JEROME B. SIMANDLE, District Judge.
Petitioner, Wayne G. Dobson, submitted this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and Respondent submitted an answer to the petition (Docket Item 13), with the available state court record. For the following reasons, the petition will be denied.
The relevant facts and procedural background are set forth in the opinion of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division ("Appellate Division"), in Petitioner's appeal of his post-conviction relief ("PCR") motion.
(Ra 25, State v. Dobson, A-5120-06T4 (May 4, 2010), at pp. 2-4).
Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), which was denied in a written opinion dated February 6, 2007, by the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of PCR on May 4, 2010 (Ra 25) and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on July 19, 2010 (Ra 29).
Petitioner filed this habeas petition thereafter, and was informed of his rights pursuant to
In his petition (Docket Item 1), Petitioner sets forth three grounds for habeas relief: (1) denial of due process where plea was not voluntary and there was no adequate factual basis; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) unconstitutional sentence imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment. (Petition, ¶ 12).
Respondent argues that Petitioner procedurally defaulted on Grounds One and Three, and that he failed to exhaust. Alternatively, Respondent argues that as to the merits of his petition, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. (Answer, Docket Item 13).
As amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 now provides, in pertinent part:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
With respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, the writ shall not issue unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000) (O'Connor, J., for the Court, Part II). A state court decision "involve[s] an unreasonable application" of federal law "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case," and may involve an "unreasonable application" of federal law "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply," (although the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide the latter). Id. at 407-09. To be an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law, the state court's application must be objectively unreasonable. See id. at 409. In determining whether the state court's application of Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable, a habeas court may consider the decisions of inferior federal courts. See Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 F.3d 877, 890 (3d Cir. 1999).
The deference required by § 2254(d) applies without regard to whether the state court cites to Supreme Court or other federal caselaw, "as long as the reasoning of the state court does not contradict relevant Supreme Court precedent." Priester v. Vaughn, 382 F.3d 394, 398 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002)), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1093 (2005).
Further, "Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements." McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). A petition must "specify all the grounds for relief" and set forth "facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified." See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 2(c) (amended Dec. 1, 2004).
In Ground One of his petition, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by accepting his "plea of guilty to the amended count of aggravated manslaughter, where there was no adequate factual basis established to substantiate the elements under that offense, and where the plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." (Petition, ¶ 12).
Petitioner raised this claim in his PCR motion. The PCR court found that Petitioner's claim was nothing more than a "bald assertion," and noted that "Petitioner admitted in open Court he understood the consequences of his plea and was pleading guilty voluntarily." (Ra 14 at p. 14). Later, the court found that "Petitioner admitted that he caused the death of the victim and acted recklessly with the handgun in doing so, to the point of manifesting extreme indifference for human life. Those are the elements of aggravated manslaughter." (Ra 14 at p. 43).
The standard for determining the validity of a guilty plea is "whether the plea represents a voluntary intelligent choice among the alternative courses open to the defendant." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (a guilty plea is invalid only if it is not the result of the defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of his/her rights or if the offered plea has no factual basis). "Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial[,]" including the defendant's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243. The voluntariness of a plea "can be determined only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970). Relevant circumstances include the petitioner's statements during the plea colloquy:
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).
In this case, Petitioner's plea, as summarized in the PCR court's Opinion denying relief (Ra 15), is reproduced below, in relevant part:
(Ra 15 at pp. 13-14, Rta 1 at 8:9-25; 16:25, 17:1-12).
A review of the plea transcript reveals that the state courts were not unreasonable in their determination that Petitioner's plea was voluntary and intelligently submitted. Petitioner thoughtfully considered the judge's questions and understood to what he was pleading guilty. This Court sees no reason to upset the findings of the state court in accepting the plea, and finds no violation of Petitioner's constitutional rights. He has not demonstrated that the state courts' acceptance of his plea was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.
The Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that a criminal defendant "shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The right to counsel is "the right to effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must show both that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional assistance and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the outcome would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984). A "reasonable probability" is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. Counsel's errors must have been "so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687. "When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." Id. at 695.
The performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland may be addressed in either order, and "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice ... that course should be followed." Id. at 697.
There is "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. As a general matter, strategic choices made by counsel after a thorough investigation of the facts and law are "virtually unchallengeable," though strategic choices "made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation." Id. at 690-91. If counsel has been deficient in any way, however, the habeas court must determine whether the cumulative effect of counsel's errors prejudiced the defendant within the meaning of Strickland. See Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1101-02 (3d Cir. 1996).
The Strickland two-part standard applies to ineffective assistance claims arising out of the guilty plea process. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-9 (1985). In the context of guilty pleas, the first element of the Strickland test remains "nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence." Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. The "prejudice" requirement, "on the other hand, focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In other words, in order to satisfy the `prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. See also Weeks v. Snyder, 219 F.3d 245, 257 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1003 (2000).
Petitioner argues in his petition that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when: (1) counsel failed to consult adequately with the defendant in preparing his case, and failed to investigate and pursue a passion provocation defense; (2) counsel failed to investigate and pursue a defense based on imperfect self-defense; (3) counsel failed to contact a key witness who could have aided in the defense; and (4) counsel failed because he did not argue for mitigating factor four at the time of sentencing. (Petition, ¶ 12).
These claims were raised in Petitioner's PCR motion. Citing and summarizing Strickland, the PCR court found that Petitioner did not have ineffective assistance of counsel (Ra 15 at p. 15). The PCR court's written opinion, sets forth the reasoning:
(Ra 15 at pp. 18-20). The Appellate Division affirmed the PCR court's "thorough and comprehensive opinion," and citing Strickland, added "defendant failed to establish that his attorney conducted an inadequate investigation of the matter, thereby denying him the effective assistance of counsel." (Ra 25 at p. 8).
This Court finds no reason to upset the plea entered by Petitioner based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Besides the examination conducted by the state courts as to Petitioner's arguments, Petitioner himself stated at his plea that he was "satisfied with [his attorney's] services" and that his attorney answered all of his questions. (Rta 1 at 8:18-25-9:1). Further, Petitioner has not shown that counsel's decisions in handling his case as to defenses and witnesses were anything other than sound trial strategy. Finally, this Court agrees that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that he wouldn't have pled guilty had counsel performed differently, especially considering the sentencing consequences that he faced had he gone to trial.
The Court is satisfied that none of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims presented by Petitioner in Ground Two of his petition are sufficient to warrant habeas relief. As the state courts correctly relied on Strickland, the state courts' decisions were neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. An examination of the record also reveals no evidence that they were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts presented in the state court proceedings. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground.
In Ground Three of his petition, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because the sentencing court "increased his sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum solely upon facts that were not admitted by the defendant or submitted to a jury and, as such, violates defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial." (Petition, ¶ 12).
This Court notes from the onset that a federal court's ability to review state sentences is limited to challenges based upon "proscribed federal grounds such as being cruel and unusual, racially or ethnically motivated, or enhanced by indigencies." See Grecco v. O'Lone, 661 F.Supp. 408, 415 (D.N.J. 1987) (citation omitted). Thus, a challenge to a state court's discretion at sentencing is not reviewable in a federal habeas proceeding unless it violates a separate federal constitutional limitation. See Pringle v. Court of Common Pleas, 744 F.2d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 1984); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990).
Here, Petitioner was sentenced in accordance with state law pursuant to his plea agreement. Petitioner has not provided this Court with any justification to grant habeas relief and upset the state court proceedings.
However, to address Petitioner's claims more fully, this Court notes that in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 471, 490 (2000), pursuant to the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, the Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Supreme Court overturned a sentence imposed under Washington state's sentencing system, explaining that "the relevant statutory maximum is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings." 542 U.S. at 302 (internal quotations omitted).
In State v. Natale ("Natale II"), 184 N.J. 458 (2005), the New Jersey Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of the New Jersey sentencing scheme in light of the Apprendi line of cases, and found:
Natale, 184 N.J. at 484 (emphasis added). Because the Code's system allowed for sentencing beyond the statutory maximum presumptive term, the New Jersey Supreme Court found the system unconstitutional and determined that the appropriate remedy would be to follow the lead of Booker and abolish the presumptive terms. "Without presumptive terms, the `statutory maximum' authorized by the jury verdict or the facts admitted by a defendant at his guilty plea is the top of the sentencing range for the crime charged, e.g., ten years for a second-degree offense." Natale II, 184 N.J. at 487 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit generally has held that the rules announced in the Apprendi line of cases are not applicable retroactively to cases on collateral review. See generally, United States v. Swinton, 333 F.3d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 977 (2003) (holding that Apprendi does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review). Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the rule it announced in Natale II is applicable retroactively only to cases in the direct appeal pipeline as of the date of that decision. See Natale II, 184 N.J. at 494 (holding that "`Pipeline retroactivity'-applying our holding to defendants with cases on direct appeal as of the date of this decision and to those defendants who raised Blakely claims at trial or on direct appeal-best balances principles of fairness and repose").
In this case, Petitioner's direct appeal concluded in 2004, prior to the decision in Natale II. See State v. Dobson, 179 N.J. 309, 845 A.2d 134 (2004). Thus, his claim that his sentence violated the mandates of Blakely is meritless, as Blakely would not apply to his case, which was not in the direct appeal "pipeline" as of the Natale II decision. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken from a final order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A certificate of appealability may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). "A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).
Here, Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. No certificate of appealability shall issue.
For the reasons set forth above, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied. No certificate of appealability will issue.
An appropriate Order follows.
