI Warden Elwood, MCCI Corrections Officer Dixon, and MCCI Classification Officer John Doe, and (2) deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs, also in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, against Monmouth County, Warden Elwood, Doctor John Doe, Nurse Jane Doe, and Nurse John Doe.

(1) Failure to Protect

Pretrial detainees are protected from punishment without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979); Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 373-74 (3d Cir. 2012). That inquiry generally involves application of the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard, insofar as "the Fourteenth Amendment affords pretrial detainees protections `at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.'" Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)). "To state a claim for damages against a prison official for failure to protect from inmate violence, an inmate must plead facts that show (1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the official was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to his health and safety, and (3) the official's deliberate indifference caused him harm." Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 367; accord Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997).9 Deliberate indifference is a subjective standard: "the prison official-defendant must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety." Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001). "It is not sufficient that the official should have known of the risk. A plaintiff can, however, prove an official's actual knowledge of a substantial risk to his safety `in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.' In other words, `a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.'" Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 367 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

Applying Iqbal's plausibility standard and the above constitutional standard to Plaintiff's allegations concerning the attack on October 7, 2011, this Court finds that Plaintiff plausibly states a due process failure to protect claim against Defendant Corrections Officer Dixon. Plaintiff alleges facts indicating that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk to his safety, as he asserts that the gang members who attacked him had previously threatened him. Plaintiff adequately pleads that Defendant Dixon was deliberately indifferent to that risk, in that Plaintiff alleges that "[p]rior to this assault, plaintiff informed defendant Di[xon] that his life was threatened by these same gang members, [but] nothing was done to investigate pursuant to applicable policy and procedure [and] plaintiff's pleas for help w[ere] ignored." (ECF No. 6 at 3.) And it can be inferred from the allegations in the Amended Complaint that Dixon's alleged failure to reasonably respond to the known threat to Plaintiff's safety caused the harm that occurred, i.e., the gang members who threatened Plaintiff later attacked and severely injured him. This Court will not dismiss the § 1983 failure to protect claim against Dixon for failure to state a claim.10

Nevertheless, relying on Knox v. Doe, 486 F.App'x 725 (3d Cir. 2012), Defendant Dixon argued in his motion that "Plaintiff cannot state a claim for deliberate indifference against Defendant, Christopher Dixon based upon a mere allegation that at an unknown date prior to the alleged assault, Plaintiff informed Defendant Dixon that he was threatened by gang members." (ECF No. 28-2 at 14.) Knox is distinguishable. In that case, Knox merely "alleged that he sent a request slip to a[n unspecified] prison official in April 2009 stating that `someone in the jail' was going to hurt him," and he claimed that "several unnamed prison employees acted with deliberate indifference by failing to prevent the attack." Knox, 487 F.App'x at 727. Plaintiff's allegations regarding Dixon are much more detailed than those in Knox. Plaintiff was detained at the jail on or about July 15, 2011; he alleges that he was attacked less than three months later on October 7, 2011, and that he informed Dixon, prior to the assault, that his life was threatened by the same gang members who attacked him, but Dixon did nothing to investigate and ignored Plaintiff's "pleas for help." (ECF No. 6 at 3.)

The Amended Complaint does not plead facts showing that Warden Elwood or Classification Officer John Doe were deliberately indifferent to the risk to Plaintiff's safety posed by the gang members who attacked him. Plaintiff asserts that Elwood and the Classification Officer "were aware that [MCCI] ha[d] a gang problem," that they did not take corrective action, and that Plaintiff was housed "with county and state inmates in violation of State and Federal law." (ECF No. 6 at 3.) But, unlike his allegations with respect to Dixon, Plaintiff does not assert facts showing how Warden Elwood and the Classification Officer (1) became aware of the gang problem and (2) became aware that Plaintiff was at risk. In the absence of such allegations, the Amended Complaint does not plausibly plead a failure to protect claim against Elwood and the Classification Officer in their individual capacities. The § 1983 failure to protect claim will be dismissed without prejudice against Defendants Elwood and Classification Officer Doe.

Nor does Plaintiff assert facts showing that, to the extent that the Warden was a policymaker for the County and that Elwood had a custom or policy of housing federal pretrial detainees with "county and state inmates," this custom or policy was the cause of the attack upon Plaintiff. Accordingly, the failure to protect claim under § 1983 will be dismissed without prejudice against Monmouth County.11

(2) Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

"A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior." Batts v. Giorla, C.A. No. 13-1926, ___ F.App'x ___, 2013 WL 6824930, at *2 (3d Cir. Dec. 27, 2013) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). In this case, Plaintiff does not assert facts in the Amended Complaint showing that Corrections Officer Dixon or Classification Officer John Doe had any involvement in providing or determining the medical care that Plaintiff received while he was confined at MCCI. Accordingly, this Court will dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 medical care claim without prejudice as against Defendants Dixon and Classification Officer Doe for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Plaintiff also sues Warden Elwood, Dr. John Doe, and Nurses John and Jane Doe for inadequate medical care. Courts generally "disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment[,] which remains a question of sound professional judgment." Batts at *2 (quoting Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal alterations, quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, "absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with . . . deliberate indifference." Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). However, the facts in this case are distinguishable from these holdings. In response to Defendants' motions, Plaintiff asserts that he

(Letter to Court dated Oct. 28, 2013, ECF No. 30 at 2.)

Plaintiff asserts, and this Court's docket confirms, that Plaintiff was sentenced on October 9, 2013. (ECF No. 30 at 1; United States v. Quinonez-Mazariegos, Crim. No. 12-0467 (MLC) minute entry (D.N.J. Oct. 9, 2013). One can plausibly infer that Plaintiff was detained at MCCI from his arrest on July 15, 2011, until at least October 9, 2013. Since Plaintiff asserts that on February 17, 2013, an optometrist determined that he needed to be seen by a specialist as soon as possible because the optometrist could not control his eye pressure,12 it follows that the alleged failure of Defendant Dr. John Doe and the Defendant Nurses John and Jane Doe to provide a consultation with a glaucoma specialist for months (which delay allegedly caused Plaintiff's blindness in one eye by April 15, 2013) sufficiently pleads deliberate indifference, i.e. the refusal to provide prescribed treatment,13 rather than the exercise of independent professional medical judgment.14 This Court finds that the Amended Complaint, when read in the context of Plaintiff's supplemental allegations, adequately pleads a claim of deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical need for the timely care of an appropriate specialist to treat his trauma-induced glaucoma against Defendant Dr. John Doe and Defendant Nurses John Doe and Jane Doe.15,16 This Court will direct the Clerk to file Plaintiff's letter dated October 28, 2013, as a Supplemental Complaint. (ECF No. 30 at 2.)

In addition, as Plaintiff asserts that he submitted a grievance complaining that jail medical personnel were mistreating or not treating his loss of vision, it can be plausibly inferred that this grievance went to Warden Elwood, who failed to reasonably respond to an inmate's serious complaint of blindness due to the mistreatment or failure to provide any treatment by contract providers of his trauma-induced glaucoma. This Court finds that the Amended Complaint, as supplemented by Plaintiff's letters, adequately asserts facts plausibly showing that Warden Elwood was deliberately indifferent to the mistreatment or failure to provide treatment for Plaintiff's progressive blindness under the holding of Spruill.

This Court further finds that Plaintiff adequately pleads a § 1983 medical care claim against the County based on Warden Elwood's failure to act. At this early stage of the proceeding, and in the absence of full briefing on the question of which county official has final policymaking authority under New Jersey law with respect to the conditions provided to MCCI inmates and with respect to monitoring CCS's compliance with its contractual obligations, this Court will not at this time find as a matter of law that Warden Elwood was not a policymaker for Monmouth County with respect to the failure to treat Plaintiff's blindness. See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245 (3d Cir. 2006) ("In order to ascertain if an official has final policy-making authority, and can thus bind the municipality by his conduct, a court must determine (1) whether, as a matter of state law, the official is responsible for making policy in the particular area of municipal business in question, and (2) whether the official's authority to make policy in that area is final and unreviewable.") (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Accordingly, this Court finds that the Amended Complaint, when supplemented by Plaintiff's letter, adequately pleads a § 1983 medical care claim against Monmouth County.17 See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) ("Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law."); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126 (1988) ("If, however, a city's lawful policymakers could insulate the government from liability simply by delegating their policymaking authority to others, § 1983 could not serve its intended purpose."); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986) ("If the decision to adopt that particular course of action is properly made by that government's authorized decisionmakers, it surely represents an act of official government `policy' as that term is commonly understood. More importantly, where action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly.") (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted); McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 367-68 (3d Cir. 2005) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Pembaur makes clear that an official with policymaking authority can create official policy, even by rendering a single decision.")

D. Appointment of Counsel for Plaintiff

In Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants' motions, he repeatedly asks this Court to appoint counsel to represent him in this action. (ECF Nos. 27 at 4, 30 at 1-2, 31 at 1.) Once a court finds that an indigent party's case has arguable merit, in deciding to appoint counsel, the court should "consider a number of additional factors including: (1) the plaintiff's ability to present his or her own case; (2) the difficulty of the particular legal issues; (3) the degree to which factual investigation will be necessary and the ability of the plaintiff to pursue investigation; (4) the plaintiff's capacity to retain counsel on his or her behalf; (5) the extent to which a case is likely to turn on credibility determinations; and (6) whether the case will require testimony from expert witnesses." Cuevas v. United States, 422 F.App'x. 142, 145 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-57 (3d Cir. 1993)). In his letters, Plaintiff asserts that he unsuccessfully attempted to subpoena the video of the October 7, 2011, incident, the logbook, the photographs, records, and incident report, but he "really do[esn]'t know how to do it." (ECF No. 29 at 1.) He further states: "My claim has a lot of merit[] and evidence of what happened to me. I need help with counsel or the necessary assistance to plead my claim and get all the evidence for my discovery and guide me in the right direction on this claim." (ECF No. 30 at 2.) Given the need for discovery and factual development, the likelihood that Plaintiff will need an expert witness, and Plaintiff's inability to pursue investigation of his claims because he is no longer incarcerated at MCCI, this Court finds that the appointment of pro bono counsel for Plaintiff, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), is necessary. This Court will appoint counsel, subject to Plaintiff's filing an application to proceed in forma pauperis,18 and this Court's determination that he is unable to afford counsel within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, this Court denies the motion filed by CCS to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment without prejudice; denies the motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment filed by the Monmouth County Defendants without prejudice; after screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), dismisses the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 failure to protect claim without prejudice against Monmouth County, Brian Elwood, Classification Officer John Doe, Dr. John Doe, Nurse Jane Doe, and Nurse John Doe; allows the § 1983 failure to protect claim to proceed past dismissal against Christopher Dixon; dismisses the § 1983 inadequate medical care claim without prejudice against Christopher Dixon and Classification Officer John Doe; allows the § 1983 failure to protect claim to proceed past dismissal against Monmouth County, Brian Elwood, Dr. John Doe, Nurse Jane Doe, and Nurse John Doe; and appoints counsel for Plaintiff, subject to his filing, and this Court's granting, his application to proceed in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1).